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This thesis focuses on the six decades of Sikh existence in modern 
Shanghai between 1885 and 1945. Taking the translocal approach, it explores 
the interplay between the Sikh community in Shanghai and the translocal 
networks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The main 
argument of this thesis is that the cross-border circulation of personnel, 
institutions, information, and ideologies in the British colonial network as well 
as the Sikh diasporic network shaped the main features of the Sikh community 
in Shanghai. The Sikhs in Shanghai too played crucial roles in influencing the 
patterns of the global Sikh migration and the enterprise of Indian nationalist 
struggles in Southeast and East Asia in the first four decades of the twentieth 
century. 
By focusing on translocal networks, this study distinguishes itself from 
extant studies on modern Shanghai, imperial history, and the Sikh diaspora. 
By incorporating Shanghai into the networks of the British Empire and Sikh 
migration, this study critiques the nationalist historiography that 
overemphasizes Shanghai as merely a modern Chinese city per se, while 
overlooking its position in translocal networks. Additionally, different from 
the paradigm of imperial history that normally scrutinizes issues from the 
perspective of the metropole-colony binary dichotomy, this study argues that 
inter-colonial interactions and connections played a significant role in 
effecting issues such as specific policies of individual colonies, the migration 
of colonial subjects, and anti-imperial activities of nationalists. Last but not 
the least, it views Sikhs as subalterns and tries to recover their subjectivities in 
global history. Different from most studies of the Sikh diaspora that focus 
	 v	
either on the link between overseas Sikhs and their homeland, the Punjab, or 
on the acculturation and assimilation issues of Sikh migrants in a foreign 
country, this thesis focuses on migration as multi-stop journeys to illustrate 
how the interrelated connections among numerous Sikhs communities 
overseas framed their emigrant experience. In sum, taking the experience of 
the Sikhs in Shanghai as an example, this thesis exposes the weakness and 
limitation of the national history that is unable to appropriate certain cross-
boundary phenomena and subjects. It further champions the translocal 
perspective that not only considers human pasts as connected and shared, but 




List of Tables 
 
Table 1. The Composition of the SMP, 1863-1883                             43 
 
Table 2. Annual Salaries of Sikh Policemen and Soldiers                   91 
 
Table 3. Annual Salaries of Sikh Policemen in Local Currencies and 
Rupees                                                                                                  95 
 
Table 4. Salaries after Exchange Rate Compensation                         96 
 
Table 5. Engaged and Dismissed Sikh Constables in Hong Kong, 1903-
1907                                                                                                     98 
 
Table 6. Sikh Police Force in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai  
                                                                                                             99 
 
Table 7. Police Staff Admitted to the Hospital in Hong Kong, 1901-1909   
                                                                                                            104 
 
Table 8. Indian Immigration into Canada, 1905-1908                       147 
 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. The photograph hanging on the side wall of the entrance in the 
Sikh gurdwara in Hong Kong, 2013                                                       2 
 
Figure 2. A Sikh policeman standing on Chappo Road Bridge, Shanghai, 
1900                                                                                                       34 
 
Figures 3. Chinese policeman in Hong Kong, 1900s                            42 
 
Figure 4. Chinese policeman and prisoners in Shanghai, 1907             44 
 
Figure 5. Aden Armed Police, 1966                                                      49 
 
Figure 6. Sikh and Chinese policemen in Hong Kong, 1900s               54 
 
Figure 7. Sikh policeman in Singapore, 1900s                                      58 
 
Figure 8. Map of Punjab                                                                        85 
 
Figure 9. The Location of Punjab in South Asia                                   86 
 
Figure 10. Mounted Sikh policemen being trained in Louza police school, 
1900s                                                                                                    108 
 
Figure 11. Wadda gurdwara in Penang, 2007                                      109 
 
Figure 12. Sikh gurdwara in Wanchai, Hong Kong, 2013                   110 
 
Figure 13. Sikh gurdwara in North Sichuan Road, Shanghai, 1910s   111 
 
Figure 14. The building of the SMP Hongkou station, 2011               113 
 
Figure 15. Map of Shanghai, 1920s                                                     117 
 
Figure 16. Hongkou in the 1920s                                                         118 
 
Figure 17. Early Sikh immigrants in North America, 1907                 143 
 
Figure 18. Komagata Maru near the coast of Vancouver 1914           146 
 
Figure 19. Bhagwan Singh, 1919                                                         154 
 
Figure 20. Sikh policeman in Hankou, 1920                                        165 
 
Figure 21. Shanghai residents welcoming the nationalist troops, 1927   
                                                                                                              175 
 
Figure 22. Map of the International Settlement, Shanghai, 1920s       178 
 
	 viii	
Figure 23. The SMP Central Station, 1930s                                         179 
 
Figure 24. Fujiwara Iwaichi and Mohan Singh, 1942                          200 
 
Figure 25. Subhas Chandra Bose inspecting the INA soldiers in Singapore, 
1943                                                                                                      210 
 
Figure 26. Mass gathering initiated by the INA in Singapore, 1944    212 
 
Figure 27. The INA training School (Azad School) in Singapore, 1944    






In July 2013, I visited the Sikh gurdwara in Wanchai, Hong Kong. 
While talking with the gurdwara manager, I caught sight of a letter on 
his desk with an address in Penang, Malaysia. Knowing that Penang 
had a Sikh community, I asked the manager whether the letter was 
from his coreligionists there; he answered in the affirmative. The letter 
from Penang’s Wadda gurdwara detailed a joint project to promote 
Sikh teachings in both places. The manager also told me that Sikh 
communities in Southeast Asia had formed a network that expedited 
the exchange of information and personnel, mainly for cultural and 
economic cooperation. However, as I was walking out of the gurdwara, 
I noticed a huge photograph hanging on the side wall of the entrance 
that recorded the turbulent incident in Amritsar in 1984.1 On the 
photograph, some red words clearly stood out: “The Entire Indian 
System is Guilty. Never Forget 1984”. One idea flitted through my 
mind--the network probably also served political purposes, including 
providing a platform for circulating Sikh nationalist ideas amongst 
Sikhs living overseas. Indeed, at a time when India was still under the 
British Raj and when the Sikhs still struggled for the independence of 
India instead of Khalistan, the Sikh diasporic network that expedited 
cultural, economic, and political connections had already been at work. 
Focusing on the Sikh community in Shanghai, this thesis therefore 																																																								
1 In June 1984, Indian military forces stormed Harmandi Sahib (Golden Temple) 
Complex in Amritsar in order to arrest leaders of the Sikh independent movement. 
More than 400 civilians, most Sikhs, were killed in the operation. This incident 
stirred up strong anti-Indian reactions amongst Sikhs overseas.   
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examines the origin of the Sikh diasporic network, how it was 
employed by various agents during the colonial period, and how the 
Sikhs, through the medium of this network, came into contact with 
global issues.  
 
Figure 1. The photograph hanging on the side wall of the entrance in the Sikh 
gurdwara in Hong Kong, 2013 (Photo by Cao Yin). 
 
Sikh Migration in the Context of Global Migration 
The Sikh migration was one part of the huge human movement 
across the globe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 
Asia alone, millions of people, mainly Indians and Chinese, either 
voluntarily left or were coerced into leaving their hometowns. In terms 
of scale and influence, this Asian migration was as significant as the 
transatlantic migration of the nineteenth century that was dominated by 
Europeans. However, scholarships of the Asian migration are full of 
stereotypes. Asian migrants are usually depicted as indentured, 
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unaware of the outside world, unlikely to settle down, and emigrated 
because of famine, overpopulation, coercion, and European 
intervention. Many practitioners assume that people in Asia were 
unable to travel freely in a modern way and that their migrations were 
impelled either by European powers or despotic Asian regimes. 2  
Recent studies, however, contend that the patterns, quantities, and 
organizations of the Asian migration were fundamentally similar to 
that of the transatlantic migration.3 Adam McKeown even argues that 
these migrations are actually one migration that resulted from the 
global integration by the turn of the twentieth century. 4  This 
unprecedented movement of human beings can be attributed to several 
factors. First, there was a revolution in transport and technology in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, epitomized by the advent of the 
steamboat and the railway, which made long-distance travel easier, 
cheaper, and faster than before.5 Second, the expansion of world 
markets into European colonies and the westward expansion in the 
																																																								
2 Pier Emmer, “European Expansion and Migration: The European Colonial Past and 
International Migration, an Overview,” in European Expansion and Migration: 
Essays on the Intercontinental Migration From Africa, Asia, and Europe, eds., Pieter 
Emmer and Magnus Morner (New York: Berg, 1992), 11; Timothy Hatton and 
Jeffrey Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson, 
Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and 
Performance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Adam Mckeown, “Chinese 
Emigration in Global Context, 1850-1940,” Journal of Global History 5 (2010): 96-
97; Adam Mckeown,  Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of 
Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 45. 
3 Mckeown, Melancholy Order, 61. 
4 Adam McKeown, “Global Migration 1846-1940,” Journal of World History 15 
(2004): 155-189.  
5 Gordon Boyce, Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of 
Large-scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995); Gordon Jackson and David Williams, eds., Shipping, 
Technology, and Imperialism (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1996); Duncan Bell, “Dissolving 
Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought, 1770-1900,” 
Journal of Modern History 77 (2005): 523-562.    
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United States stimulated the demand for laborers. Third, the abolition 
of slavery in the British Empire and the United States opened the door 
for global employment of indentured and contracted laborers from 
India and China.6 
In many aspects, the Sikh migration was similar to other 
migrations during this period. Like other Indian and Chinese migrants, 
Sikhs went overseas to look for better salaries. Economic concern was 
the primary cause for most migrations at that time.7 Also, the Sikh 
migration followed the sojourning pattern of other migrations. Wang 
Gungwu argues that the main pattern of the Chinese migration before 
the 1940s was sojourning. Males worked abroad for remitting earnings 
back to families in China and eventually returned home themselves.8 
Adam McKeown finds that this pattern of migration also existed in 
Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as India.9 Almost all Sikh 
migrants in the late nineteenth century were males working for the 
colonial army or police forces. They sent much of their salaries back to 
their families in the Punjab. After completing their contracts, most 
chose to return homes.10 Lastly but importantly, the Sikh migration, 
likes many other Asian migrations, was deeply influenced by colonial 
empires, and the British Empire in particular. The Chinese emigration 																																																								
6 Adam Mckeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842-1949,” Journal of 
Asian Studies 58 (1999): 306-337; Sunil Amrith, Migration and Diaspora in Modern 
Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 25-28.  
7  Jan Breman, Labour Migration and Rural Transformation in Colonial Asia 
(Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990).  
8 Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic 
Press, 1991), 198-221.  
9 Mckeown, Melancholy Order, 62. 
10 Sucheng Chan, “Overseas Sikhs in the Context of International Migrations,” in 
Sikh Studies: Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Tradition, eds., N. G. Barrier 
and M. Juergensmeyer (Berkeley: Berkeley Religious Studies Series, 1979), 191-206. 
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to Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century was the response to the 
high demand of labor force in British Malaya and the Dutch East 
Indies. The Indian migration, indentured or not, was made possible by 
and contributed to the enterprises of the British Empire. The British 
Empire not only facilitated the movement of Sikh migrants through 
providing easy transportations and working opportunities, but also 
relied on the work of Sikhs to maintain its colonial rule.11 
Although migrations in Asia shared a common global context, we 
should not simplify these processes and take for granted that there was 
an irreducible Indian migration, Chinese migration, or Asian migration. 
Adam McKeown notices the internal difference of the Chinese 
migration. While most migrants in Southeast Asia were from southern 
provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan, migrants in 
Manchuria were largely from Shandong. Other parts of China did not 
contribute much to this period’s long-distance migration.12 Migrants 
originated from the same region usually stayed together and worked in 
the same industry. For example, the opium farms in Penang were 
exclusively cultivated by the Cantonese, while the tin mines in Alor 
Star were labored by Hokkiens. 13 In this sense, the transnational 
movement of Chinese migrants can be reduced to several translocal 
movements.    
																																																								
11 Adam McKeown, “Regionalizing World Migration,” Internationaal Instituut voor 
Sociale Geschiedenis 52 (2007): 135.  
12 Mckeown, Melancholy Order, 43-65. 
13 Wu Xiaoan, Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882-1941: Kedah 
and Penang (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).   
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This translocal approach can also help us better understand Indian 
migration.14 There are different versions of Indian migration. Indians 
from Tamil Nadu who worked in the sugarcane fields in Mauritius 
should be distinguished from Indians from Bengal who migrated to 
Rangoon to work as craftsmen and merchants. Sikhs of the Punjab also 
had their specific destinations and occupations. 
What made Sikh migration special was that many of them 
actually served in the colonial police forces while their Indian and 
Chinese counterparts were indentured laborers, miners, craftsmen, and 
merchants and so became the subjects being policed.15 In this sense, 
the Sikh migrants were both colonized subjects on the one hand and 
executers of the colonial law-enforcement regimes on the other.16 
Since they had been thought to be very useful in deterring the Chinese, 
British colonies and settlements with large Chinese population, such as 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, enlisted large numbers of Sikhs 
into their police forces and thereby became the main destinations of 
Sikh migration.  
																																																								
14 This study understands that the translocal approach is not only an explanatory 
framework that can be used to examine interactions in various geographical scales, 
but also closely related to the concept of translocality, which challenges the 
simplifying dichotomy between local and global in globalization studies. Details of 
the translocal approach will be discussed later. 
15 A few hundred Sikhs were brought to Fiji as indentured workers in the sugar cane 
plantations in the 1880s. Also, in East Africa, Sikh indentured laborers were brought 
to build the Uganda railway in the 1890s. Both cases, however, are exceptions. Gajraj 
Singh, The Sikhs of Fiji (Suva: South Pacific Social Sciences Association, 1976); 
Parminder Bhachu, Twice Migrants: East Africa Sikh Settlers in Britain (London: 
Tavistock, 1985), 21-23.  
16 The Gurkhas from Nepal were also massively enlisted into the British Indian Army 
and deployed overseas during the colonial period. However, most Gurkhas were 
soldiers while very few served in colonial police forces, see Purushottam Banskota, 
The Gurkha Connection: A History of the Gurkha Recruitment in the British Indian 
Army (Jaipur: Nirala Publications, 1994).  
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As nationalism and communism developed in Asia in the early 
twentieth century, the Sikh migration became different from other 
contemporary migrations. On the one hand, colonial authorities 
counted on the Sikh policemen for checking nationalist movements 
and suppressing labor strikes; on the other hand, Sikh migrants also 
became a subject of interest to the Indian nationalists. Their military 
background, as well as the crucial position they held in colonial 
security, made the nationalists believe that their independence struggle 
would be greatly facilitated if they could turn the overseas Sikhs to 
their side.  
Because of this special status, a study of Sikhs overseas in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could shed light not only on 
the Sikh migration, but also on some broader issues such as inter-
colonial interactions, the politics of colonial law-enforcement, the 
Indian nationalist struggle, and consequently the global anti-colonial 
movement. Indeed, these various issues were related to each other in 
certain interwoven translocal networks. This thesis aims to 
demonstrate that the concept of translocal networks provides us with a 
useful means of investigating the special case of Sikh migration. 
 
Shanghai in the Translocal Networks 
There is a new trend amongst historians to view human pasts as 
entangled and interconnected. In so doing, they expect that the 
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boundaries and limitations of national history could be transcended.17 
The concept of transnationalism has often been employed to analyze 
the connections amongst human societies and the circulation of 
population, commodities, institutions, and ideas. Since the 1900s, 
scholars from disciplines such as geography, cultural studies, and 
anthropology have set out to explore the local-to-local relations and the 
localized phenomena in transnational migration.18 Gradually, they find 
that the transnational approach, which still rests its main concern on 
the transcendence of and exchange beyond national boundaries, cannot 
appropriately describe phenomena involving mobility, circulation, and 
spatial connectedness in other geographical scales.19 For example, 
when studying Chinese emigration to Canada in the late nineteenth 
century, Henry Yu finds that the dominant group of emigrants at that 
time were Cantonese from certain specific villages of the Guangdong 
province, while the principal destination for them was British 
Columbia, and Vancouver in particular. He contends that it is 
inappropriate to use the concept of the transnational network to 
investigate the movement of population from one locality to the other. 
																																																								
17 For discussions of how entangled and interconnected histories developed in the 
late twentieth century, see Shalini Randeria, “Entangled Histories of Uneven 
Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and the Post-Colonial State in India,” 
in Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness, ed., 
Yehuada Elkana (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2002), 77-104.  
18 Karen Olwig, “Cultural Sites: Sustaining a Home in a Deterritorialized World,” in 
Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object, eds., Karen Olwig and K. 
Hastrup (London: Routledge, 1997), 17-38; Luis Guarnizo and Michael Smith, “The 
Locations of Transnationalism,” in Transnationalism from Below, eds., Luis 
Guarnizo and Michael Smith (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 3-34; David 
Lev, “Transnational Spaces and Every Lives,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 29 (2004): 151-164.  
19 Julia Verne, Living Translocality: Space, Culture and Economy in Contemporary 
Swahili Trade (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012).  
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Translocal network, in his words, is a more lucid concept for 
explaining this phenomenon.20 
In addition to the scale problem, some scholars argue that the 
transnational approach inclines to highlight the interactions and 
exchanges between Western nation-states at the elite level, while 
connections within and between Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
under the elite level are largely neglected. 21  In other words, the 
transnational approach fails to elucidate power distribution and 
experience of the powerless in flows and movements.22   
Attempting to overcome the weakness of the transnational 
approach, a growing number of practitioners have turned to the 
translocal approach since the mid-1990s.23  To date, the translocal 
approach is used to describe socio-spatial dynamics. From the spatial 
perspective, it provides an alternative way to understand the mobility, 
circulation, and interconnectedness that transgress borders on different 
scales. From the social perspective, it underscores the importance of 
subalterns in these cross-boundary movements. Lower-class people 
																																																								
20 Henry Yu, “Introduction: The Rhythms of the Transpacific,” in Connecting Seas 
and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas 
Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s, eds., Donna Gabaccia and Dirk Herder 
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), 451-463.  
21  Ulrike Freitag and Achim Von Oppen, eds., Translocality: The Study of 
Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 3; Tim 
Harper and Sunil Amrith, eds., Sites of Asian Interaction: Ideas, Networks and 
Mobility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1.  
22 Philip Kelly and Tom Lusis, “Migration and the Transnational Habitus: Evidence 
from Canada and the Philippines,” Environment and Planning 38 (2006): 831-847.  
23 The translocal approach has also been called as translocality or translocalism by 
scholars. Akhil Gupta uses the term, “translocal”, to distinguish state from localities, 
while Arjun Apparurai goes a step further to indicate that translocality is a 
framework that could relate the global, the state, and the local. See Akhil Gupta, 
“Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the 
Imagined State,” American Ethnologist 22 (1995): 375-402; Arjun Appadurai, “The 
Production of Locality,” in Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, ed. 
Richard Fardon (New York: Routledge, 2003), 204-225. 
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from localities are not only participants of translocal circulations, but 
also architects and designers of structures that sustained these 
circulations.24  
The translocal approach is employed by this thesis for two 
reasons. In terms of scale, this thesis examines the circulation of 
migrants, colonial officers, institutions, remittances, and information 
between Punjab, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and California. 
This sort of circulation cannot not be explained as a transnational 
phenomenon, as none of these spatial entities are nations. In terms of 
actors, this thesis is about the experience of ordinary Sikhs and the 
flow of their identities as migrants, policemen, and revolutionaries. 
The translocal approach, with its emphasis on subalterns’ migration, is 
an appropriate starting point to account for this mobility. It is 
important to point out that both the spatial circulation between places 
and the flow of identities happened within the multidirectional and 
overlapping translocal networks.25 																																																								
24 Clemens Greiner and Patrick Sakdapolrak, “Translocality: Concepts, Applications 
and Emerging Research Perspectives,” Geography Compass 7 (2013): 373-384. 
25 For discussions of translocal network, see Malte Steinbrink, “The Role of Amateur 
Football in Circular Migration Systems in South Africa,” Africa Spectrum 45 (2010): 
35-60; Clemens Greiner, “Migration, Translocal Networks and Socio-Economic 
Stratification in Namibia,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 8 
(2011): 606-627; Annelies Zoomers and Guus van Westen, “Introduction: Translocal 
Development, Development Corridors and Development Chains,” International 
Development Planning Review 33 (2011): 377-388. For the concept of “network”, 
scholars have noticed that it has been employed rather casually in historical and 
contemporary social analysis, and needs to be defined carefully when taken as an 
agent of historical change. See Tony Ballantyne, “Empire, Knowledge, and Culture: 
From Proto-Globalization to Modern Globalization,” in Globalization in World 
History, ed., A. G. Hopkins (London: Pimlico, 2002), 115-140; Gary Magee and 
Andrew Thompson, Empire and Globalisaion: Networks of People, Goods and 
Capital in the British World, 1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 45-46. Some scholars have developed a concern over the approach of network 
as a whole, contending that the concept of network excludes those actors whose have 
insufficient resources to be able to access them. Instead, they tend to replace network 
with “assemblages”, “rhizome”, or “web”, see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 1980); Uma 
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Translocal networks have long existed in history.26 For military, 
economic, or religious reasons, human beings, commodities, 
institutions, knowledge, and species have travelled across regions. As 
movements became more frequent, localities were connected more 
closely and networks took shape.27 This thesis focuses its attention on 
two networks: the British colonial network and the Sikh diasporic 
network. The two networks were by no means separate, but in fact 
overlapped each other. The colonial network facilitated the flow of 
information and knowledge concerning Sikhs from India to Southeast 
and East Asia. Moreover, when colonial authorities decided to set up 
Sikh police units, they counted on the colonial network to recruit Sikhs 
in the Punjab and to introduce training and administrative institutions. 
These Sikh policemen were pioneers of Sikh migration. Their 
experience inspired more and more Sikhs to go abroad to find a better 
livelihood.  
																																																																																																																																																	
Kothari, Migration and Chronic Poverty (Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research 
Centre, 2002); Colin McFarlane, “Translocal Assemblages: Space, Power and Social 
Movements,” Geoforum 40 (2009): 561-567. 
26 For discussions of the concept of the network in world history, see Frederick 
Cooper, “Networks, Moral Discourse and History,” in Intervention and 
Transnationalism in Africa: Global-local Networks of Power, eds., Thomas 
Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 23-46; Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen Siu, and Peter Perdue, eds., Asia Inside 
Out: Changing Times (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Eric 
Tagliacozzo, Helen Siu, and Peter Perdue, eds., Asia Inside Out: Connected Places 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
27 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, 
Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy 
and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: 
Notes toward a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern Asian Studies 3 
(1997): 735-762; John Steele Gordon, A Thread Across the Ocean: The Heroic Story 
of the Transatlantic Cable (New York: Walker & Co., 2003); Himanshu Prabha Ray 
and Edward Alpers, eds., Cross Current and Community Networks: The History of 
the Indian Ocean World (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
	 12	
Port cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai that 
provided opportunities harbored tens of thousands of these Sikhs by 
the turn of the twentieth century. Since these cities had already been 
incorporated into the British colonial network through administrative 
arrangements, shipping lines and cables, the movement of Sikh 
personnel and information on payment and job opportunities, as well 
as Sikh institutions set up in target destinations had increased 
tremendously.28 A Sikh diasporic network thereby emerged. In this 
sense, the Sikh diasporic network was actually built onto the existing 
colonial network. These intertwined networks were not only used by 
colonial authorities and Sikh migrants, other actors such as the British 
Foreign Office, Indian revolutionaries (the Ghadar Party and the Indian 
National Army in particular), the Comintern, and the Japanese Empire 
also employed these networks for their respective ends.  
Port cities were the central nodes for these networks. The 
connections amongst port cities shaped the network itself. In both 
networks, the Chinese treaty port of Shanghai was a special case. By 
the turn of the twentieth century, Shanghai had been divided into three 
independently administered parts--the International Settlement, the 
French Concession, and the Chinese city. Amongst these, the 
International Settlement, which was largely controlled by British 
nationals and protected by the British navy, was the most prosperous. 
Owing to the growing British investment in the International 
Settlement and the intense interaction between Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
																																																								
28 Magee and Thompson, Empire and Globalisation, 45-63.  
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Singapore, and India, this Chinese treaty port had gradually been 
integrated into the British colonial network since the late nineteenth 
century. 
Nevertheless, the International Settlement was under the 
administration of an independent body--the Shanghai Municipal 
Council, which was mainly dominated by Shanghailanders.29  The 
British authorities did not hold much leverage in the policy-making 
process of the International Settlement. As quarrels between the 
Shanghai Municipal Council and the British Consul-General in 
Shanghai over legal issues and local policies broke out frequently, 
Shanghai became one of the weakest points in the colonial network in 
terms of social control and surveillance. The absence of any strict 
regulation on immigration, a weakening colonial control, and the 
prospect of comparatively good salaries made Shanghai specifically 
attractive for Sikh migrants. From the 1880s onwards, thousands of 
Sikhs flocked into this Chinese port city, mostly employed as 
policemen or watchmen. The Sikh policemen later became the 
backbone of the Shanghai Municipal Police, the law-enforcement unit 
of the International Settlement.30 
There are other reasons that made Shanghai a special place for 
Sikh migration. Since Shanghai was the midpoint between India and 																																																								
29 According to Robert Bickers, Shanghailanders refer to Europeans and Americans 
who settled down Shanghai’s International Settlement from the 1840s to the 1930s, 
see Robert Bickers, “Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British 
Settler Community in Shanghai, 1843-1937,” Past & Present 159 (1998): 161-162. It 
is important to point out that the SMC did not consist solely of Shanghailanders, but 
also included other settlers and expatriates at different times.  
30 It is important to point out here that not all Indians in the Shanghai Municipal 
Police were Sikhs. Muslims from the Punjab also worked as policemen and 
watchmen in Shanghai. However, comparatively speaking, Sikhs were the dominant 
group of Indians in the Shanghai Municipal Police. 
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North America, it played a crucial role in Sikh migration to North 
America in the early years of the twentieth century. As Indian 
nationalism soared in the 1910s and 1920s, Shanghai was used as a 
forward base and transferring center by Sikh revolutionaries of the 
Ghadar Party, who attempted to overthrow the Raj by force. Taking 
Shanghai’s Sikh community as a case of special interest, this thesis 
outlines the networks that this Sikh community laid within and 
demonstrates the broader historical processes that they participated in. 
This approach takes Shanghai not as the gate to modern China, 
but as a crucial node of translocal networks, thereby distinguishing 
itself from most writings on modern Shanghai history. A large body of 
literature about modern Shanghai history has been created since the 
1980s, in which Yeh Wen-hsin observes two main streams.31 On one 
hand, scholars take Shanghai as a particular case to explore how the 
modern Chinese state sought to transform local society, and how social 
elements responded to state infiltration.32 The other stream focuses on 
																																																								
31 Wen-hsin Yeh, “Shanghai Modernity: Commerce and Culture in a Republican 
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Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Centre, 
1986); Christian Henriot, Shanghai, 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and 
Modernization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Frederic Wakeman 
Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); 
Brian Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and the Organized Crime, 1919-
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University Press, 2001); Elizabeth Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, 
Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007); Nora Dillon and Jean Oi, eds., At the Crossroads of Empire: 
Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-Building in Republican Shanghai (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008); Marie-Claire Bergere, Shanghai: China’s Gateway 
to Modernity, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Shirley 
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the specific socio-economic milieu of Shanghai and this city’s 
ambiguous identity hovering between the modern and traditional 
worlds. Its working classes, commercial culture, little idiosyncrasies, 
and intellectual life have all been scrutinized.33 In fact, both streams 
take note of Shanghai’s cosmopolitan features. While topics such as 
the large number of foreign residents, the neo-classical architecture 
along the Bund, the modern banking system, and the hybridized 
entertainment industry have been well documented,34 most writings 
confine their scope to looking just at Shanghai. Little has been related 
about what kind of mechanism, and under what kind of context 
brought these foreign elements tightly together in Shanghai, and how 																																																																																																																																																	
Ye, “Corrupted Infrastructure: Imperialism and Environmental Sovereignty in 
Shanghai, 1873-1911,” Frontiers of History in China 10 (2015): 428-456.   
33 Writings of this direction include Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei 
People in Shanghai, 1850-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Emily 
Honig, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mils, 1919-1949 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Elizabeth Perry, Shanghai on Strike: the 
Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Bryan 
Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in 
Shanghai, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Sherman 
Cochran, Inventing Nanjing Road: Commercial Culture in Shanghai, 1900-1945 
(Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1999); Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai 
Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Christopher Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: 
Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2004); Lu Hanchao, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early 
Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Jiang Jin, 
Women Playing Men: Yue Opera and Social Change in Twentieth-Century Shanghai 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Charlotte Cowden, “Wedding 
Culture in 1930s Shanghai: Consumerism, Ritual, and the Municipality,” Frontiers of 
History in China 7 (2012): 61-89.   
34 Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Yeh Wen-hsin, eds., Shanghai Sojourners (New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 1992); Yeh Wen-hsin, “Corporate Space, Communal Time: 
Everyday Life in Shanghai’s Bank of China,” The American Historical Review 100 
(1995): 97-122; Kristine Harris, “The New Woman: Image, Subject, and Dissent in 
1930s Shanghai Film Culture,” Republican China 20 (1995): 55-79; Chiara Betta, 
“From Orientals to Imagined Britons: Baghdadi Jews in Shanghai,” Modern Asian 
Studies 37 (2003): 999-1023; Marcia Ristaino, Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora 
Communities in Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Jeffrey 
Wasserstrom, Global Shanghai, 1850-2010: A History in Fragments (London: 
Routledge, 2009); Robert Bickers, “Incubator City: Shanghai and the Crisis of 
Empires,” Journal of Urban Studies 38 (2012): 862-878; Huang Xuelei, Shanghai 
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2014); James Farrer, Shanghai Nightscapes: A Nocturnal Biography of a Global City 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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the cosmopolitan features of Shanghai were transferred into inland 
China and other parts of the world.35 
The overemphasis on the locality of modern Shanghai studies 
might have been the result of what Paul Cohen calls the “China-based 
turn” in historical writings about modern China. In his thought-
provoking monograph Discovering history in China, Cohen points out 
that historians working on China’s recent past have gradually turned to 
regional or local levels instead of taking China as an undivided whole. 
In so doing, they seek to resettle the Eurocentric paradigm that relies 
on the impact-response model to understand the turn of events in China 
in the last two centuries.36 This overemphasis on the local perspective, 
however, downplays the fact that locality is produced in the context of 
cross-boundary mobility. 37  The China-based paradigm detaches 
Shanghai from the translocal networks it was rooted in. Shanghai’s 
cosmopolitan features have been exclusively analyzed from the local 																																																								
35 Joseph Esherick suggests that scholars should look beyond Shanghai and challenge 
Shanghai’s representational status in studies of modern Chinese history, see Joseph 
Esherick, ed., Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-
1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001).  
36 Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the 
Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Cohen later 
revised his assertion of the China-based paradigm and warned that the overreliance 
on this paradigm could lead to the Sino-centrism, see Paul Cohn, China Unbound: 
Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (New York: Routledge, 2003).    
37 Appadurai, “The Production of Locality”. For the critiques of the China-based 
approach, also see William Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign 
Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Period,” China Quarterly 150 
(1997): 433-458; Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn 
of the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 17-25; Isabella 
Jackson, “Chinese Colonial History in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History 15 (2014), accessed 10.1353/cch.2014.0042. 
Bryna Goodman and David Goodman have noted a historiographical tendency in 
recent years that reasserts the importance of foreign elements, colonialism in 
particular, in modern Chinese history. Scholars of this direction contend that the 
investigation of modern China must be related to a comprehensive understanding of 
how China was placed in a colonial world. See James Hevia, The Pedagogy of 
Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); 
Bryna Goodman and David Goodman, eds. Twentieth Century Colonialism and 
China: Localities, the Everyday, and the World (London: Routledge, 2012), 7.  
	 17	
perspective, while the translocal connections and backgrounds of these 
features have been neglected.  
 
Revisiting Sikh Diaspora and British Imperial History 
My original intention for this thesis was to write a local story of 
the Sikh community in modern Shanghai, similar to what has already 
been done with the Japanese, British, Russian, and Jewish 
communities in this metropolis. Nevertheless, when I set out to look 
into the archives, I found that it would be almost impossible to fully 
comprehend the Sikh experience in Shanghai if I were to overlook the 
Sikh migration experience in Singapore, Hong Kong, and North 
America, and if I ignored the socio-economic milieu in the Punjab, the 
concerns of British colonial authorities across Asia, and the Indian 
nationalist struggle in the early years of the twentieth century. The 
current approach of modern Shanghai studies, however, greatly 
restricts us from extending our vision to issues that took place beyond 
the boundaries of the municipality of Shanghai. To solve this problem, 
this thesis turns to two other fields--British imperial history and the 
Sikh diaspora--for inspiration. 
Imperial history has long been on the margin of British history, as 
the tradition has been for scholars to examine how the metropole 
imposed its influence, politically and economically, on the colonies 
and the colonized people. The colonies and their people were often 
treated as passive subjects just waiting for initiatives to reach them 
	 18	
from the metropole.38 Since the 1980s, this Eurocentric approach has 
been revisited and challenged.39 Practitioners contend that colonies 
were active players in this core-periphery interaction. Colonies and 
colonized people in their turn greatly transformed the politics, cultural 
landscape, and economic structure of the metropole.40 This revisionist 
view has extended the historical vision from the stereotyped one-way-
direction perspective to a more interactive relationship, thereby greatly 
enriching our understanding of the mechanism of the empire. 41 
Nevertheless, as Sidney Mintz observes, “when scholars focus on the 
center, they lose sight of the periphery, whereas when they focus on 
the periphery, they lose sight of the center.”42 In other words, this 
metropole-colony binary dichotomy lacks the translocal consideration 
that takes multilateral links amongst colonies and settlements into 
account.43 
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42 Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New 
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The rise of global history in recent decades, with its emphasis on 
concepts such as networks and circulation of people and ideas, has 
provided imperial historians with a chance to review their approach.44 
On one hand, practitioners have set out to investigate interconnections 
between the British Empire and other European empires.45 On the 
other, more attention has been paid to the actual inter-colonial 
connections. 46  The result is that the analytical tool of imperial 
networks has been particularly highlighted in recent years. An 
increasing number of scholars have been willing to take the British 
Empire not as a vertical structure that only concerns the linear 
interaction between the metropole and the individual colony, but as an 
integrated system that connected different parts of the empire and 
beyond.47 It is at this moment that this dissertation resonates with the 
new trend.  
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The network turn of imperial history also influences the way we 
understand the Sikh diaspora. The migration of colonized population 
across the British Empire was always of central concern to the colonial 
authorities. Nevertheless, most imperial historians have paid attention 
to the diaspora of Europeans, while leaving the movement of people 
from other parts of the world to national histories.48 For this reason, 
what we can read about the Indian diaspora is mostly written from the 
perspective of Indian national history, and studies of the Sikh diaspora 
are no exception.49  
Influenced by the national narrative, most writings on the Sikh 
diaspora focus on two areas. On one hand, they look back to the Sikh 
homeland, the Punjab, to ascertain the socio-economic context from 
which the Sikhs migrated away;50 on the other, they jump to the host 
societies to investigate the assimilation and acculturation of the Sikh 
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migrants and their continuing interactions with the Punjab.51 In this 
vein, Indians overseas were incorporated into the deterritorialized 
Indian nation-state.52  
Ironically, by highlighting the motherland-settlement dichotomy 
in the studies of the Sikh diaspora, this national narrative strengthens 
the Eurocentric perspective.53 When explaining the background to Sikh 
migration in the late nineteenth century, scholars tend to highlight the 
British influence. The British theory of their being a martial race is 
usually referred to.54 Heather Streets contends that the main reason for 
the overseas employment of the Sikhs was that they were tagged by the 
Government of India as the martial race who were particularly adept in 
military-related occupations. Furthermore, the urgent needs for reliable 
law-enforcement forces in certain British colonies and settlements 																																																								
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played an equally vital role in the Sikh diaspora. Arunajeet Kaur notes 
that the activities of Chinese secret societies in the Straits Settlements 
seriously disturbed colonial rule and harmed British interests. To wipe 
out criminals and to maintain social order, Sikh constables were 
introduced.55 The crown colony Hong Kong and the International 
Settlement of Shanghai also experienced similar troubles, and their 
solutions were no different from the Straits Settlements.  
The Eurocentric perspective can also be detected from studies that 
turn back to the Sikh motherland, the Punjab, to look for alternative 
explanations for Sikh migration. Verne A. Dusenbery argues that the 
socio-economic milieu of the Punjab in the late nineteenth century 
gave rise to the large-scale Sikh migration. The Punjab had undergone 
dramatic transformations since the 1860s. The British had introduced 
agricultural infrastructures, which remarkably altered the economic 
conditions of the Sikh peasants. As lands had been accumulated into 
the hands of rich landowners, most Sikh peasants were drawn into 
debt. The strong desire to help their families get out of financial 
trouble, as Dusenbery points out, was the principal cause of their 
migration.56 
Whether it was the push factors such as poverty in the Punjab, or 
the pull factors, such as the needs of overseas colonies and settlements, 
it seems that the colonial authorities were always the dominant element 
that directed the migration, while the Sikh migrants were merely 																																																								
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subjects who went to destinations as directed and not of their own free 
will. In this explanatory framework, Sikhs were always waiting for 
some outsiders, the British in particular, to create a condition, whether 
it be the needs of overseas colonies or the specific socio-economic 
milieu shaped by the Government of India, for their migration. This 
Eurocentric perspective “refuses to take an inquiry into the extent and 
nature of free will within the general structure of human society”.57  
In an effort to recover the subjective experience of Sikhs and at 
the same time to illustrate fully their diasporic spread, this study argues 
that the macro-analysis typically underscores the imperial structure and 
context, and thus is far from sufficient. Microscopic approach might be 
a good complementary means for us to understand the migration 
process.  
Similar to biographical writing, microhistory bases its strength on 
analyzing the course of an individual’s life. Yet, it distinguishes itself 
by paying specific attention to the negotiation and interaction between 
the individual and the world he or she resided in. If the individual is 
the protagonist in a biography, the microhistory’s priority lies in the 
social and cultural canvas in which the individual becomes 
entangled.58  
Although some classics such as Natalie Davis’ The Return of 
Martine Guerre and Carlo Ginzburg’s Cheese and Worms are more or 																																																								
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less local stories, a rising interest in employing the microscopic 
approach to investigate cross-boundary histories has been seen in 
recent years. Practitioners who are studying Atlantic history have long 
tried to elucidate unacknowledged and unobserved aspects of the 
African migration through telling stories of cross-boundary lives.59 
Historians with an interest in cross-cultural interactions have also 
turned their attention to micro-levels.60 World historians have recently 
championed the idea of global microhistory, which tends to use 
specific individuals to illustrate broad historical structures and 
processes.61  
The study of the Sikh diaspora would greatly benefit from the 
approach of global microhistory. On the one hand, differing from the 
prevalent Eurocentric explanatory framework that treats Sikhs as 
passive subjects in their migration, the microhistorical analysis not 
only sketches out the specific living world that the Sikh migrants 
inhabited, but also sheds light on how Sikhs interacted, negotiated, and 
even utilized their social structure for their own interests. On the other 
hand, it scrutinizes the Sikh diaspora through the lens of the diasporic 
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network, and thus provides an alternative view apart from the 
motherland-settlement dichotomy paradigm.62  
Because the early Sikh migration was a product of India’s place in 
the British Empire, the growing interest in the imperial network 
amongst imperial historians opens up a new window for scholars of 
Sikh history to track the early stage of the Sikh migration.63 As Tony 
Ballantyne observes, the Sikh diasporic network was deeply 
interwoven and overlapped with the British imperial network in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The imperial network 
connected the Punjab to the distant parts of the empire, while the Sikhs 
employed the connections to construct their own network through 
kinship structures and religious institutions. 64  For this reason, a 
network approach is not only helpful, but also necessary to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of Sikh migration in its early stages.  
 
Rescuing Shanghai Sikhs from Nation 
By introducing the translocal networks into modern Shanghai 
studies, this thesis not only tells a local story about the work, daily life, 
and struggles of the Sikh community in Shanghai, and as series of 
episodes about them, but also demonstrates how these Sikh migrants, 																																																								
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an Imperial World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 30-31. 
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implicitly or explicitly, involved themselves in broader issues such as 
the civilizing project of the International Settlement, the Chinese 
nationalist revolution, the international communist movement, and the 
Indian independence struggle. Taking the Sikh experience as an 
example, this thesis articulates that it is time to rescue modern 
Shanghai history from the China-based paradigm, and reposition it 
amongst the Shanghai-based translocal networks. In so doing, many 
foreign elements in Shanghai, which have long been oversimplified as 
imperialism’s direct impositions, can be proved to be products of more 
complex translocal transportations and transference. 65 
In bringing the translocal approach to the three seemingly 
separate fields--modern Shanghai studies, imperial history, and the 
Sikh diaspora, this thesis seeks to challenge the long-established 
national framing of history. In Chinese national history, the red-
turbaned Sikh policemen have long been depicted as a symbol of 
imperial existence in modern China and a reminder of China’s national 
humiliation.66 This highly politicalized image prevents practitioners 
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from further exploring how the Sikhs engaged themselves in local 
affairs. Indian national history, in its turn, has treated Sikh migrants in 
Shanghai as being no different from other Indian nationals overseas 
who were displaced by the oppressive colonial rule, tenaciously held 
on to their Indian identity, and maintained a close relationships with 
their motherland.67 However, their specific role as an essential part of 
the colonial oppressive machine in Southeast and East Asia has rarely 
been touched upon. British national history, which deeply influences 
imperial historical writing, tends to take the top-down perspective to 
make sense of the formation, work, and cultural aspects of the Sikh 
police unit in Shanghai.68 Obviously, the other identities of these Sikhs, 
such as fortune-seeking migrants, ordinary residents, and even 
revolutionaries, could hardly have been made clear using this approach. 
The incomplete and sometimes even distorted information 
regarding the Sikhs in modern Shanghai exemplifies some of the 
problems of national history. In the past two centuries, national history, 
with its emphasis on the linear conception of temporality, has 
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gradually dominated most people’s understanding of the human past.69 
The hegemonic status of national history in modern historical writings 
came at a time when nation-states have become the principal polities 
across the world and desperately desire to legitimize their sovereignties 
over their territories and people. One way to strengthen this legitimacy 
is to frame the nation-state as a coherent entity, both spatially and 
temporally. The linear concept of time serves this goal as it confers the 
nation-state to exist in an unbroken past and a progressive future. It 
makes the people of a certain nation believe that they share an origin 
that goes very far back and that the land they are presently living in 
was the land of their ancient ancestors. In other words, the nation is 
always there and the history of the nation is the exclusive property of 
that single national entity. 70  For elements that can hardly be 
appropriated into the national framework, their history would have 
been edited, falsified, muted or even eradicated. 71  The Sikhs in 
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Shanghai, with their cosmopolitan features and ambiguous identities, 
were amongst these elements. 
Critiques on national history have been voiced repeatedly in 
recent decades.72 A growing number of practitioners have reached the 
consensus that the historical profile of a community is possibly 
crisscrossed and shaped by interactions and connections, and that the 
history of a certain group of people is not exclusive, but is shared with 
others.73 Since the interactions and connections amongst communities 
over history often spill over beyond the boundaries of the modern 
nation-state and sometimes even across continents, studies of such 
subjects have been tagged as transnational or global history.74 
The motif of this thesis echoes the concern for a connected and 
shared human past. Taking the Sikh community in modern Shanghai as 
a medium, this thesis inquires into the links amongst the mechanisms 
of the British colonial rule in Asia, the Sikh diaspora in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Shanghai’s development as a 
cosmopolitan hub, the Indian nationalist struggle overseas, the 
international communist movement, China’s nationalist revolution, and 
Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. These seemingly 																																																																																																																																																	
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unrelated histories, as this thesis will reveal in the following chapters, 
were in fact highly associated with one another. Moreover, the British 
colonial network and the Sikh diasporic network played crucial roles in 
integrating the once discrete histories into a connected one.  
 
Sources and Structure 
The translocal approach used in this study requires the 
translocalization of primary sources. Documents, archives, and 
newspapers located in New Delhi, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and California are thereby used. British Colonial Office records that 
pertain to the history of the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong are 
employed to explore the British imperial network. These records, 
together with local materials such as Straits Times Overland Journal (a 
Singapore based contemporary newspaper) and the Hong Kong 
Government Gazette, are especially helpful for us to understand the 
establishment and development of Sikh police units within the empire. 
To investigate the origin of the Sikh community in Shanghai, as well 
as the work and daily life of Sikhs, official documents such as the 
Shanghai Municipal Archives and The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal 
Council, as well as local newspapers such as Shenbao and North China 
Herald, are employed. There is no systematic collection of archives 
about the anti-British struggle of Sikhs overseas. Relevant documents 
scatter around the world. This thesis uses Shanghai Municipal Police 
Files, Sedition Committee Report 1918, Komagata Maru Committee of 
Inquiry, Indian National Army Document Collection, and British 
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Foreign Office Documents to scrutinize how Sikh revolutionaries took 
advantage of the Sikh diasporic network to organize their struggle, and 
how the British authorities responded this challenge with a global 
surveillance network. Given the limitation of time and funding, this 
study has not collected documents written by Sikh migrants themselves 
(if there is any) and oral records passed by them or their descendants. 
It is hoped that these crucial sources could be included in a future 
project.  
In addition to Introduction and Conclusion, this thesis has four 
chapters, which are organized in a partly thematic and partly 
chronological order. Chapter One traces how the idea of trusting 
Punjab Sikhs to be good and loyal soldiers and policemen was 
produced, and how this concept flowed from India to other British 
colonies and settlements. It was the British colonial network that 
facilitated the setup of Sikh police units in Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai. This chapter also elaborates on the process of establishing 
the Sikh police unit in Shanghai. It sheds light on how the colonial 
network equipped the Shanghai Municipal Council with information 
concerning Sikhs, and how its interaction with other colonial 
authorities influenced its decision-making. Chapter Two takes the 
journey of a Sikh individual from the Punjab to Shanghai in the 1900s 
as an example to try to piece together the subaltern experience of this 
Sikh migration. It looks into the work and daily lives of the Sikhs in 
Shanghai. On one hand, they were not merely responsible for checking 
riots and crimes, but also for carrying out the civilizing project in the 
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International Settlement. On the other hand, they frequently challenged 
the authorities that they thought to be oppressive and discriminative. 
Between these two extreme positions, the Sikhs shared the normal life 
alongside most other Shanghai residents. Many Sikh migrants in 
Southeast and East Asia continued their journey onwards to North 
America after 1905, where they encountered racial discrimination from 
the local white population. Chapter Three charts the rise of one of the 
most influential Indian revolutionary parties in North America--the 
Ghadar Party, and its continuous efforts to secure an anti-colonial 
network in Asia. Through unearthing the murder case of Buddha Singh, 
the head of the Sikh police force in Shanghai, this chapter sheds light 
on the mechanism and main features of the Ghadar network. The 
Indian revolutionary movement regained its momentum during the 
Pacific War when the British forces were driven out by the Japanese. 
The last chapter outlines how the Indian National Army movement 
developed its extensive influence by riding on the Sikh diasporic 
network in Southeast and East Asia, and how the Sikh community in 
Shanghai were mobilized and militarized. The end of the Pacific War 
not only sealed the fate of the Indian National Army, but also marked 
the disintegration of the British Empire. As most Sikhs returned to 




Establishing the Sikh Police Unit in Shanghai 
 
In 1962, the Hong Kong based writer, Cao Juren, drafted several 
articles to recount his experience in Shanghai from the 1920s to the 
1940s. In one article, he wrote, “When I came to Shanghai, my first 
impression of this city was Sikh policemen on streets, whose faces 
were black and who wore red turbans.”75 Cao Juren’s impression of 
Sikhs was shared by many contemporary Chinese. When depicting the 
scenery of the Bund in the 1930s, a writer claimed, “red-turbaned Sikh 
policemen were the authority of the Bund. They directed all traffics 
and maintained the order of the city”.76 Shanghai-based writers were so 
familiar with Sikh policemen that these Sikhs were often mentioned in 
literary works. For example, in Eileen Chang’s novel Lianhuantao 
(Woes),	 a	 few	Sikh	policemen	were	hanging	 their	 red	 turbans	on	tress	for	drying.77  Another Shanghai writer, Liu Na'ou, told a story of 
how a young Chinese woman was chased by a terrible looking Sikh 
policeman at midnight.78 
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Figure 2. A Sikh policeman standing on Chappo Road Bridge, Shanghai, 1900 
(Courtesy of Historical Photographs of China Project). 
 
Who were these Sikhs? Why did they come to Shanghai? Why 
did the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC hereafter) employ them, 
who lived in a place thousands of miles away from Shanghai and who 
were unfamiliar with the local population and culture, into its police 
force? Furthermore, given the fact that the Shanghai Municipal Police 
(SMP hereafter) was set up in 1854, why did the SMC choose to add a 
Sikh branch into its police force only as late as 1885? This chapter 
contends that the origin of the Sikh police force in Shanghai lies in the 
circulation of police officers, policing knowledge, and information in 
the British colonial network and the circulation of the idea of taking 
Hong Kong as the reference point amongst Shanghailanders from the 
1850s to the 1880s. Furthermore, by highlighting the translocal 
connections and interactions amongst British colonies and settlements, 
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this study tries to break the metropole-colony binary in imperial 
history studies.  
 
Hong Kong as the Reference 
After the First Opium War (1839-1842), Shanghai was opened to 
foreign trade according to the terms of the Treaty of Nanjing. Western 
merchants, mainly British, French, and Americans, flocked into this 
city to pursue commercial interests. British, American, and French 
concessions were then established in the late 1840s. Citizens of the 
three countries enjoyed extraterritorial rights in the concessions.79 
The SMC was established in 1854 in the context of the Small 
Sword Uprising in Shanghai and the encroaching Taiping Rebellion.80 
The primary concern of the SMC at that moment was to check rampant 
violence, to control the influx of Chinese refugees, and to provide a 
hygienic environment for Western residents. 81  To resolve these 
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problems, the establishment and maintenance of a full-time 
professional police force was necessary.82  
In fact, to strengthen the police forces was a trend across the 
British Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. As the 
British authorities sought to strengthen its position in Asia by replacing 
indirect rule under the East India Company with direct rule from 
London,83 it was immediately found out that security conditions from 
Ceylon to Shanghai were far from certain.84 For example, the influence 
of Chinese secret societies was so great in Malaya and the Straits 
Settlements that their consecutive riots threatened British rule there.85 
The forms of perils the British authorities faced at that time were not 
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only riots, but also the illegal trafficking of human beings, drugs, and 
weapons which weighed heavily on tax incomes and worsened the 
already weakened social stability.86 Also, uncontrolled prostitution and 
widespread venereal diseases made it imperative for the authorities to 
establish effective inspections of the population.87  
These challenges not only heavily drained revenues of the 
authorities, but also incurred extra expenditure in social controlling, 
and thus hindered the full development of colonial societies. For 
instance, in 1880, the Straits Settlements government spent $3, 963 and 
$41, 520 on education and medical sectors in Singapore respectively, 
while $116, 368 on policing.88 Ironically, the return of such a high 
expenditure on security sectors repeatedly failed to meet expectation. 
The problems that bedeviled colonial officers remained. It was in this 
historical context that the strengthening of police forces in Britain’s 
Asian colonies and settlements became urgent. For the authorities, the 
problem that continuously haunted them was how to organize the 
police force, and the doubt over which should be the strategically 
appropriate pool from which the ranks of the police could be drawn. 
Soon after its establishment, the SMC began to set up its 
municipal police. In its $25, 000 (Mexican silver dollars) total estimate 																																																								
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for the year of 1854, $15, 000 was for the budget of the police force.89 
However, since most members of the SMC then were just businessmen 
and had neither the expertise nor experience required to organize a 
police force, they desperately looked for a model to follow. Because 
many Shanghailanders stayed in Hong Kong before moving to 
Shanghai, and Shanghai’s demographic condition was very similar to 
that of Hong Kong’s, the Hong Kong Police became the prototype.90  
It is necessary to point out here that the Hong Kong Police in the 
1850s was by no means a good model. The policemen’s disciplinary 
problems and their low efficiency were the main concerns of the Hong 
Kong authorities at that time.91 However, for the SMC, it seemed that 
there was no other options to take.92 
In 1854, a former Hong Kong police officer, Samuel Clifton, was 
appointed as the Superintendent of the SMP. Along with Clifton, more 
than twenty policemen from Hong Kong were employed.93 Based on 
the policing knowledge these policemen brought with them from Hong 
Kong, fundamental functions of a civil constabulary on British lines 
such as patrolling streets, checking transportation, and inspecting 																																																								
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unlawful activities were briskly executed.94 At the same time, the 
doctrine of the Hong Kong Police that prejudged the Chinese to be 
unreliable and unqualified subjects that were unsuitable to be 
employed as policemen were also imported to Shanghai.95 In the first 
decade of the SMC, there was no Chinese employee in the police 
force.   
In its early years, staff members in the SMP were heavily 
overworked. For the total of twenty-four policemen in 1856, eight 
were on duty every eight hours.96 As the influx of Chinese refugees 
surged in the late 1850s and early 1860s, residential areas were 
extraordinarily expanded and thus put great pressure on the already 
exhausted municipal police. 97  It was under these conditions that 
growing numbers of Europeans were added to the unit.98 Nevertheless, 
considering the relatively high cost of recruiting policemen from Hong 
Kong, most newly recruited Europeans were dismissed sailors. 99 
Obviously, neither were they qualified for nor did they really intend to 
be serious about policing work.100 Disciplinary cases involving being 
heavily drunk, absence from duty, and be engage in corruption were 																																																								
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widely reported.101 Even the Superintendent of Police himself, Samuel 
Clifton, was dismissed in 1860 for corruption.102 
As the American Concessions combined with the Settlement in 
the early 1860s, the population grew remarkably, as did security 
problems.103 To inspect the ever-increasing population and to check 
violations of laws and regulations, an enlargement of the SMP seemed 
to be imperative. Nevertheless, the size of the SMP had in fact been 
slightly diminished, owing to the tremendous financial burden and 
competition from other employers. 104  In the early 1860s, the 
expenditure of maintaining the police force accounted for a large 
proportion of the total expenditure of the SMC, and thus became 
unbearable for ratepayers.105 The Council was often forced to refrain 
from employing more staff for the police. 106  Meanwhile, private 
merchants and businessmen who were deeply concerned over their 
properties in the Settlement tried to attract reliable Europeans to serve 
as their watchmen or bodyguards with much higher salaries than those 
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paid by the SMC.107 For this reason, many able policemen rushed to 
resign or obtain their dismissal.108 Apart from the economic concern, 
the SMC had developed an uncomfortable opinion of its European 
servicemen. In a report, the Council admitted that its European police 
staff were not effective in dealing with Chinese burglars, neither did 
they understand the Chinese language, nor were they able to recognize 
criminals’ faces.109 
 
The Rise and Decline of the Localization Policy in the SMP 
In fact, the manpower shortage and disciplinary problems also 
haunted the Hong Kong Police at that time.110 Some colonial officers 
came to suggest that the authorities should include the Chinese in the 
police force.111 After Police Magistrate Charles May, who made the 
policy to reject the employment of the Chinese, left the police force in 
1863, the Chinese had gradually been added into the ranks.112 
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111 CO 129/99, pp. 359-363, From Robinson to Colonial Office, 10 Aug. 1864. 
112 Miners, “The localization of the Hong Kong police force, 1842-1947,” 301.  
	 42	
 
Figures 3. Chinese policeman in Hong Kong, 1900s (Courtesy of Hong Kong 
Museum of History). 
 
The news of how the Hong Kong Police began to engage the 
Chinese spread to Shanghai before long. Considering it was a good 
way to cut the tremendous amount of spending on the policing sector 
and to maintain an adequate number of officers on duty to watch over 
the ever-expanding Settlement, the newly appointed Superintendent 
Charles Penfold, a former London police officer, persuaded the SMC 
to follow the step of Hong Kong.113 The SMC approved this proposal 
and authorized Penfold to enlist some Chinese in 1864.114 From then 
on, increasing numbers of Chinese constables were taken into the SMP 
to replace the Europeans. In addition to patrolling streets and 
regulating the traffic, Chinese constables were also assigned to detect 
																																																								
113 In the year of 1864, the SMP merely had 126 staffs while the Council estimated 
that 100 more policemen were urgently needed if the Settlement could be well 
managed, see “Impartial, not Neutral,” North China Herald, Apr. 9, 1864. For 
Penfold’s plan to recruit Chinese as constables, see The Minutes of Shanghai 
Municipal Council (Vol. 2), 490.  
114 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 2), 490.  
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crimes and collect taxes and fees. Table 1 illustrates how the 
composition of the SMP was transformed from 1863 to 1883. 
 
Table 1. The Composition of the SMP, 1863-1883 
 
 1863115 1864116 1865117 1871118 1883119 
Europeans 133 140 75 34 30 
Chinese 0 10 37 87 225 
 
The localization process in the police forces in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, however, was not that radical. While natives were low-cost 
and accustomed to local environment, the British assumed that they 
were liable to corruptions.120 In the 1879 Straits Settlements Police 
Commission Report, colonial officers noted that local policemen’s 
salaries were too low to support their basic living ($6 a month, even 
lower than that of common laborers) and that this poor payment 
pushed the policemen to take bribes.121 Furthermore, many British still 
held the view that a police force composed largely of the locals would 
be unreliable in any anti-Western riot.122  
																																																								
115 “Municipal Report for the Half Year Ending,” North China Herald, Nov. 14, 
1863. 
116 “Mr. Holliday on the New Police Scheme,” North China Herald, Mar. 14, 1883. 
117 “Reports of Municipal Council Committee,” North China Herald, June. 10, 1865. 
118 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 3), 594-595. 
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Figure 4. Chinese policeman and prisoners in Shanghai, 1907 (Courtesy of Historical 
Photographs of China Project). 
 
The weakness of the localization policy in Shanghai was soon 
exposed. Complaints and frustrations about Chinese constables in the 
Settlement were frequently heard, especially amongst local Chinese 
residents who had contact with them in their daily lives.123 At first, the 
Chinese constables were no less corrupt than their European 
counterparts. Since most Chinese constables were recruited from 
amongst local vagrants if not gang members, they made good use of 
their connections to extort money from Chinese residents and abuse 
their newly obtained positions to bully their countrymen. 124  As 
business in the Settlement prospered in the 1870s, Chinese constables 																																																								
123  “Zhongxi xunbu shuo” (The comparison between Western and Chinese 
constables), Huatu xinbao 1 (1881): 119.  
124 “Bendi xunbu bangou fandianzhu an” (A case on the Chinese constables beat the 
owner of a restaurant), Shenbao, Aug. 24, 1872; “Cheng bendixunbu wei laoye” 
(Chinese constables were called as masters), Shenbao, July 30, 1873; “Huabu bufa” 
(Unlawful Chinese constables), Shenbao, Nov. 16, 1877; “Huabu Ouren” (Chinese 
constables beat residents), Shenbao, Mar. 3, 1878; “Kuochong xifa xunbu shuo” 
(Expanding the Western style policing laws), Yiwenlu 1538 (1896): 14; The Minutes 
of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 2), 599; The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal 
Council (Vol. 3), 506. 
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turned to brothels, opium houses, and gambling establishments to 
extort bribes in exchange for not reporting any violation of the rules in 
these businesses.125  
Furthermore, it seems that these Chinese constables were unable 
to strike fear in the Chinese population at large. The Chinese, be they 
peddlers, rickshaw coolies, thieves or robbers, were not intimidated or 
deterred by the appearance of Chinese constables when committing 
crimes. It was frequently reported that Chinese constables were looked 
down on and sometimes even aggressively insulted by their 
countrymen when they were executing their duties.126 
Another problem brought about by the introduction of Chinese 
policemen was that the Chinese yamen (local government) was able to 
infiltrate into the SMP through its influence over the SMP’s Chinese 
staff. Whenever the instruction of the Superintendent was in conflict 
with the yamen’s, most Chinese constables took the side of the latter in 
order to avoid being blacklisted by the Chinese authorities.127 
These deficiencies then developed into a series of scandals within 
the SMP in the early 1880s. On 14 July 1882, the influential local 
newspaper North China Herald reported that the SMP had suffered 
from the incursion of yamen-runners from the Chinese government for 
a long time and that the Chinese government had probably controlled 																																																								
125 “Squeezes,” North China Herald, Feb. 22, 1871; “Lun xunbu” (On constables), 
Shenbao, July 14, 1876; “Municipal Council,” North China Herald, Aug. 19, 1879; 
The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 7), 596. 
126 “Oubu exi” (The bad habit of beating up constables), Shenbao, July 31, 1878; 
“Chesui buyi” (Tearing uniforms of constables to pieces), Shenbao, Mar. 9, 1881; 
“Oubu panfa” (Being sentenced for beating up constables), Shenbao, Apr. 29, 1881; 
“Huabu shouru” (Chinese constable has been insulted), Wanguo gongbao 746 
(1883): 14-15.  
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most of these Chinese constables.128 One month later, a member of the 
SMC, Charles J. Holliday, pointed out that the efficiency of the newly 
recruited Chinese constables was extremely low and that the criminal 
rate was ever on rise.129   
To better evaluate the condition of its police force, the SMC 
elected Holliday as the chairman of the Watch Committee and asked 
him to probe wrongdoings within the police. On 28 February 1883, 
Holliday submitted a brief report to the Annual Meeting of Ratepayers 
in which he claimed that the SMP was becoming a body full of 
scandals that no one except the Council members still trusted. He also 
expressed his deep frustration over the rampant corruption, 
demoralization, and nepotism amongst policemen.130 
According to Holliday’s report, the expenditure of the SMP 
between 1872 and 1882 swelled to around Tls. 7, 000 (from Tls. 44, 
000 in 1872 to Tls. 51, 000 in 1882). This increased expenditure had 
not been used to recruit adequate numbers of qualified constables, but 
was instead spent on paying the unreasonable salaries and bonuses of 
certain European police officers. Indeed, the salary of European 
officers in the SMP was two times higher than that of their Hong Kong 
counterparts. From this point of view, the original goal of the 
localization policy in the 1860s, which was to cut policing expenditure 
while maintaining adequate personnel to preserve social order, had not 
been attained at all. On the one hand, the money saved by replacing 																																																								
128 “The Proposed Municipal Regulations and By-laws,” North China Herald, July 
14, 1882.  
129 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 7), 796. 
130 “Annual Meeting of Ratepayers,” North China Herald, Feb. 28, 1883. 
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European constables with the Chinese had been used to meet the 
requirements of a few European officers. On the other hand, the 
employment of the Chinese, most of whom were just vagrants and 
hooligans, had degenerated the police force. To resolve these evils 
once and for all, the report advocated a complete reorganization.131      
Nevertheless, this much-needed reorganization of the SMP seems 
to have been a dilemma for the Council. Just as a local commentary 
pointed out, a massive recruitment of Europeans would inevitably 
escalate the expenditure to an extent that the SMC could not afford, but 
to add more Chinese would only worsen the situation.132 To resolve 
this dilemma, the Watch Committee turned its attention elsewhere for 
guidance. 
 
A Martial Race in Motion 
In fact, most British colonies by that time faced the same dilemma 
that troubled the SMC. The solution was to adopt a let-aliens-rule 
strategy--recruiting colonial subjects from one colony and deploying 
them to other colonies to police the people with whom they were 
unfamiliar.133 In Aden, no locals were employed in the armed police 
force before 1965. Instead, nearly all policemen were Protectorate-
born Arabs whom the British assumed to be “outsiders”. 134  The 
security forces in the Bahamas in the late nineteenth century were 																																																								
131 Ibid. 
132 “Zailun zujie yitian xunbu” (The second comment on the further introduction of 
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133 For this strategy, see David Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule: Madras, 
1859-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); Streets, Martial Races. 
134 John Willis, “Colonial Policing in Aden, 1937-1967,” The Arab Studies Journal 5 
(1997): 61.  
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firstly staffed by Africans and then by policemen from Barbados, while 
recruiting from the local population was never even considered.135 In 
Dar es Salaam, the British authorities implemented “the strategy of 
reducing the local men serving in a police unit to the smallest number 
possible.”136 This strategy of using aliens to police colonies was also 
applied to Britain’s Asian colonies. Since India was believed to be the 
cornerstone of British rule in East Africa and Asia, Indians were 
widely used in securing and sustaining British interests from Uganda 
to China. 137  From the nineteenth century onwards, it was not 
uncommon to see that Indian policemen were deployed in Mauritius, 
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Figure 5. Aden Armed Police, 1966 (Courtesy of National Army Museum, U.K.). 
 
Nevertheless, not all Indians in the eyes of the British were 
suitable for military service. Indeed, only those who were viewed and 
classified as “martial races” were deployed overseas. The concept of 
“martial race” was a British invention based on the nineteenth century 
race theory. It assumed certain groups of men were “biologically and 
culturally predisposed to the arts of war”.139 Harsh environment and 
specific culture could make people such as Punjabi Sikhs and Nepali 
Gurkhas possess superior military capabilities. 140 Although similar 
ideas that defined certain societies as “warlike” or “peaceful” had not 
been rarely seen in pre-colonial India and Enlightenment Europe alike, 
the “martial race” ideology that combined nineteenth-century 
																																																								
139 Streets, Martial Races, 1. 
140 For the development of the martial race theory, see Streets, Martial Races; David 
Omissi, “Martial Races: Ethnicity and Security in Colonial India, 1858-1939,” War 
& Society 9 (1991): 1-27; Purushottam Bamskota, The Gurkha Connection: A 
History of the Gurkha Recruitment in the British Indian Army (New Delhi: Nirala, 
1994); Barua, “Inventing Race,” 107-116; Kaushik Roy, Brown Warriors of the Raj: 
Recruiting and the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913 (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 2008), 80-144.  
	 50	
Darwinist “scientific” understanding of race with an artificial strategy 
of colonial rule was largely a British invention after the 1857 Indian 
Rebellion.141 
The Sikhs were recognized as a typical “martial race” by the 
British authorities during the colonial period.142 Generally speaking, 
the name “Sikh” referred to those people who came from the Punjab 
and who believed in Sikhism.143 As early as the two Anglo-Sikh wars 
(1845 to 1848), Sikh fighters’ bravery and bellicose character had 
deeply impressed the British officers and thus had earned them the 
great reputation of being excellent soldiers with a strong martial 
spirit.144 Nonetheless, the Sikhs were not widely deployed outside 
India before the Indian Mutiny.145  During the Mutiny, the Sikhs 
																																																								
141 For the concept of martial race in pre-colonial India and Enlightenment Europe, 
see Douglas Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison 
State in India, 1819-1835 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995). For the historical background 
of the invention of the “martial races” ideology, see Streets, Martial Race, 7. For 
broader discussion of how the British invented different forms of norms to legitimize 
their rule around the world in late nineteenth century, see Erick Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).  
142 Other typical “martial races” in South Asia were Gurkhas in Nepal and Muslims 
in Northwest India.  
143 For the debate of the identity of Sikh people, see W. H. McLeod, The Evolution of 
the Sikh Community: Five Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Mehar Singh 
Chaddah, Are Sikhs a Nation? (Delhi: DSGMC, 1982); Richard Fox, Lions of the 
Punjab: Culture in the Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); W. 
H. McLeod, Who is a Sikh? The Problems of Sikh Identity (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989); Choor Singh, Understanding Sikhism: The Gospel of the Gurus (Singapore: 
Central Sikh Gurdwara Board, 1994).  
144 For the Anglo-Sikh wars and Sikhs’ resistance against the British, see Hugh Cook, 
The Sikh Wars: The British Army in Punjab, 1845-49 (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 
1975); Amandeep Madra, Warrior Saints: Three Centuries of the Sikh Military 
Tradition (London: I. B. Tauris in association with the Sikh Foundation, 1999), 55-
70; J. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab: The New Cambridge History of India, Vol. 
II.3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For contemporary British 
officers’ perception on the Sikhs, see Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Daring 
Adventurers Who Tamed India’s Northwest Frontier (New York: Carroll & Graf, 
2000).  
145 One main reason why the British had no interest in recruiting the Sikhs into the 
Indian Army was that the Sikhs fought so well in the Anglo-Sikh wars that the 
British were afraid of a possible Sikh mutiny in their own Army in the future, see 
	 51	
demonstrated their loyalty to the Raj by not only fighting against the 
mutineers along with their British officers, but also actively joining the 
government army.146 By incorporating the perception of bravery and 
loyalty of the Sikhs with the social Darwinist racial theory, the British 
thus tagged the Sikhs as a “martial race”. As a “martial race” whose 
character and reliability had been proved, the Sikhs were perceived to 
be a vital force for Britain’s colonial rule in Asia.  
Once the Sikhs had been recognized as the “martial race”, 
information and knowledge about their martial features were spread 
around the empire. Heather Streets’ study on the relationship between 
the British Indian Army and mass media sheds much light on the 
circulation of the “martial race” ideology across the empire. According 
to Streets, British officers in India produced large numbers of 
handbooks, memoirs, and military journals about the merits and 
characteristics of the “martial races” to justify and support their 
recruiting policies. 147  These publications, with most updated 
knowledge and information produced by colonial officers, quickly 
flowed out of India and were widely circulated in other colonies.148 																																																																																																																																																	
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Therefore, colonial officers outside India could become well 
acquainted with information on the Sikhs and make the decision to 
recruit them. 
In addition to publications, British officers themselves were 
carriers of information as they were frequently transferred from one 
colony to another.149 For example, when the colonial secretary of the 
Bahamas, Captain H. M. Jackson, who served as the Inspector-General 
of Police in Sierra Leone from 1880-1884, decided to reorganize the 
Bahamas police force in the late nineteenth century, he took the Sierra 
Leone colonial police as his model and recruited Barbadians who were 
employed in Sierra Leone, into the Bahamas police.150 The early 
Kenya police force was mainly modeled on its Indian counterpart, 
because almost all police officers in Kenya had previously served in 
India.151 In Hong Kong, dissatisfied with the meager performance of 
European and Indian contingents in the 1870s, the commanding officer 
Major-General Whitfield insisted that black West Indian soldiers 
should be employed into the Hong Kong Police, a decision mainly 
based on his previous experience as a police officer in the Caribbean. 																																																																																																																																																	
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While this proposal seemed unrealistic given the long distance between 
Hong Kong and the Caribbean, it gained strong support from some 
Hong Kong government officers who shared the experience of serving 
in the West Indies.152 By the same token, when British officers who 
once served in India were transferred to other colonies, they took with 
them their knowledge, information, and perceptions on India’s “martial 
races”.153 Once they held new positions in another colony, it was 
natural for them to apply their previous expertise to the management of 
the new territories. 
The establishment of the Sikh police force in Hong Kong was a 
direct result of the circulation of colonial officers. In the 1860s the 
governor of Hong Kong, Sir Richard MacDonnell, castigated the Hong 
Kong Police as the most corrupt and low-efficiency police force he had 
known throughout his entire career. 154  Frustrated over the poor 
performance of the police and concerned about social unrest, 
MacDonnell proposed alternative ways to secure this colony.155 As the 
governor was haunted by the deficiency of his police force, Charles 
Creagh, the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Sind, was transferred 
to Hong Kong to act as the Deputy Superintendent of Police in 1866.156 
Since Creagh had a positive perception of the well-disciplined 																																																								
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153 This circulation of individuals and information centered on India is best illustrated 
by Thomas Metcalf and Robert Blyth, both of whom designate India as the center of 
British rule in East Africa and Asia and highlight the significance of the export of 
British officers’ Indian experience and knowledge, see Blyth, The Empire of the Raj; 
Metcalf, Imperial Connections. 
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character of the Sikh policemen in his unit while he had been in India, 
he immediately recommended that the governor recruit some Sikhs 
from the Punjab to police the troubled colony.157  
MacDonnell approved this proposal in 1867. From 1867 to 1868, 
two hundred Sikhs were recruited by Creagh from the Punjab.158 
Although it was reported that these Sikhs were totally unqualified in 
the metropolitan-style beat duty, they were very skillful in quelling the 
riots, deterring the secret societies, and pacifying local clashes.159 In 
addition, the government noted that it was necessary to keep the Sikhs 
operational in duties such as patrolling hill roads at night, guarding 
prisons, and watching government buildings.160 Since then, the Sikh 
branch of the Hong Kong Police had principally maintained the scale 
and functions of its early years.161  
 
Figure 6. Sikh and Chinese policemen in Hong Kong, 1900s (Courtesy of Hong 
Kong Museum of History). 																																																								
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In the 1870s, the Hong Kong government was remarkably 
satisfied with their service.162 When addressing the Police Force in 
1878, the Hong Kong governor Pope Hennessy asserted that the Hong 
Kong Police was one of the best in the empire and that the Sikh corps 
was a credit to the colony.163 The character and performance of the 
Sikhs in Hong Kong were even added into the handbooks and guides 
for young colonial officers.164 For this reason, the Sikhs in Hong Kong 
“acquired a reputation amongst the British officers for their loyalty and 
martial prowess in service to the Empire”.165 Subsequently, other 
colonies and settlements also attempted to establish their own Sikh 
police units, modeling them on Hong Kong’s experience. 166  As 
Isabella Jackson argues, “India was at the center of one web of empire, 
whilst Hong Kong and its police force were similarly at the center of a 
further web”.167  
The Straits Settlements’ Sikh unit was grounded in Hong Kong’s 
experience. Thanks to the frequent interactions and personal exchanges 
between the two crown colonies, decision makers in the Straits 																																																								
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Settlements were well informed about policing work in Hong Kong. 
Since the Hong Kong Police had recruited the Sikhs in 1868, the 
Straits Settlements government had closely observed this experiment. 
Then when a debate arose in 1870 as to whether the Straits Settlements 
also needed to have a semi-military Sikh police force, both sides used 
Hong Kong’s case to support their arguments.168 When the Hong Kong 
Police Commission held discussions on raising the portion of Chinese 
constables in the Hong Kong Police Force years later, 169  this 
information immediately spread to the Straits Settlements and drew 
enthusiastic attention, mainly because the Straits Settlements 
government supposed that it was facing the same problem.170 
In fact, for most of the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
Straits Settlements government perceived its Hong Kong neighbor as a 
perfect model, a source of imitation and admiration, and a principal 
reference. 171  Although this over-appreciation of the Hong Kong 
experience in the policy-making process incurred the occasional 
critiques,172 the perception of Hong Kong as a model colony was 
deeply embedded into the minds of colonial officers in the Straits 
Settlements.   
As a result, the Straits Settlements’ police commission 
immediately turned to the neighboring Hong Kong Police when 																																																								
168 “The Police Force,” Straits Times Overland Journal, 3 June 1870.  
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discussing how to improve its police force in 1879. Learning that the 
Hong Kong Police was composed of Sikhs, Chinese and European 
constables, and that this mixed composition had worked well and had 
proved advantageous in Hong Kong, the commissioners “adopted the 
Hong Kong Police Force as the model on which our much abused 
force should be re-organized”. 173  Since there already existed 
Europeans and Chinese in the unit, the establishment of a Sikh 
contingent was the essential point of this re-organization.174 Referring 
to the performance of Sikhs in Hong Kong, most commissioners 
agreed, “It would be very advisable to introduce a certain number of 
Sikhs. It is enough to say that they have proved a marked success in 
Hong Kong, where they were introduced by Governor Sir R. 
Macdonnell.”175  
Once the decision to recruit new policemen into the unit had been 
made, commissioners set out to discuss the proposed salaries for the 
new recruits. Again, they took the rates of pay of the Hong Kong 
Police as the point of reference. Newly recruited Europeans would be 
paid at the same rates ($40-$100 a month) as their Hong Kong 
counterparts, while the salaries of the Sikhs were fixed lower than 
those in Hong Kong ($9--$30 a month).176  
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Furthermore, commissioners also took Hong Kong’s police 
education institution into account. Informed that the Hong Kong Police 
had their own school to teach Indian police personnel regulations and 
languages (Indians needed to learn both English and Chinese in Hong 
Kong), and that only those who passed the relevant examinations could 
be promoted,177 commissioners proposed to build police schools in the 
Straits Settlements to educate fresh recruits with policing knowledge 
and languages and to relate promotion with examination 
performance.178 When the Sikh contingent was formed in 1881, that 
proposal was executed by the government simultaneously, as a police 
school specifically for the Sikhs was established in Singapore.179 
 
Figure 7. Sikh policeman in Singapore, 1900s (Courtesy of National Library Board, 
Singapore). 
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“They were Unsuitable for Shanghai”: Rejecting the Sikh Scheme 
Shanghai was another student of Hong Kong in employing Sikhs. 
When the Watch Committee of the SMC sought to reform the SMP in 
1883, Hong Kong, the long-time preferred model in the eyes of 
Shanghailanders, immediately drew the attention. On the grounds that 
the chairman of the Watch Committee, Charles J. Holliday, also ran 
businesses in Hong Kong, the first-hand information on the Hong 
Kong Police was soon gathered through his business partners there.180 
Based on this newly obtained information, the Watch Committee 
sought to comb through practicable knowledge for their reform.  
The Committee reached several conclusions. First of all, the 
salaries of the European staff in the SMP was two times higher than 
those of the Europeans in the Hong Kong Police. In other words, by 
using the same amount of money, the Hong Kong Police could employ 
many more Europeans than their Shanghai counterparts could.181   
Secondly, even if European staff in Hong Kong were paid much 
less than their Shanghai counterparts, their service was reported to be 
more professional. Indeed, almost all European constables in Hong 
Kong had once served in Britain and received professional policing 
training. To obtain such qualified servicemen, the Hong Kong Police 
even kept an agent in London to help them select suitable officers. In 
contrast, most of SMP’s European constables had been unemployed 
sailors.182   																																																								
180 “Special Meeting of Ratepayers,” North China Herald, Oct. 10, 1883. 
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In addition, the pension system implemented by the Hong Kong 
Police also played a decisive role in attracting capable men to work in 
the colony. After fifteen years of service in the police, a European 
constable was able to receive a pension equal to fifteen percent of his 
salary, while his Shanghai counterpart had no pension at all. 183 
Nevertheless, the pension system was costly and thus limited the size 
of the European branch in Hong Kong. The Sikhs were thereby 
introduced as the third element. It was reported that their clean, modest, 
and well-disciplined characteristics made them very qualified 
policemen who were able to conduct almost all police duties.184  
Hong Kong’s professional European policemen and well-
performing Sikhs remarkably intrigued the Watch Committee. In 
March 1883, a scheme was drafted to call for a total reorganization of 
the SMP. European constables were required to be directly employed 
from Britain in the future. To facilitate this proposal, the Committee 
procured the approval from the Hong Kong Police to make use of their 
agents in Britain to help with enlistment.185  The Committee also 
recommended introducing a third element in the police force to 
balance the Chinese police. Since the work of Sikhs was highly 
cherished in Hong Kong, they were prescribed. The Annual Report of 
the Municipal Council later reported that the Sikhs were suitable to 
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form a complementary military force when emergency events took 
place.186  
The Watch Committee submitted the New Police Scheme to the 
Council in July 1883. The essential part of this scheme was the 
reorganization of the SMP. The Committee suggested setting up a Sikh 
branch for the SMP. Given their plan, the new police force would be 
composed of 81 Europeans, 65 Sikhs, and 120 Chinese.187 To better 
implement the Hong Kong experience, a former Deputy 
Superintendent of the Hong Kong Police, J. P. McEuen, was 
nominated by the Watch Committee as the Captain Superintendent to 
succeed Penfold who was to leave office in January 1884.188  
Whereas the scheme was generally welcomed by the Council, 
specific concern was expressed about the employment of Sikhs. The 
Watch Committee originally proposed to assign the Sikh policemen to 
regulate and supervise the street traffic. Nevertheless, since the Sikhs 
had no knowledge of either Chinese or English, doubts on whether 
they could effectively follow their officers’ instructions and whether 
they were able to interact effectively with the local population were 
voiced. In spite of the objections of some Council members, Holliday 
insisted that Sikhs were perfect policemen to oversee traffic. If they 
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could also be trained in a formal way and taught to use arms, they 
would form a complementary defensive force.189 
Since a consensus on the scheme could not be reached within the 
Council, it was then submitted to the ratepayers for their assessment 
and final decision. On 5 October 1883, the Special Public Meeting of 
Ratepayers was held to discuss the scheme for the reorganization of the 
SMP. Objections against this scheme first surfaced among the 
members. One principal objection to this scheme was that the Watch 
Committee would be imitating the organization of the Hong Kong 
Police. It was pointed out that the title “Captain Superintendent” for 
the new head of the SMP was directly borrowed from Hong Kong, and 
that the pension system was exactly the same as Hong Kong’s. More 
significantly, the enlistment of Sikhs, the methods for drilling and 
training them, and the plan to equip them with rifles, were definitely 
useless imitations of Hong Kong without any practical consideration. 
Overall, the scheme was too Hong Kong-oriented to be put into 
practice in the specific milieu of Shanghai.190  
In his response to the objection, Holliday articulated that neither 
the title nor the pension system was specifically an imitation of Hong 
Kong. Indeed, such methods were commonly employed across the 
British Empire. Even if certain proposals in the scheme were similar to 
those of Hong Kong, they were carefully adopted for the well being of 
the Settlement rather than being crudely thought out policies without 
careful consideration. As for the introduction of Sikhs, Holliday then 																																																								
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turned the question to his opponents by asking them whether they 
could point out any other race whose recruiting ground was closer to 
Shanghai, who were more familiar with European customs, and who 
were more reliable and cheaper than Sikhs. If they were unable to give 
another option, then the Sikh option should be accepted.191  
Regardless of Holliday’s justification, other concerns about the 
Sikhs were raised. The language barrier was still regarded as the 
biggest challenge. Now that the Sikhs were unable to understand the 
English and Chinese, the Council would have to arrange an interpreter 
for each Sikh policeman if they were deployed on the streets. Such a 
measure, however, was hopelessly unrealistic, given the high 
expenditure thereby incurred. Furthermore, on the grounds that the 
Sikhs were frequently reported to strike the Chinese and be rough 
towards the local population in Hong Kong, it was worried that they 
would behave in a similar way in Shanghai and thus agitate and anger 
the natives. Last but by no means least, the Chinese would not easily 
accept these dark-skinned, bearded, and exotically clothed Sikhs to 
police them and the harmonious Sino-foreign relationship in the 
Settlement enjoyed up until then would be harmed.192  
To argue against these critics, again, Holliday resorted to Hong 
Kong’s case. He stated that Sikhs were very adept in learning 
languages. In Hong Kong, Sikh policemen were said to acquire the 
local language within one or two years, more quickly than their 																																																								
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European counterparts. Therefore, if frequent language courses were 
offered to them, the Sikhs would soon get familiar with both Chinese 
and English. Moreover, the specific feature of their work, such as 
directing the transport, did not call for a very high level language 
ability. It was argued that, if the Chinese coolie who did not have any 
knowledge of English could follow the instructions of their European 
officers well, then there was no reason why the Sikhs would not fare 
similarly.193 
With regard to the harsh attitude the Sikhs held towards the 
natives, Holliday attributed this to their specific work environment in 
Hong Kong. Sikh policemen in Hong Kong were frequently deployed 
to patrol not only downtown areas, but also the countryside and outer 
roads at night. They were supposed to battle predatory gangs and 
bandits with guns and batons. In executing such dangerous duties, their 
aggression was thus understandable. However, in Shanghai, the Sikhs 
would merely be assigned to direct the downtown transport and they 
would not be armed while performing this duty. Holliday argued that 
the Sikhs would obediently keep their tempers under control if the rule 
that any violence towards civilians in Shanghai was prohibited and that 
anyone violating this rule would be dismissed immediately could be 
clarified to them.194  
Concerning the possible curiosity and indignation brought about 
by the appearance of Sikhs in Shanghai, Holliday reminded those 
raising objections that the natives were already familiar with foreign 																																																								
193 “Special Meeting of Ratepayers,” North China Herald, Oct. 10, 1883. 
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faces such as Africans and Filipinos. For this reason, Sikhs would not 
cause much of a stir amongst the Chinese. An enquiry conducted by 
the Watch Committee also indicated that Chinese residents living in 
the Settlement would welcome reorganization within the SMP if the 
number of Chinese policemen could be reduced. Now that Europeans 
were too costly to be employed on a large scale, the Chinese had no 
opposition to employ the Sikhs.195   
Finally, Holliday warned that the Settlement was not as secure as 
they imagined. Threats from outside or within could crop up at any 
time and expose the properties of all Shanghailanders to perilous 
conditions. A branch of eighty well-disciplined and war-like Sikhs, 
who could be equipped with arms in an emergency, would provide 
reliable protection for the European population and their properties in 
the Settlement.196  
Following Holliday’s statement, G. J. Morrison, one of the 
leading ratepayers in Shanghai, came up to express his concern on this 
issue. Morrison happened to have been in Hong Kong before then and 
had made an inquiry about the Sikh policemen there. Admitting that 
the Sikhs could be extremely helpful when facing a turbulent 
population and a very complicated milieu such as Hong Kong, 
Morrison then stressed that the Sikhs were too harsh towards the 
Chinese and too militant to be deployed in a relatively peaceful city 
like Shanghai. He also rebutted Holliday’s survey that Chinese 
residents held a positive attitude towards the introduction of these 																																																								
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Sikhs. In his opinion, this optimism was out of their ignorance of the 
pugilism of the Sikhs.197  
Since no compromise was reached in this meeting, Morrison put 
forward an amendment of the New Police Scheme that retained all of 
its contents except the employment of Sikhs and asked for a vote 
amongst the ratepayers. Since significant ratepayers such as Alex 
Myburgh, who was the Chairman of the SMC and who also 
represented the most votes in the meeting (29 of the total 205 votes), 
did not support the Sikh scheme, the result was soon released with the 
acceptance of the amendment.198 In this sense, the first attempt to enlist 
the Sikh policemen in Shanghai failed. 
 
New Bottle with Old Wine: Revival of the Sikh Scheme 
Although the Sikh scheme was turned down, it seems that 
Chinese and Western residents were in favor of this plan. In an article 
written by a European, the rejection of introducing the Sikhs had been 
criticized as a grave mistake made by the ratepayers. The author 
pointed out that some ratepayers’ accusations about the rough behavior 
of Sikhs was groundless, given the fact that no serious skirmish 
between the Chinese and the Sikhs had ever been reported in Hong 
Kong. As for the language problem, the author argued that since the 
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policing subjects in Shanghai were mainly Chinese, most of the Sikhs 
were only required to master the Chinese language--a requirement 
much easier for them to meet. More seriously, without the Sikhs, the 
SMP had to recruit more Chinese constables to maintain its size. Since 
Chinese constables had earned an extremely bad reputation in the 
Settlement, an augmentation of this branch would result in a 
disaster.199 
This judgement was supported by others. In a correspondence 
letter, a Chinese resident expressed his deep regret on the abortion of 
the Sikh scheme when he saw Chinese constables doing nothing to 
prevent crimes conducted by Westerners while seizing every chance to 
bully their Chinese countrymen. In his opinion, no one would be 
rougher towards the local population than the Chinese constables and a 
well-disciplined Sikh unit would be a better option.200 
On the grounds that the public was so frustrated by the 
abandonment of the Sikh scheme, the influential local newspaper 
North China Herald sent its correspondent to Hong Kong to closely 
scrutinize the Sikh policemen there in December 1883. To obtain 
comprehensive, objective, and accurate information on this subject, the 
correspondent visited many crowded and ill-reputed streets. 
Surprisingly, he found that the Sikhs got along very well with the local 
Chinese and that they were not viewed as rough by the natives. Those 
Sikhs could speak a little Chinese as well as English. It was also 																																																								
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reported that the Sikhs were able to pick up foreign languages much 
faster than their European colleagues. When interviewing some local 
gentries, the correspondent found that they gave the Sikhs very high 
commendation. Overall, the correspondent concluded that the Hong 
Kong Police was far superior to the SMP and he thus expected that the 
newly appointed Captain Superintendent J. P. McEuen would bring his 
experience in Hong Kong to Shanghai to help improve its degraded 
police force. One of the strategies for doing so was to set up a Sikh 
unit.201 
When McEuen took up office in the SMP in March 1884, he had 
to address the deteriorating security conditions in the Settlement owing 
to the growing tension between China and France. The advance of the 
French troops into northern Vietnam in 1883 and 1884 had agitated the 
Chinese government, which still claimed suzerainty over Vietnam. As 
the two countries came close to an open war in 1884, the Settlement 
was also impacted, owing to the rampageous anti-foreign sentiment 
amongst the local population and a possible Chinese attack on the 
nearby French concession. 202  Soldiers deployed by the Chinese 
government to defend Shanghai also aroused considerable anxiety. It 
was reported that the morale of these soldiers was extremely low and 
that their appearance was more like that of bandits than military 
men.203 Their occasional rude behavior on the streets of the Settlement 
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stirred great concern and panic.204 In case that disturbance might break 
out, the SMP was instructed to be especially vigilant in watching over 
Chinese “rowdies” and prohibiting public meetings held by groups of 
Chinese. Also, a call for an urgent reinforcement of the SMP was 
expressed.205 
Now that the New Police Scheme had failed to meet 
Shanghailanders’ expectations, the SMC had to figure out a new 
solution for this new situation. In the Special Meeting of the 
Ratepayers held in the previous year, most ratepayers admitted that the 
Sikhs were good soldiers and might be very helpful in maintaining 
order in troubled areas. However, the main reason some important 
ratepayers gave to reject the Sikh Scheme was that those militant-like 
Sikhs were unsuitable for a peaceful settlement like Shanghai. As the 
Settlement was then in great danger of being plagued by riots and 
crimes and in the event of the outbreak of war, the Sikh Scheme 
surfaced again.  
The window opened when Chinese soldiers encamped along the 
Bubbling Well Road (one of the earliest extra-settlement roads in 
Shanghai) brought about a frenzied response amongst local 
residents.206 As a response, the residents stated that they would like to 
pay for extra patrolling forces in their neighborhood for three 
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months.207 Considering that the Bubbling Well Road was not within 
the realm of the Settlement and was thus vulnerable to potential unrest, 
the SMC immediately approved this request. On the grounds that the 
expenditure would be paid for by the residents rather than by using its 
own budget, the SMC took up the Sikh option.208  
The original plan of the Bubbling Well Road Committee (an 
administrative organization of the extra-settlement road) was that they 
would pay $200 a month to have policemen patrol the neighborhood 
for three months. The SMC intended to employ eighteen Sikhs from 
Hong Kong for this task. The cost of such a contingent, however, 
would be close to $2, 000, far exceeding the amount that those 
residents could afford. A discussion was then processed to decide 
whether the Council still should hold on this plan. Most councilors 
agreed that the reinforcement of the police force in the Bubbling Well 
Road, which was located on the outer west side of the Settlement, 
would not only safeguard the properties of the residents of that area, 
but would also provide very effective protection for the Settlement at 
that time. Nonetheless, someone expressed concern that it might not be 
very economical to recruit Sikhs from Hong Kong for three month of 
patrolling work and then dismissed them afterwards. The chairman of 
the SMC revealed his intention that those Sikhs could probably be 
integrated into the formal unit of the SMP in future. As a result, the 
Council passed a resolution to pay all expenditure incurred for 
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employing eighteen Sikhs to watch over the Bubbling Well Road from 
September to December 1884.209 
The Superintendent McEuen was then authorized to make use of 
his network in Hong Kong to facilitate the employment of Sikhs. 
However, no available personnel could be obtained from Hong Kong 
at that time.210 McEuen turned to the alternative local market for 
suitable personnel. Six Sikhs who drifted into Shanghai were then 
picked up for a monthly pay of $15 each.211 After five years’ service, 
they would receive a bonus equal to $45 and a passage home. They 
were put in a unit composed of four European and four Chinese 
constables led by a European Sergeant.212 Stationed in the Carter Road, 
this unit was instructed to patrol the Bubbling Well Road 
neighborhood regularly.213 
The experiment in the Bubbling Well Road proved to be a success 
as the Sikhs had no difficulty in communicating with their colleagues 
and their temper was not as aggressive as some councilors had 
previously been concerned about. McEuen was then authorized by the 
SMC to employ five or six additional Sikhs from Hong Kong on the 
																																																								
209 “Nishe xunbu” (Proposing to set up constables), Shenbao, Aug. 20, 1884; 
“Meetings,” North China Herald, Aug. 22, 1884; The Minutes of Shanghai 
Municipal Council (Vol. 8), 582.  
210 “Meetings,” North China Herald, Sept. 12, 1884. 
211 Current archival research cannot tell how the six Sikhs made their way to 
Shanghai.  
212 In September, the number of the Sikh policemen in the Bubbling Well Road was 
increased to eight or nine, see “Tianshe xunyi” (Reinforcing the patrolling force), 
Shenbao, Spet. 2, 1884; “Summary of News,” North China Herald, Sept. 6, 1884.  
213 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 8), 586. 
	 72	
same terms as those previously engaged to reinforce the Bubbling Well 
Road unit.214 
Thanks to his previous experience in the Hong Kong Police, 
McEuen successfully engaged six Sikhs in October. He also persuaded 
a Sikh sergeant who had served in Hong Kong for ten years and who 
was able to speak fluent English to come to Shanghai. The SMC 
accepted McEuen’s recommendation and hire the Sikh sergeant with a 
salary of $25 a month.215  
Acquiescing that the Sikhs had provided effective protection for 
the Bubbling Well Road neighborhood and had thus helped to stabilize 
the situation of the Settlement, the Council unanimously agreed to 
maintain this patrolling until the end of the war.216  
As the security conditions in Shanghai improved in early 1885, 
the debate over the maintaining of a Sikh police unit in the Settlement 
came up again. The Watch Committee suggested that this force should 
now be integrated into the SMP formally and be allowed to participate 
in the merit scale of pay with the same amount as other members of the 
force. Realizing that the Ratepayers Meeting had not in fact authorized 
the engaging of Sikhs for the police force, the SMC declined this 
suggestion.217 However, advocators in the Council then took this issue 
to the Annual Meeting of Ratepayers, which was held in February 
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1885. They contended that the rejection of the Sikh Scheme in the 
Ratepayers’ Meeting of 1883 had disappointed the public. On the 
grounds that the Sikhs had performed impressively in the Bubbling 
Well Road neighborhood, it was impossible to find any reason to 
discontinue their service. Approved by most ratepayers, the Meeting 
sanctioned a proposal to bring Sikhs into the Settlement to maintain the 
social order. 218 With this approval, the Sikh branch of the SMP 
continued to exist for more than five decades. 
 
Conclusion 
The Sikhs in Shanghai have recently drawn some scholarly 
attention. Some attribute the introduction of the Sikhs in Shanghai to 
the consideration of economy and Sikh reliability. Once European 
constables were thought to be too expensive to be massively enlisted, 
the Sikhs, whose salary was much lower than the Europeans, were then 
introduced as a complementary element. Since the SMC did not fully 
trust their Chinese policemen, the Sikhs were used as a reliable force to 
balance the Chinese unit.219 This explanation leaves an impression that 
the establishment of the Sikh branch in Shanghai was a sudden and 
random decision. The oversimplification of certain historical events 
actually echoes the weakness of the modern Shanghai studies that 
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overemphasizes the local perspective while overlooking translocal 
factors.  
Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson move away from this local-
based framework and analyze this topic from the perspective of 
imperial history. In their view, the Sikhs not only played a substantial 
role in local policing and defense work, but also became a symbol of 
imperial power. They further point out that the process of setting up 
the Sikh police unit in Shanghai was by no means just a local issue, but 
also sheds lights on the mechanisms of the British colonial system.220  
This chapter benefits from the work of Bickers and Jackson, and 
takes a step further to address in detail how the SMC interacted with 
other colonial authorities, the Hong Kong government in particular, in 
organizing and reforming its police force. Because of geographic and 
demographic reasons, as well as the links of the British Empire, the 
SMP had turned to Hong Kong for its experience since the first day of 
its inception. British police officers were employed from Hong Kong, 
and with them, the Hong Kong Police institutions and knowledge. 
Based on this connection, the SMP was established and developed. As 
the SMC tried to reform its police force in the 1880s, it again resorted 
to Hong Kong for lessons. The circulation of Sikh personnel, 
institutions, and recruitment pattern from Hong Kong to Shanghai 
helped the SMP inaugurate its own Sikh branch. 
In fact, translocal connections and interactions played crucial 
roles in shaping local policies across the British Empire. For example, 																																																								
220 Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London: 
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Nyasaland’s first police training school at Zomba, which provided 
modern policing techniques and knowledge for new recruits, was 
actually introduced by a former officer in the King’s African Rifles 
who had served in the British South African Police for over ten years. 
Police reform in Nyasaland in the 1940s was conducted under an 
experienced colonial police officer who had served fourteen years in 
Palestine.221 For reforming Mombasa’s colonial police, the British 
brought from India not only Indian policemen but also police-related 
institutions, codes, and procedures.222 In Aden, high-profile officers 
were all transferred from either London or other colonies and whose 
expertise was expected to help secure colonial rule.223  
In addition to the circulation of personnel, information, and 
institutions over space, practices and ideas circulated over history. 
Facing a state of emergency, such as the Small Sword Uprising, the 
SMC turned to Hong Kong’s police personnel and institution for help 
in 1854. Some thirty years later, facing the upheaval caused by the 
Sino-French War, the SMC turned to Hong Kong again for introducing 
its Sikh personnel and institution. What we have seen here is not a 
repetition of these practices over thirty years, but the reinvention of old 
practices in new circumstance so as to solve new challenges. 
The approach of circulatory history that underscores translocal 
connections and interactions could be applied to the studies of imperial 
history. The history of Sikh policemen outside India, or to the larger 																																																								
221 John McCraken, “Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a 
Colonial Police Force,” The Journal of African History 27 (1986): 129-138.  
222 Wolf, “Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950,” 401-412.  
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context, the colonial police as a whole, is indeed an extensive canvas 
of scholarship in imperial history.224 Most studies of imperial history 
tend to divide the British Empire into two parts, the metropole and the 
colonies.225 Their attention has mostly been drawn to the impact that 
the metropole imposed on its colonies.226 Colonial subjects have been 
depicted as passive victims of this repression and exploitation.227 
Furthermore, colonies have been regarded as laboratories for 
experiments in modernization, within which Westerners exported and 
tried out their modern ideas and institutions. 228  In sum, modern 
bureaucratic institutions such as political administration, coercive 
organizations, and industrial sectors in colonies were imitated or 
																																																								
224 In the Studies in Imperialism, a series of works on the imperial history published 
by the Manchester University Press in the 1990s, two collections on the colonial 
police have been included, see Anderson and Killingray, eds., Policing the Empire. 
Also see Anderson and Killingray, eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, 
Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992).  
225 Although scholars tend to see Ireland as a colony of the British Empire during the 
period of the union between Great Britain and Ireland in the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries, this study takes Ireland as a special part of the metropole, mainly 
because Ireland’s political structure, demography and relations with Britain were 
very different from that of other colonies during this period. Therefore, the metropole 
hereafter refers to Britain and Ireland in this article. For the metropole-colony binary 
in the imperial historiography, see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between 
Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire: 
Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World, eds., Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1-56.  
226 A good example is the five-volume Oxford History of the British Empire. W. R. 
Louis and Alaine Low, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire (5 vols.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
227 Michael Barratt-Brown, The Economic of Imperialism (London: Penguin, 1974); 
Ronald Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1990); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of 
Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1995). 
228  Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Paul Rabinow, French Modern: 
Norms and Forms of Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995); Warwick Anderson, “Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the Poetics 
of Pollution,” Critical Inquiry 21 (1995): 640-669.  
	 77	
imported from the metropole. 229  Such a diffusionist analytical 
framework can also be found in studies on the colonial police, a 
modern and repressive institution. Indeed, the debate over the origin, 
development and adaptation of the colonial police has long been 
dominated by the diffusionist argument, which asserts that the colonial 
policing system was first invented in Ireland by the British authorities 
and then diffused to other colonies with the deployment of British 
officers across the Empire.230 
A reappraisal of this framework, however, reveals that the degree 
of variation amongst colonies has been underestimated and that the 
localization of Western elements, widely existing to various degrees, 
has not been taken into account.231 So is it a case of the subjectivity of 
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the colonialized population.232 In this sense, interactions between the 
metropole and the colonies have frequently been placed within the 
impact-response model, and then consequently simplified as a 
repressive relationship.233 
Realizing the weakness of the approach of this imperial history, 
some scholars have sought to change the paradigm and tagged their 
studies as the new imperial history.234 A key step in this new imperial 
history is to underscore the impact of the colonies on the metropole.235 
It contends that colonialism not only influenced colonies and colonized 
peoples, but also, explicitly or implicitly, transformed its birthplace--
the metropole.236 Culturally speaking, colonial experience remarkably 
reconfigured and reshaped the forms of European literature and art, 
and even transformed the way the Europeans perceived themselves.237 																																																								
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In the political field, differing from the viewpoint that assumes 
colonized people to be only recipients of Western political ideologies, 
be they nationalism, anarchism or socialism, revisionists argue that 
political movements in the colonies also redrew the political 
landscapes of the metropole itself.238 
By the same token, revisionists contend that the experience of the 
colonial police actually contributed greatly to the shape of the 
Metropolitan police and the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.).239 They 
have illustrated that policing practices in London and Dublin borrowed 
many colonial policing features and that the colonial police was even 
the origin of their metropolitan counterpart.240 
In addition, departing from the “old” imperial history approach 
that had been largely confined to a specific national past, revisionists 
preferred to look at an interactive global network.241 The flow of 
ideologies, institutions, commodities, and populations back and forth 
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between the metropole and the colonies demonstrates the principal 
features of the new imperial history.242  
Nevertheless, this revised paradigm shares something of the same 
binary dichotomy with the “old” one.243 By stressing the colonial 
empire’s influence on both the metropole and the colonies, it seems 
that the new imperial history is endeavoring to decentralize the 
stereotyped Eurocentric perspective that pays exclusive attention to 
Western influences around the world.244 Ironically, the essential focus 
of the “old” imperial history, namely the metropole, has remained and 
even been strengthened when the focal point has been turned back to 
the metropole from the periphery.245 In this sense, the interactive 
global network indicated by the new imperial history has widened the 
gap between the metropole at the center and the colonies at the 
periphery. In this approach, the colonies change places with the 
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metropole of the old narrative.246 Other forms of connections have 
largely been overlooked or compromised.247  
The approach of circulatory history rescues imperial history from 
the metropole-colony binary framework and turns our attention from 
the vertical metropole-colony dichotomy to horizontal lateral 
networks. Thomas Metcalf and Robert Blyth have persuasively 
demonstrated that it was India rather than the metropole that played the 
central role in shaping the colonial enterprises of the British Empire in 
East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The center of the 
British rule in Asia and beyond was not in London but in Calcutta.248 
Isabella Jackson goes a step further to contend that Hong Kong was at 
the center of an extended network in East Asia.249 This chapter echoes 
Jackson’s argument by showing that Hong Kong’s colonial officers, 
institutions, and experience spread to Singapore, Shanghai, and other 
Chinese treaty ports, and influenced their administrative policies. In so 
doing, it is expected that we could have a better understanding of the 
British Empire beyond the metropole. 
This chapter only focuses on studying the British authorities over 
various colonies and settlements, while the experience of the Sikhs has 
yet to be told. Why did the Sikhs, whose homeland was in northwest 
India, consent to work in Shanghai? How did they make their journeys? 
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And what was their work and life like in this Chinese treaty port? In 
other words, the top-down perspective of imperial history is 
insufficient to reconstruct the exact experience of Sikh policemen in 
Shanghai. The approach of the Sikh diaspora that champions the 
bottom-up perspective to take Sikhs as active participants of the British 
colonial enterprise is therefore introduced. 
However, the problem of center-periphery dichotomy haunts 
studies of the Sikh diaspora. Similar to the imperial historiography that 
overemphasizes the mutual interactions between the metropole and 
colonies, most writings of the Sikh diaspora tend to explore how the 
Sikh motherland, the Punjab, interacted with individual Sikh 
settlement overseas. The emigration process and the connections 
amongst diasporic communities have largely been neglected.  
Chapter Two takes the case of a Sikh migrant who migrated to 
Shanghai and worked in the SMP in the 1900s to illustrate the broader 
context of the Sikh emigration to Shanghai. It also transcends the 
motherland/settlement dichotomy in studies of the Sikh diaspora via 
highlighting how translocal interactions amongst Sikh communities in 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai shaped the work and daily life of 




The Journey of Isser Singh: A Sikh Migrant in Shanghai 
 
So far, the Sikhs in Shanghai has largely been discussed within 
the realm of British imperial history. Narratives on the circulation of 
the martial race ideology and the establishment of Sikh police forces in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai are mainly written from the 
standpoint of the British authorities. The motivations, considerations, 
and daily work and life of the colonized have been left out. This 
chapter diverts our attention from the British authorities to the Sikh 
diaspora.  
Taking the case of Isser Singh, a Sikh constable who served in the 
Shanghai Municipal Police from 1906 to 1911, as an example, this 
chapter exhibits the specific context of Sikh migration in Shanghai. As 
a global microshitory, it contends that individuals such as Isser Singh 
were not voiceless subjects who were constantly under the 
manipulation of colonial authorities. Instead, the Sikh migrants played 
a crucial role in shaping policies in various colonies and settlements. 
Furthermore, Sikhs were all too ready to exploit the colonial network 
to pursue their own interests. As a translocal history, the chapter 
demonstrates that facilities and provisions for Sikh constables in 
Shanghai were neither novel nor locally invented, but products of 




A Peasant’s Son in the Punjab 
Since no letter, diary, or memoir has yet been discovered, primary 
sources on Sikh constables in the SMP are mostly government archives, 
newspapers, and court testimonies. The case of Isser Singh is no 
exception, as details of this man’s life are scattered across news reports 
about daily crimes and court investigations. By reorganizing these 
primary sources and by referring to the contemporary context, the 
following contents try to reconstruct the course of Isser Singh’s 
diasporic experience and the world he inhabited.  
None of the sources such as newspapers indicates which part in 
the Punjab Isser Singh came from. Since Isser Singh took part in a 
strike organized by Sikhs from the Majha region of the Punjab to 
protest against the SMC’s decision to remove a Majha Sikh interpreter 
in July 1910, he was probably from a village in Majha, in the central 
Punjab region.250 In fact, in the early twentieth century, nearly 70 
percent of Sikh constables in the SMP were from the Majha region, 
with smaller numbers mainly from the Malwa region, also in the 
central Punjab region.251 Majha Sikhs and Malwa Sikhs dominated 
Sikh police forces in other British colonies and settlements, too. This 
representation of certain regions of the Punjab was not a coincidence 
but one that had local socio-economic grounds. 
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 Figure 8. Map of Punjab in British Raj (Courtesy of View Punjab Project). 
 
The Punjab was annexed by the British after the second Anglo-
Sikh War in 1848, and the socio-economic structure of this area 
underwent a dramatic change. During the Sikh kingdom period, most 
high-caste Sikh males were professional military men in the Khalsa.252 
After the defeat of the Sikh army, the British authorities in the Punjab 
set out to take steps to disarm the Sikh soldiers for fear that they would 
rise against British rule. Several thousand Sikh soldiers in the Khalsa 
were then ordered to hand over their weapons and then disbanded.253 
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The only alternative for these unemployed men was to “exchange the 
sword for the plough”, to become peasants.254 
 
Figure 9. The Location of Punjab in South Asia (Courtesy of Wikimedia 
Commons). 
 
Now that there were more laborers working on the land, and the 
weather in the Punjab was very suitable for cultivation in the 1850s, 
agricultural production increased dramatically. 255  Continuous good 
harvests, however, failed to help the Sikh peasants, owing to the fall in 
agricultural product prices. 256  Since the British authorities in the 
Punjab taxed Sikhs not in kind as the Sikh Kingdom used to, but in 
cash, so that a sharp fall in crop prices led to the bankruptcy of many 
peasants who failed to sell their products in the markets at a good 
price.257 As a result, peasants had to resort to moneylenders and thus 
drew themselves into poverty. 
To pacify the unhappy Sikh peasants and to withstand Russia’s 
threat from Central Asia, the British authorities spent more than three 																																																								
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million pounds to build infrastructure throughout the region in the 
1850s.258 By the eve of the Indian Mutiny, 3, 600 miles of roads had 
been built and several canals that irrigated once barren areas had been 
accomplished.259 Extensive roads and railways linked the Punjab with 
the outside world, especially with the port of Karachi, from where 
Punjabi agricultural products could be exported to other parts of the 
world.260 
Thanks to the large-scale infrastructural building, the agricultural 
economy of the Punjab was opened to the outside market.261 As this 
market-oriented transformation brought capital from other parts of 
India, Sikh peasants were further marginalized. Cultivable lands 
became concentrated in the hands of a few Hindu and Muslim large 
landholders and moneylenders, while the majority of Sikh peasants 
held very small tracts of land. In the Majha region where Isser Singh 
probably came from, most lands were tilled by Sikh landholders whose 
tracts were too small to lease out.262 Malcolm Darling attributes the 
smallholdings of Sikh peasants to the Sikh traditional law of dividing a 
father’s land equally amongst his sons.263 In this sense, even if a Sikh 
peasant held a medium-sized piece of land, this land would be divided 																																																								
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into tiny pieces amongst his descendants. Therefore, the fragmentation 
of family land was inevitable due to Sikh tradition.264 
As small proprietors, Sikh peasants were exposed to various 
disadvantages. Firstly, they had to face the fierce competition of large 
landowners whose agricultural products could be sold at relatively 
cheaper prices because of the economy of scale. Furthermore, the 
peasants had no choice but to till the lands with their own hands in 
order to feed their families and pay tax. This subsistence work forced 
poorer Sikhs to bear the risks of illness, bad weather and other 
accidents.265 To improve their condition, Sikh peasants also resorted to 
enlarging their holdings by borrowing money from moneylenders. The 
consequence of this rampant borrowing was that almost all Sikh 
smallholding peasants were more or less indebted by the turn of the 
twentieth century.266 
Borrowing money to buy more land was not the sole cause that 
trapped Sikh peasants into indebtedness. Throughout the colonial 
period, female infanticide was notoriously rampant amongst the Sikh 
population in the Punjab. As a result, there was a shortage of women 
for young Sikh males to marry, and those who desired to have a wife 
had few choices but to spend typically 1, 000 to 2, 000 rupees to buy 
one.267 
																																																								
264 McLeod, “The First Forty Years of Sikh Migration,” 35.  
265 Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, 28.  
266 Royal Roseberry argues that the indebtedness of Punjabi peasants during the 
colonial period was also a result of high interest rate, often amounted up to 30% per 
year, see Roseberry, Imperial Rule in Punjab, 224  
267 Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, 50. 
	 89	
In addition to purchasing a bride, Sikhs had the tradition to hold a 
luxurious wedding ceremony that would put an even heavier economic 
burden on the husband’s family. Sikh weddings in the Punjab involved 
more than just inviting a few guests to attend a ceremony. Sumptuous 
dishes had to be prepared, entertainment activities should be provided, 
and most importantly, jewelry and clothes should be purchased for the 
bride. Therefore, another 1, 000 rupees would have to be spent on the 
marriage. 268  Facing such enormous expenditure, a typical Sikh 
peasantry family that had an average 500 rupees in their savings had to 
borrow, and found themselves at the mercy of the moneylenders. 
Overall, purchasing land and arranging for marriages would usually 
exhaust the whole savings of a Sikh household and draw the family 
into debt.  
It is very possible that Isser Singh was from an ordinary peasant 
family that owned a tiny tract of land. Like most Sikh households in 
the Punjab, Isser’s family may have been troubled by debt, because of 
purchasing more land, preparing for a wedding, or constructing a brick 
house. To alleviate the debt burden, Sikhs normally worked to find 
supplementary sources of income in addition to laboring on the land.  
One of the main solutions was to encourage junior male members 
of the family to join the Indian Army. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, a soldier in the Indian Army could earn 84 rupees a year, 
much more than they could earn through working on the land.269 The 
																																																								
268 Ibid, 54-56.  
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authorities also promised that those servicemen would obtain 
considerable portion of land in newly developed Canal Colonies after 
decades of long service in the army.270 
Whereas joining the army was more promising than cultivating 
the land, not every Sikh had the equal chance to be enlisted. Apart 
from possessing an adventurous spirit, Sikhs in the Indian Army had to 
be from specific sects of the Sikh population. Sikh peasants, who 
resided in great numbers in the Majha and Malwa districts of the 
central Punjab region, were particularly preferred by recruiting agents 
on the grounds that the British assumed that they maintained the 
martial tradition of Sikhism and were physically sturdy, owing to their 
harsh living environment.271  
As a Majha Sikh who intended to add wealth to his household, 
Isser Singh would have offered himself to the Indian Army and 
become enlisted. He was assigned to the 74th Punjabis Infantry 
Regiment based in Bellary with a monthly salary of seven rupees.272 
Compared with agricultural work, this army payment was very good. 
However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
Indian Army repeatedly warned that its reserves of Sikh soldiers was 
draining and that it could no longer employ qualified Sikhs in the near 																																																																																																																																																	
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future. The Government of India attributed this draining of its 
recruiting pool to the migration of the Sikhs to other parts of the world, 
particularly to the colonies in Southeast and East Asia that provided 
Sikhs with much higher wages than the Indian authorities could 
manage.273  
Indeed, since the Indian Mutiny, the British military officers had 
gradually developed the ideology of the “martial race”, which 
characterized certain groups of people as robust fighters adept in 
military activities. Sikhs, according to the British definition, were 
typical of the martial race.274 As British officers who once served in 
India brought this ideology to other parts of the empire and advertised 
the extraordinary traits of Sikhs, other colonies expressed remarkable 
enthusiasm for recruiting Sikhs to defend their territories and maintain 
social order, offering them attractive remuneration.275 Table 2 below 
illustrates the annual salaries of Sikhs serving in colonial police forces 
and the Indian Army at the turn of the twentieth century.   
 










Rs.272/year Rs.377/year Rs.525/year Rs.84/year 
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Although Isser Singh was serving in the army, he was likely to 
have been very well informed about overseas opportunities, thanks to 
the Sikh diasporic network that facilitated the circulation of 
information. Tony Ballantyne sees the Sikhs diasporic network as a 
web that not merely linked the Punjab with a specific overseas 
settlement, but also connected various settlements with one another. In 
this web, Sikh migrants moved from one area to another, and so did 
their experience and knowledge of prospects in those location.276 On 
that account, the Sikhs in one region were able to know about the 
salaries in another very quickly, as they were constantly on the move. 
For example, in February 1901, the Superintendent of the SMP asked 
the SMC to increase the salary of staff in the police force, on the 
ground that Sikh constables in the SMP had recently obtained a piece 
of information about the rise of salaries for Sikh staff in the Hong 
Kong Police. The Sikhs in Shanghai had been upset by the fact that the 
SMP did not have any plan to increase their salary accordingly. 
Furthermore, the Superintendent warned that potential candidates with 
qualified characteristics would probably be attracted by higher salaries 
in Hong Kong and would cease to come to Shanghai looking for work. 
After hearing the Superintendent’s report, members of the SMC 
unanimously agreed to consider a salary improvement scheme, 
although the administration’s budget was very tight that year.277  
However, the SMC should not blame the Hong Kong government 
for this economic burden. In January 1901, news about the raised 																																																								
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salaries of Sikh constables in Singapore had spread to Hong Kong and 
stirred strong emotions amongst servicemen there. Staff in the Hong 
Kong Police correspondingly appealed for an equal rise in their 
salaries. For fear that its servicemen could relocate to Singapore for 
better payment, the Hong Kong government sanctioned an increase of 
seventeen percent in line with salaries in Singapore. 278 
Information also spread back to India in the forms of letters or 
oral messages sent with returning Sikhs.279 The returnees took their 
overseas experience with them along as well and were ready to share 
what they saw, how they felt, and how much they earned abroad with 
they relatives, neighbors and friends.280 Meanwhile, advertisements 
posted by shipment companies, newspapers and magazines also played 
a role in circulating such information.281  
Being exposed to information from the wider world, Isser Singh 
must have gradually realized that he could earn much more money 
overseas. After a serious consideration, he left the army and returned to 
his village to prepare for the journey in around 1905. Like other Sikhs 
desiring to go abroad, Isser Singh would have known how to optimize 
his migration plan by scrutinizing possible destinations.282 
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Optimizing the Migration Plan 
By the turn of the twentieth century, most Sikh migrants favored 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai as their destinations, mainly 
because of relatively good payment. Owing to the high demand for 
Sikhs for policing in these three cities, competition was inevitable. 
In the late nineteenth century, the average annual salary of a Sikh 
constable in Singapore was around 120 Mexican dollars.283 Meanwhile, 
a Sikh constable serving in the Hong Kong Police was able to earn 166 
Hong Kong dollars annually.284 Their contemporaries working in the 
SMP could obtain 168 Shanghai taels each year.285 For personal daily 
living, salaries for the Sikhs in all three locations were certainly 
sufficient, and much better than the earnings of local people. 286 
Nevertheless, Sikhs earned the money not solely for themselves, but to 
a larger extent, for their families in the Punjab. For this reason, they 
had to transfer their earnings from local currencies into Indian rupees. 
Table 3 below illustrates the annual salaries in Indian rupees that the 







283 CO 277/20, p. L50-L51, Civic Establishments, 1885. 
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Table 3. Annual Salaries of Sikh Policemen in Local Currencies and 
Rupees 
 
      Singapore287 Hong Kong288        Shanghai289 
MD$120/year HKD$166/year    Tls. 168/year 
      Rs.200/year        Rs.237/year Rs.525/year 
 
When converting these salaries into rupees, it can be seen that 
Sikh constables working in Shanghai were able to earn much higher 
than those in Singapore and Hong Kong. This gap explicitly indicates 
that Sikhs in Shanghai could transfer much more money back home 
than their countrymen serving in the other two crown colonies.  
The authorities in Singapore and Hong Kong well understood that 
the weak exchange rate between their currencies and rupees had 
imposed remarkable negative effects on their recruitment of Sikhs. To 
counterbalance this disadvantage, the Hong Kong government chose to 
allow their Sikh constables to remit their pay home at a fixed rate of 
exchange of 44 Hong Kong dollars to Rs. 100.290 The Singapore 
government, at the same time, pleaded with the Secretary of State in 
London to take measures to control the widely differing rates of 
exchange for compensation across the British Empire. As the plea was 
declined by the Secretary of State, Singapore imitated Hong Kong’s 																																																								
287 For the exchange rate between Mexican dollars (Straits Settlements dollars after 
1905) and rupees in the 1900s, see Denzel, Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 
1590-1914 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 541-542. 
288 For the exchange rate between Hong Kong dollars and rupees in the 1900s, see 
Denzel, Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590-1914, 520. 
289 For the exchange rate between Shanghai taels and rupees in the 1900s, see Denzel, 
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policy, allowing their Sikh staff to transfer their salary at the rate of 44 
Mexican dollars to Rs. 100.291 Table 4 illustrates Sikh constables’ 
salaries in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai after the 
implementation of the exchange compensation policy in Singapore and 
Hong Kong. 
 
Table 4. Salaries after Exchange Rate Compensation 
 
        Singapore         Hong Kong       Shanghai 
   MD$120/year    HKD$166/year Tls. 168/year 
         Rs.272/year          Rs.377/year Rs.525/year 
 
As the exchange rates were raised, Singapore’s Sikh constables 
were able to remit Rs. 272 to India rather than merely Rs. 200. Their 
Hong Kong counterparts could remit Rs. 377 instead of Rs. 237. 
Nonetheless, the compensated payments were still much lower than 
those provided by the SMC. 
The exclusive remuneration the Sikhs obtained in Shanghai was, 
indeed, deliberately set by policymakers there so as to maintain the 
edge over its competitors. Well informed about Sikh salaries in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, the SMC promised to provide a higher allowance 
so as to attract qualified Sikhs.292 
The deep gap in income amongst various areas reshaped the 
landscape of Sikh migration in the early twentieth century. As Sikhs in 																																																								
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the Punjab were informed that Shanghai was a city where their 
countrymen could earn much more money than others working 
elsewhere, many rushed to try for Shanghai. In 1906, the Singapore 
government had observed that fewer and fewer Sikhs were arriving in 
Singapore and applying for jobs in the local police force.293 Three 
years later, the situation in Singapore worsened, as the police force 
could neither recruit any more Sikhs from the Punjab nor keep Sikh 
staff in their positions. The head of the Singapore police force admitted 
that most Sikhs in the Punjab were reluctant to come to Singapore 
because some Far Eastern cities, particularly Hong Kong and Shanghai, 
held greater attractions.294 
Since the Hong Kong Police provided relatively higher salaries 
than the Singapore government, Sikhs continued to pour into Hong 
Kong in the first decade of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, many 
of those who came to Hong Kong were either physically unsuitable for 
policing work or sought every chance to be dismissed in order to 
migrate to other regions where they could earn more money. For 
example, while attempting to strengthen its own defense, the SMC 
enticed more than twenty Sikh constables from the Hong Kong Police 
with a higher salary and allowance in a single year.295 Moreover, 
knowing that their fellows were earning more money in Shanghai, Sikh 
constables still serving in the Hong Kong Police even went on strike in 
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order to pressure the authorities to increase their payment.296 Table 5 
illustrates that a high percentage of the newly recruited Sikh constables 
were dismissed shortly after they arrived in Hong Kong. 
 
Table 5. Engaged and Dismissed Sikh Constables in Hong Kong, 1903-1907 
 1903297 1904298 1905299 1906300 1907301 
Engaged  64 93 70 115 59 
Dismissed  61 83 58 74 52 
 
Due to the much higher payment, the Sikhs in the Punjab were 
enthusiastic about looking for jobs in Shanghai. As a result, when the 
Singapore government complained that very few Sikhs were 
volunteering to join its police force in the mid-1900s, the SMC boasted 
that it had experienced very little difficulty in getting suitable Sikh 
recruits.302 Indeed, as the SMC observed, “the influx of Sikhs and 
natives of India into Shanghai is constantly increasing”.303 
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Table 6. Sikh Police Force in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai304 
 Singapore   Hong Kong    Shanghai 
1901 152 366 172 
1902 160 367 187 
1903 166 367 187 
1904 171 375 209 
1905 184 482 235 
1906 184 410 235 
1907 184 410 511 
1908 188 388 555 
1909 179 380 550 
 
Table 6 clearly illustrates that the development of the Sikh police 
forces in Singapore and Hong Kong were almost stagnant in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. The strength of Singapore’s Sikh 
police increased 17.7 percent between 1901 and 1909. The increasing 
rate for Hong Kong’s Sikh unit was even lower, a mere 3.8 percent. In 
contrast to this, the Sikh branch of the SMP experienced a dramatic 
expansion during these years, with its strength increasing by 219 
percent. 
Owing to the Sikh diasporic network, this information may well 
have reached Isser Singh very quickly as he was preparing to migrate. 
Understandably, Shanghai became Isser Singh’s migration point of 
choice. Normally, there were two channels for Sikhs in the Punjab to 
find jobs in Shanghai. If they had friends or relatives who had already 
worked in Shanghai, they could go to this city by themselves and ask 
these people to recommend them for certain positions.305 If they did 																																																								
304 Data for Singapore is collected from Annual Report on the Straits Settlements 
Police Force; data for Hong Kong is collected from Papers laid before the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong; data for Shanghai is collected from Annual Report for the 
Shanghai Municipal Council.  
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not know anyone there, their hope counted on the recruitment of the 
SMC in the Punjab. Most Sikhs decided to travel on their own money 
on the grounds that the SMC did not frequently send agents to the 
Punjab to conduct recruitment. This migration pattern, however, was 
reshaped by the changing policy of the Government of India in the 
1900s. 
The Government of India had long been perturbed by the fact that 
its recruiting ground in the Punjab was being depleted by overseas 
demands. Also, the Government of India was upset by the fact that 
some of the British Empire’s archrivals, Russia and Germany in 
particular, began to employ Sikhs who drifted overseas.306 In 1903, the 
Government of India asked other colonies in the British Empire to 
employ Sikhs only through the agents of the Indian Army. In other 
words, colonial authorities were no longer allowed to employ Sikhs 
who applied for positions in the police forces. 307  Although the 
International Settlement of Shanghai was not officially a part of the 
British Empire, the SMC agreed to enlist its Sikh constables from the 
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The Road to Shanghai 
In December 1905, a riot agitated by anti-foreign sentiment broke 
out in Shanghai.309 As foreigners were injured and foreign buildings 
set on fire, the SMC came to realize that its policing strength was too 
weak to protect the Settlement and that an augmentation of the SMP 
was inevitable.310 Since Sikh policemen had proved most loyal and 
energetic throughout the riot, a dramatic expansion of the Sikh branch 
was proposed.311 
Based on the new recruitment policy, the SMC submitted an 
application to the Government of India to enlist forty Sikh policemen 
in January 1906.312 The Government of India sanctioned the request 
months later and instructed the Indian Army’s recruiting depot in 
Amritsar to assign a recruiting team composed of native officers and 
guides to execute the recruitment.313 Meanwhile, to keep track of the 
enlistment, the SMP sent its police cadet A. H. Fenton and an Indian 
sergeant to India in October 1906.314 
The recruiting team and Fenton visited specific villages in the 
Majha area that normally provided soldiers for the Indian Army. The 
village where Isser Singh resided must have been amongst those that 																																																								
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the recruiters visited. Understanding that the SMC provided relatively 
higher pay than other colonial authorities, Isser Singh stepped forward 
to volunteer to join. 
The SMC’s criteria for selecting constables was modeled on the 
standard of the Indian Army. The preferred candidate should be a 
Majha or Malwa Sikh, at least 160 cm tall and his chest girth should 
not be less than 89 cm.315 As an ex-soldier, Isser Singh met all of these 
requirements and was thus enlisted. 
The recruiting team brought Isser Singh and other recruits to 
Amritsar, where a train took them on to Lahore. Meanwhile, staff from 
the SMP had already been sent to Lahore to take the newly recruited 
Sikhs back to Shanghai. 316  In Lahore, a civil surgeon of the 
Government of India conducted a routine medical check on these 
recruits to make sure that their hearing, speech, and teeth were all 
satisfactory.317  Additionally, those who had symptoms of rupture, 
hydrocephalus, varicella, skin disease, or any other chronic diseases 
would be disqualified.318 After the check, Isser Singh and others 
travelled to Bombay by train where they boarded a passenger liner 
(owned by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
that was contracted by the SMC in the early twentieth century). The 
																																																								
315 CO275/69, pp. c107-c108, “Extract from the regulations as to the physical 
examination of Candidates for Appointments under the Government of India,” 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements for the Year 1904.  
316 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 16), 664. 
317 SMA, U1-1-898, p. 46, Municipal Council of Shanghai: Report for the Year 1885. 
318 CO275/69, p. c108, “Extract from the regulations as to the physical examination 
of Candidates for Appointments under the Government of India,” Proceedings of the 
Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements for the Year 1904.  
	 103	
liner took the batch of Sikhs to Hong Kong before they finally arrived 
in Shanghai.319 
 
Accommodating the Sikhs 
When Isser landed in Shanghai in November 1906, he found that 
there already existed a well-developed Sikh community with 
sophisticated facilities in this metropolis. A hospital that specifically 
catered for Sikh patients had been set up years before. A Sikh temple 
(gurdwara) was under construction for the religious needs of Sikhs. 
The Police school regularly provided necessary training and education 
for its Sikh staff. With the help of these facilities, the SMC expected to 
build up the efficiency of its Sikh police unit. In fact, the idea of 
providing Sikh police staff with customized facilities was not 
Shanghai’s original invention. By the turn of the twentieth century, the 
SMC had imported and localized numerous Sikh-related institutions 
from Hong Kong and Singapore. In other words, the hospital, 
gurdwara, and school were products of a translocal network that 
facilitated the circulation of knowledge from one locality to the other. 
Viewing Sikhs as a martial race who could easily adapt to harsh 
conditions, the colonial authorities in Southeast and East Asia had been 
keen to employ them. Ironically, the British soon found that Sikhs 
were particularly susceptible to tropical diseases, particularly malaria 
and dengue fever. In the Hong Kong Police, Sikhs always accounted 
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for a large proportion of the total number of patients admitted to the 
hospital. 
Table 7. Police Staff Admitted to the Hospital in Hong Kong, 1901-1909 
 
 Europeans Sikhs Chinese 
1901320 163 493 215 
1902321 141 498 299 
1903322 122 407 193 
1904323 111 317 226 
1905324 102 407 187 
1906325 98 375 224 
1907326 132 427 187 
1908327 97 394 136 
1909328 72 471 136 
 
The Singapore government was also haunted by the health 
condition of its Sikh constables. A government survey showed that 
Sikhs were particularly susceptible to phthisis and intermittent fever on 
this tropical island and that Sikhs have a larger proportion of sickness 																																																								
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than other contingents.329 In a report of the Inspector-General of Police 
in 1909, the Sikh contingent was declared the least healthy one.330 Sikh 
constables in Shanghai were also prone to health problems in the early 
twentieth century. Annual Reports of the SMC showed that the Sikhs 
were frequently taken to the hospital due to various diseases and cases 
resulting in death were not uncommon.331  
Various measures had been taken by colonial authorities to 
improve their Sikh policemen’s health. Since the 1860s, the Hong 
Kong government had begun to import medicines from India to treat 
Sikh patients. 332  Besides, all ailing Sikhs were taken to the 
Government Civil Hospital for treatment.333 In Singapore, a police 
surgeon was appointed to take charge of the health of all Sikh 
policemen. Those who were suffering from serious diseases were 
admitted into the government-founded General Hospital. 334  The 
hospital also catered to a specific Sikh diet for the patients.335 
What happened in Singapore and Hong Kong showed that Sikhs 
were particularly vulnerable to diseases in Southeast and East Asia, 
and that customized provisions should be provided to relieve these 
health problems. The SMC learned their lessons well and were 
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cautious about the medical care of their Sikh staff. At the time when 
Isser Singh would have arrived in Shanghai, the SMP, like its 
Singapore counterpart, had also enlisted a police surgeon to take care 
of its Sikh policemen.336 Ailing Sikh staff in the SMP would be 
checked by the surgeon and could go to the General Hospital (founded 
by the SMC) without any charge.337 To better accommodate the Sikh 
population, the SMC even built an Indian Hospital in 1919.338 The 
medical authorities in that hospital introduced Singapore’s measure to 
provide specific Sikh food for its patients. Furthermore, wives and 
children of Sikh constables were allowed to be admitted into the 
hospital as well.339 
In addition to the well-built medical facility, the SMC also 
provided training and education for Sikhs. In the first six months, all 
newly recruited Sikhs underwent compulsory English and Chinese 
languages classes, musketry shooting, and policing regulations in an 
Indian school that was set up by the SMC in 1896.340 These schooling 
institutions, like the medical care system, were also imitated from 
other colonies.   
Once the Hong Kong government established its Sikh branch in 
1868, a Sikh police school was simultaneously introduced by the 																																																								
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governor to instruct its Sikh constables how to use a musket and to 
teach colloquial English and Chinese.341 Language learning in the 
school was later related to the promotion of Sikh staff. Only those who 
passed the tests could be promoted to higher positions. 342  The 
curriculum in the school had gradually been developed, as courses 
such as Police Regulation and General Instructions, Sections and Beats, 
Local Knowledge, Police Court Routine, Observation Lessons, Jiu 
Jihsu-Police Holds, Physical Drill, and First Aid to Injured were all 
taught to Sikh policemen.343 
The Sikh police school in Singapore was to a large extent 
modeled on that of Hong Kong’s. When the Singapore authorities 
intended to set up its Sikh contingent in 1879, Hong Kong’s 
experience in employing and managing the Sikh police unit was the 
principal reference point. As a result, a Sikh police school was built in 
1881 and the Sikh servicemen were also required to take language 
exams.344   
The SMC was another student of Hong Kong. To improve the 
efficiency of the Sikh branch, the SMC repeatedly resorted to Hong 
Kong’s expertise in schooling its Sikh constables. As early as 1885 
when the first batch of Sikhs arrived, the SMC imitated the Hong Kong 
Police’s measure by introducing courses in Chinese and English 																																																								
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344 CO 275/23, p. cclxxii, Report of the Police Commission, Sept. 1, 1879; CO 
275/27, p. 95, Report on the Straits Settlements Police Force, and on the State of 
Crime, for the Year 1881.  
	 108	
languages to all recruits.345 As the Sikh branch had grown dramatically, 
the SMC asked its police officers to go to Hong Kong to learn how to 
manage Sikhs.346 Based on Hong Kong’s model, a specific Sikh police 
school was established in 1896, and courses such as musketry shooting, 
police regulation instruction, and local knowledge were introduced.347 
 
Figure 10. Mounted Sikh policemen being trained in Louza police school, 1900s 
(Courtesy of Historical Photographs of China Project). 
 
On the grounds that Sikhs based their sense of identity on the 
Sikh religion, most of them aspired to keep practicing their religious 
rituals in gurdwaras (Sikh temples) even when they were abroad. As 
more and more Sikhs migrated to Southeast and East Asia by the turn 
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of the twentieth century, gurdwaras sprang up in these regions.348 The 
first gurdwara in the Straits Settlements was set up in Penang in 1901 
in commemoration of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee.349 It was 
reported at that time that the gurdwara in Penang would be used to 
serve the religious needs of Sikhs not only in the Straits Settlements 
but also those in the Malay Peninsula.350 
 
Figure 11. Wadda gurdwara in Penang, 2007 (Photo by Nik Khusairi Ibrahim). 
 
The Hong Kong authorities were well informed about the 
construction of the gurdwara in the Straits Settlements and felt it 
imperative that they start building one for their own Sikh 
servicemen. 351  In 1902, one year after the erection of Penang’s 
gurdwara, a Sikh temple was set up in Gap Road of Wanchai, Hong 
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Kong island. Whereas the Hong Kong government provided a site 
without any charge, money for establishing the building was raised 
amongst local Sikh soldiers, policemen, and watchmen.352  
Noticeably, the SMC also donated some 600 HK dollars for the 
gurdwara in Hong Kong.353 In fact, the SMC had a strong need to 
improve its Sikh constables’ morale and efficiency in the first decade 
of the twentieth century. Assuming that a religious organization would 
watch over and correct the behavior of all Sikhs, the SMC had a 
growing interest in the work of Hong Kong’s gurdwara. 354 
 
Figure 12. Sikh gurdwara in Wanchai, Hong Kong, 2013 (Photo by Cao Yin). 
 
After years of consideration and observation, the SMC sanctioned 
the plan to build a gurdwara in 1906.355 Agents were soon dispatched 																																																								
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to Hong Kong to learn the details of the building. Blueprints and plans 
of Hong Kong’s gurdwara were also obtained and taken back to 
Shanghai.356  
Based on the Hong Kong model, a gurdwara was erected in North 
Sichuan Road in June 1908.357 The SMC expected that the temple 
could greatly facilitate its administration over all Sikhs in Shanghai, 
including policemen, watchmen, and the unemployed. With the help of 
the priests of the gurdwara, the authorities wanted to impose religious 
teachings on their Sikh subjects and thus set right any serious 
misconduct. Furthermore, the temple provided accommodation for the 
destitute and other Sikhs with no home. Disputes amongst Sikhs were 
also brought to the temple rather than before the court for resolving.358   
 
Figure 13. Sikh gurdwara in North Sichuan Road, Shanghai, 1910s (Courtesy of 
Shanghai Municipal Archives). 
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Isser Singh arrived in Shanghai at a time when all such 
sophisticated facilities had been established. Like all other Sikhs, he 
immediately received training on policing knowledge, which was 
based on the Government of India’s police training books.359 In the 
first six months, Isser Singh had to attend an English course three 
times a week.360 Since the SMC repeatedly defined its police unit as a 
defensive force that should be deployed to protect the Settlement 
during emergencies, shooting courses were also introduced to the 
newly enlisted policemen.361  
After the intensive training, Isser Singh was assigned to the 
Hongkou (Hongkew) station, and was responsible for checking 
unlawful activities in the Hongkou area. He was accommodated in a 
barrack that was specifically built by the SMC for newly employed 
Sikhs.362 The barrack was closed to all outsiders and was more like a 
military fort, on the grounds that the SMC purported to build it as the 
center of the defense of the Settlement.363 Life in this building was 
doubtlessly dull, and the eight-hour shift on the streets chasing thieves, 
directing traffic, and arresting drunkards was both exhausting and 
dangerous. 
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Figure 14. The building of the SMP Hongkou station, 2011 (Photo by Cao Yin). 
 
The most common leisure activity for Sikhs in Shanghai at that 
time was the consuming of quantities of alcohol. Indeed, Sikhs living 
in the Punjab had a tradition of over-drinking to relax their exhausted 
bodies after heavy physical labor.364 In the early twentieth century, a 
social survey illustrated that one hundred Jat Sikhs could consume five 
gallons of spirit averagely per year, while the provincial average was 
just 2.25 gallons.365 Migrants took this habit abroad with them. In 
Singapore, the authorities attributed the misconduct of its Sikh 
constables mainly to widespread drunkenness.366 The overconsumption 
of alcohol was also widely apparent amongst Sikhs in Hong Kong. 
One of the crucial reasons that the Hong Kong government 
enthusiastically advocated Sikhism was its teachings prohibited 
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excessive drinking.367 Shanghai Sikhs were no exception, as drink-
related cases were frequent.368 The SMC even claimed, “drunkenness 
is the most common crime for the Sikhs”.369 Like his fellows, Isser 
Singh occasionally indulged in spirits as well. Ironically, one of Isser 
Singh’s main jobs was to check drunkards on the streets.   
 
Policing Hongkou 
The policing style of Sikhs in the SMP was a mix of the 
metropolitan and colonial police. The modern police force was born in 
Britain in the early nineteenth century when the flourishing bourgeois 
class tried hard to impose its behavioral norms upon the working-class 
people and when the capitalist economic structure required a large 
number of well-disciplined laboring forces that could maximize the 
profits of the industry. In this sense, the police force in Britain was not 
merely responsible for detecting unlawful activities, but also for 
disciplining the population’s everyday practices and imposing the 
dominant class’ expectations on the people.370 As the British Empire 
expanded, police forces were also set up in various colonies. The 
colonial police, however, was remarkably different from the police 
force in Britain. The imperative for the colonial police was not to teach 																																																								
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colonial subjects how to meet the expectations of the middle-class in 
Britain, but to strengthen colonial rule in alien and sometimes, even 
hostile, territories by suppressing riots and overseeing locals. For this 
reason, colonial policemen were accommodated in barracks, equipped 
with heavy weapons, and trained in military techniques.371  
The SMP combined the two patterns.372 On the one hand, as an 
autonomous foreign settlement that heavily counted on commercial 
development and political stability, Shanghailanders aspired to 
establish civic law and order that conformed to the norms of Western 
society. Residents were supposed to abide by Western–styled laws that 
would keep the Settlement in order and stable. A well-ordered 
Settlement would thus attract more people and cause more investment 
to flow in. In order to carry out this project, policemen were employed 
as pioneers of civilizing and disciplining work. By punishing those 
who failed to follow the traffic regulations, who were heavily drunk on 
the streets, or who caused disturbance in public, policemen were meant 
to be there to discipline such misdemeanors. On the other hand, on the 
grounds that the Chinese had become the majority of the population 
from the 1860s, the demography of the Settlement was less similar to 
other white settlements such as Canada and New Zealand and closer to 
colonies such as Hong Kong and Singapore. It was this colonial milieu 
																																																								
371 Jeffries, The Colonial Police; Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule; Anthony 
Clayton and David Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British 
Colonial Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989); Brogden, “The Emergence of 
the Police,” 4-14; Dilip Das and Arvind Verma, “The Armed Police in the British 
Colonial Tradition: The Indian Perspective,” Policing: An International Journal of 
Police Strategies & Management 2 (1998): 354-367.  
372 Bickers, “Ordering Shanghai,” 178-179. 
	 116	
that made the SMP introduce numerous colonial policing measures, 
including the recruitment of Sikhs.  
In the debate on the police reform in 1883, C. J. Holliday, the 
head of the SMC’s Watch Committee, contended that there were duties 
that the Chinese were incapable of doing while the expensive 
Europeans were too few to fulfill these alone.373 One of the principal 
duties was to suppress Chinese riots and defend against possible attack 
from Chinese military men. During such turbulent times, Holliday 
argued, the Chinese policemen in the SMP could not be trusted. 
However, since European constables’ salaries were extremely high, the 
SMC was not able to maintain adequate numbers of Europeans during 
troubled time. For this reason, the Sikhs were introduced as the 
complementary element to reinforce Westerners’ sub-imperial rule in 
Shanghai.374 
In another speech, Holliday stressed that Indians were more 
familiar with the British customs and laws than any other nationals in 
Asia.375 As is stated above, Shanghailanders tended to impose British 
laws and norms upon the society of the Settlement, and coerced 
residents into following these regulations. Their aim was to turn the 
Settlement into another London, where traffic was well directed, 
streets were clean, prostitution and gambling were under check, and 
everything was in order. Servicemen in the SMP were one of the most 
significant coercing forces that were responsible for executing this 
civilizing work. To have servicemen execute this duty, they must be 																																																								
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familiar with and abide by those British laws from the first. 
Nevertheless, most Chinese constables were unfamiliar with if not 
violators of British civil rules. Hence, to have them instruct others to 
follow these rules often proved to be fruitless. As the Sikhs were 
assumed to have a better knowledge of British customs and rules than 
the Chinese, they were thus obliged to do the civilizing work on the 
streets of the Settlement.  
Isser Singh was assigned to execute this civilizing duty in 
Hongkou, in the northern part of the International Settlement. The 
Hongkou district was mainly under the administration of the American 
concession between 1848 and 1863. As the American concession was 
combined with the British concession in 1863, Hongkou became a part 
of the International Settlement, although it was less secure than other 
parts of the Settlement.376  
 
Figure 15. Map of Shanghai, 1920s (Courtesy of Tales of Old Shanghai Project). 
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Shanghai was one of the largest and busiest ports in Asia in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and sailors from around 
the world landed for entertainment, especially to consume alcohol. 
Drunken sailors were particularly perilous elements for the order of the 
Settlement. Drunken sailors would either fight with one another or 
bully the Chinese or damage properties. Their rude behavior stirred a 
strong resentment amongst Shanghailanders, who wished to see 
Shanghai become a model settlement in which business could be done 
in a stable and safe environment. Sikh constables were responsible for 
correcting the wrongdoings of these troublesome seamen and arresting 
those who caused disturbances in the public.  
 
Figure 16. Hongkou in the 1920s (Courtesy of Shanghai Municipal Archives). 
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Since Hongkou was particularly notorious for crimes and troubles 
caused by sailors, Isser Singh encountered them frequently. At mid-
night on 19 December 1906, Isser Singh was patrolling along the 
Yuhang Road when he saw an American cruiser sailor who was drunk. 
As Isser Singh was trying to hold this man in custody, the drunkard 
assaulted him. A tussle ensued, and thanks to his former experience as 
a soldier, Isser Singh soon had the American under control and took 
him to the police station.377 On 23 May 1907, a Russian cruiser sailor 
was lying down on Boone Road under the influence of alcohol and was 
obstructing traffic. On call, Isser Singh rushed to the spot and made the 
arrest. The man was later sent back to his ship for punishment.378   
In fact, Isser Singh’s encounter with sailors was not unusual for 
the Sikh policemen. On the morning of 1 April 1887, several British 
sailors fought with one another in Broadway, a popular place for 
seamen to go to for recreation. It was reported that sticks, wooden bars, 
and knives were used. A group of Sikh constables were then ordered to 
the spot to quell the fighting. The sailors dispersed before the arrival of 
the policemen, but the Sikhs still managed to seize two of them.379 
Nonetheless, not all drunkards would run away without any resistance. 
On 30 August 1892, two British seamen were drunk outside “The 
Travelers” public house and their riotous behavior affected the traffic 
on the road. A Sikh constable was then instructed to take them to the 
police station, but when the Sikh constable approached the two men, 
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they struck him down, took away his baton and beat him on the 
head.380 
In addition to checking drunkards, Isser Singh was also in charge 
of duties such as checking sanitary issues and detecting fire. Since 
furious dogs often bit pedestrians and their bark was also complained 
by residents, the SMC viewed these animals as uncivilized subjects 
that besmirched the peaceful environment. The Sikhs were then 
ordered to catch all dogs wandering on streets without masters. And 
residents who were unable to control their furious dogs were 
sometimes also faced with punishment.381 On the morning of 30 June 
1907, Isser Singh caught a dog that was straying in North Sichuan 
Road with no owner in sight. On his way back to the police station, the 
dog’s master came out and asked him to return the dog to him. 
Although that man insisted that it was Isser who enticed his dog onto 
the road, the court still fined him $10 for letting the dog go 
unmuzzled.382 
As these records demonstrate, Isser Singh worked well during his 
six-month probationary service between November 1906 and May 
1907 and was therefore promoted into the rank of the sixth class 
constable. His monthly salary at that time was around $16.50 (Mexican 
dollars). Like most of his colleagues, on receiving his salary, Isser 
Singh probably sent almost all of them back to India to support his 
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family. Claude Markovits analyses four testaments left by Sikh 
policemen who died in Shanghai between 1895 and 1931. He 
surprisingly finds that these Sikhs left extremely few savings in their 
accounts. Markovits further points out that most Sikh policemen in 
Shanghai remitted a large portion of their earnings back to the Punjab, 
given their peasantry background. 383  This argument is strongly 
supported by the case of Constable Sorlan Singh. When he was fined 
for ten Mexican dollars for drunkenness and misconduct, he had no 
money to pay the fine, because he had just sent most of his wages back 
to his wife in India. As a result, he was sentenced to prison for one 
month.384 
Apart from the cash earning, Isser Singh also enjoyed some other 
forms of welfare privileges such as free uniforms, fuel, and light.385 In 
1905, the SMC even employed three Sikh cooks to prepare Punjabi 
food for all Sikh staff.386 Indeed, if Isser Singh could have kept up such 
a satisfactory performance, he would have had a high chance of being 
promoted to the rank of fifth class constable one year later.387 However, 
a lack of the knowledge on rules and regulations promulgated by the 
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“A Man Who Gives Considerable Trouble” 
In May 1907, the Chairman of the SMC received a letter from the 
Shanghai Taotai,388 the magistrate of the Chinese territory in Shanghai, 
complaining about the action of an Indian constable who had crossed 
into Chinese territory with a gun and bullied some Chinese men.389 In 
fact, Sikh constables’ harsh attitude toward the Chinese in Shanghai 
often antagonized the locals and caused complaints and demonstrations 
of resistances.390 For example, Sikh constables were often called in to 
fight with Chinese mafoos (carriage drivers) and rickshaw coolies 
when the Sikhs tried to confiscate non-licensed carriages and 
rickshaws by force.391 It was also reported that Chinese rickshaw 
coolies were frequently struck and kicked by Sikhs, only because their 
rickshaws either blocked the traffic or went in the wrong directions.392 
Furthermore, since very few Sikhs were able to communicate in 
Chinese, 393  misunderstandings between the constables and their 
policing subjects had often resulted into brawls.394 In one case, a Sikh 
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constable was charged with beating a Chinese mafoo because the 
mafoo had wrongly parked his carriage on the road and obstructed the 
traffic. A later investigation revealed that the clash could mostly be 
attributed to the poor communication between the two. Since the Sikh 
was unable to speak Chinese, his order had been misunderstood by the 
mafoo. Irritated by the mafoo’s disobedience, the Sikh then seized the 
horsewhip and beat the Chinese.395  
However, the case mentioned by Shanghai Taotai was special 
given the fact that it happened outside the International Settlement. 
Further reports from Chinese newspapers elaborated that the Indian 
constable was invited by a Chinese hooligan to enter into the Chinese 
territory to help bully some other shopkeepers. With the help of this 
Indian, the hooligan also beat a Chinese policeman who came to check 
the case.396 Assuming that the Indian constable was either privately 
employed by the Chinese hooligan or deputed by the SMC to 
deliberately breach the Chinese law, the enraged Chinese authorities 
required the SMC to fully investigate this incident and punish this 
Indian.397 
The ensuing investigation conducted by the SMC revealed that 
the Indian constable was none other than Isser Singh. Isser Singh 
stated that he had been patrolling on the Wuzhou Road on 29 April 
1907 when a Chinese man came to him reporting that a lot of loafers 
were in his house outside the Settlement. Isser Singh then went with 																																																								
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that man to the spot but found no one was there. He returned to his 
duty immediately afterwards. Based on this statement, the SMC judged 
that the accusation from the Chinese side had been much exaggerated 
and that there seemed to be no need to pay any more attention to this 
issue.398 While Isser Singh had been spared from being accountable for 
this cross-boundary incident, he undoubtedly left a negative impression 
with his officers, as the captain of the Sikh branch later commented, 
“he [Isser Singh] had given his officers considerable trouble”.399  
On 2 August 1907, Isser Singh refused to follow the order to go 
on duty, saying that he had lost his money in the barrack and had been 
unfairly treated by senior Sikh officers. Disobeying senior officers’ 
orders was not uncommon amongst the Sikh constables in Shanghai. In 
the early twentieth century, the SMC were forever complaining about 
the deteriorating discipline of their Sikh branch.400 More often than not, 
the authorities chose to appease their Sikh staff, owing to its heavy 
reliance on Sikhs for defending the Settlement.401 For example, on 28 
May 1908, two Sikh constables disobeyed the order of an Indian 
Sergeant-Major, and one of them even used abusive and filthy 
language to attack the officer. Whereas both were taken to the police 
court, the sentences were quite slight as one was jailed for just three 																																																								
398 Ibid.  
399 “Hudao qingshang xibu wuzai yuejie” (The Taotai required foreign constables to 
stay within the border), Shenbao, July 1, 1907; “REX (S.M.P.) v. Isser Singh,” North 
China Herald, Aug. 9, 1907.  
400 The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Vol. 16), 655; SMA, U1-1-922, p. 
35, Municipal Council of Shanghai: Report for the Year 1909; “Shanghai Sikh 
Police: Deportation Order Disobeyed,” The Hong Kong Telegraph, Oct. 23, 1909; 
SMA, U1-1-923, p. 36, Municipal Council of Shanghai: Report for the Year 1910;  
401 Outside observers had long noticed that the SMC was used to punish unlawful 
Sikhs with light sentences in exchange of their loyalty, see “The Valueless Sikh,” 
The China Mail, July 31, 1907.  
	 125	
days with hard labor and the other was jailed for seven days with hard 
labor.402 In contrast, Isser Singh was imprisoned for one month with 
hard labor, mainly because the court judged him as a troublemaker in 
the police unit.403 When Isser Singh was released in September 1907, 
the judge gave him two choices: he could either return to the Sikh 
branch by finding two sureties of $500 each or return to India.404 With 
the help of his friends, Isser Singh successfully found two sureties and 
was allowed to resume his work in the police force.  
In the next three years, it seems that Isser Singh no longer caught 
any drunkards on streets, and nor did he cross boundaries or cause any 
trouble during this period. In July 1910, Isser Singh was again 
imprisoned, owing to his participation in a strike. Strikes held by Sikh 
policemen in Shanghai were not uncommon, especially when they felt 
that they were unfairly treated. On 8 August 1891, the Chief Inspector 
of the SMP went to inspect one Sikh barrack. He found that the 
barrack was infested with bugs and was very sloppy. Perturbed by the 
poor sanitary conditions, the Watch Committee fined each member of 
the twenty-seven Sikhs living in the barrack three Mexican dollars. 
Clearly exasperated by this punishment, all those billeted in that 
barrack refused to go to work that day. Their strike was later supported 
by another thirteen Sikh constables in other barracks who had not been 
fined. The Watch Committee immediately summoned a meeting and 
reached a conclusion that the punishment was too heavy for these 
Sikhs who were not directly responsible for this problem. The Watch 																																																								
402 “REX v. Pumun Singh and Ujazar Singh,” North China Herald, May 30, 1908. 
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Committee then informed the Sikhs that they would not be fined. 
Instead, only those who continued their strike would be fined one 
day’s salary. The Sikhs accepted this compromise and went back to 
work the same day.405  
Not all strikes ended in a compromise, however. In most 
instances, strikes simply led to serious punishments. On 19 March 
1897, Sikh constables in the Louza Station refused to report for duty, 
stating that they had received ill-treatment from their British officer 
who had ordered them to drill in the rain and abused them with violent 
language. The Sikhs submitted a petition to the Watch Committee in 
which they asked to reconsider the frequency of such drilling and to 
employ a Sikh inspector from India. After evaluating this complaint 
and the Sikhs’ request, the Watch Committee informed them that their 
petition was groundless and thus ordered them to go back to work. 
Frustrated by this judgment, fifty-nine Sikhs from the Louza Station 
and the Carter Road Station went on strike. Faced with this crisis, the 
Watch Committee reiterated that the request of the Sikhs was not 
justified and that they would take harsh action against the misconduct 
of these Sikhs so as to prevent such requests in future. As a result, 
fifteen Sikh constables who had bad records were dismissed. Other 
strikers were threatened with the same fate if they did not go back to 
work immediately. Eventually, all Sikhs gave up their protests and 
resumed their duties.406 
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 The strike that Isser Singh took part in was not to protest against 
unfair British treatment, but resulted from rivalries between different 
sects of Sikhs in Shanghai. There were mainly two sects of Sikhs 
serving in the SMP in the early twentieth century. One was from the 
Mahja district, between the Beas and the Ravi rivers of the Punjab; the 
other was from the Malwa district, south of the Sutlej River of the 
Punjab.407 Although both sects shared the same religion and lived side-
by-side in India, differing views on castes and a conflict of economic 
interests brought about mutual discrimination, altercation and even 
clashes. 408  As people from both districts came abroad for their 
livelihood, they also brought this old antagonism to the new land.409 
In Shanghai, the hostilities between the two sects repeatedly 
irritated the SMC.410 In July 1910, a Sikh interpreter who was from the 
Mahja sect was dismissed by the SMC. It was rumored that the Malwa 
sect was behind this man’s dismissal. Outraged Mahja Sikhs 
assembled in the Louza Police Station on the afternoon of 15 July 1910 
to demand that their interpreter be restored and that they have more 
privileges. As a Mahja Sikh, Isser Singh found that he had an 
obligation to stand up with his fellows and express his support. 
Supposing that it was just a peaceful petition and that no serious 
consequence would be incurred, Isser Singh headed to the Louza 																																																								
407 For the locations of the Malwa and Majha regions, see Joyce Pettigrew, “Some 
Notes Oil the Social System of the Sikh Jats,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 1 (1972): 363.  
408 Rajwant Singh, “Sikh Sects,” International Bibliography of Sikh Studies 1 (2005): 
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2014), 350-359.  
409 “Nationalities in India,” North China Herald, June 5, 1909.  
410 SMA, U1-1-923, p. 36, Municipal Council of Shanghai: Report for the Year 1910. 
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Station from Hongkou that afternoon. Nonetheless, as the Captain 
Superintendent of the SMP rejected a direct dialogue with the Mahja 
Sikhs, these men refused to obey the command of their officers to 
dismiss but kept on protesting. The next day, all Sikhs involved in this 
parade, including Isser Singh, were arrested and taken to the British 
gaol.411 Most of these men, however, were released a few days later, 
owing to the authority’s unwillingness to stir anti-British sentiment 
amongst the Sikh population in Shanghai.412 But Isser Singh was 
detained two more days than the others with the allegation that this 
was the second time he had disobeyed orders.413 Since the SMC did 
not want to lose a whole batch of experienced Sikh constables, and 
bear the considerably high expenditure of deporting them back to India, 
almost all detained Sikhs, including Isser Singh, were reenlisted into 
the unit.  
As Isser Singh returned to the work, drunkards on the streets, 
again, became the subjects that he had to engage with. On 16 March 
1911, Isser Singh saw a drunken Sikh lying on East Hanbury Road and 
took him back to the police station.414 One month later, however, Isser 
Singh himself shared a similar fate as the drunkard he had arrested. On 
the evening of 13 April 1911, Isser Singh was found heavily drunk and 
disorderly on North Sichuan Road. Affected by the alcohol, he 
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assaulted a Chinese man by dragging him across the road. He was then 
arrested and sentenced for seven days’ hard labor with a fine of $10.415 
 
An Unending End 
The case of drunkenness is, however, the last piece of information 
on Isser Singh. Since then, no clue about Isser Singh has been found. It 
is possible that he left Shanghai in 1911 as his term of service ended. 
The Sikh constables serving in the SMP were normally contracted for 
five years. By the end of their service, they would be granted nine 
months’ leave on half pay with $10 passage money. If the SMC was 
satisfied with the constable’s performance during the term, he could 
return to the force after his leave. 416  Obviously, in light of the 
misconducts Isser Singh had been found guilty of in the past five years, 
he was not the ideal kind of person that the SMC were looking for a 
second term contract.  
With the money he saved during his term there, Isser Singh 
possibly returned to his village in the Punjab, and ended up as a farmer 
with adequate resources to support his family. However, it was more 
probable that Isser Singh stayed in Shanghai, and worked as a 
watchman or moneylender. Owing to the higher pay and more 
opportunities, most dismissed or retired Sikh constables chose to stay 
in Shanghai to find another job.417 Thanks to their “martial race” 
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reputation, locals were too all ready to employ them as watchmen.418 
Although the wage of a Sikh watchman was lower than that of their 
countrymen in the SMP (fifteen Mexican dollars a month for a Sikh 
watchman versus eighteen Mexican dollars a month for a Sikh 
constable), they still earned much more than Chinese constables in the 
late nineteenth century (ten Mexican dollars a month).419 Indeed, Sikh 
watchmen were commonly seen in teahouses, theatres, warehouses and 
banks around the city.420 In 1907, of the 800 or more Sikhs in 
Shanghai, nearly half of them worked as watchmen.421 In addition to 
obtaining salaries through working as policemen or watchmen, most 
Sikhs in Shanghai were keen to join the moneylending business so as 
to make extra money. Normally, the Sikhs set the interest rate at 
around ten percent, a safe level that would bring them some profit 
while diminishing the risk of delinquency. They not only lent the 
money to their Indian countrymen, but also did business with the 
Chinese and Europeans.422 
The other possibility is that he migrated onwards to other parts of 
the world. In the mid-1900s, rumors about the high salaries in North 
America, Australia and Russia came to circulate amongst the Sikhs 
around the world. In the year of 1906 alone, 2, 400 Sikhs in the Punjab 																																																								
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migrated to Canada.423 Those who served overseas also turned their 
eyes to more lucrative areas. The Hong Kong government had long 
discerned that noticeable numbers of its Sikh servicemen left their 
positions to move to Port Arthur (Lü Shun) and Vladivostok on the 
eastern seaboard of Russia, attracted by higher pay there.424 During the 
Russo-Japanese War, it was reported that some Sikhs who were 
captured by the Japanese in Port Arthur had migrated from the Straits 
Settlements.425 In Shanghai, the authorities reported, “many Sikhs 
resigned in order to go to Siberia or North America for better 
payment”.426 Since the SMC only allowed twenty Sikh policemen to 
purchase their discharge yearly, 427  some Sikh constables even 
deliberately behaved badly in the hope that they would be dismissed 
and proceed forthwith to America. 428  Taking this backdrop into 
account, the diasporic journey of Isser Singh would probably not just 
culminate in Shanghai.  
 
Conclusion 
In terms of the approach, this chapter benefits from Robert 
Bickers’ monograph, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in 
Shanghai, which takes the case of an ordinary Englishman, Richard 
Maurice Tinkler, who served in the SMP as a constable in the early 
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twentieth century, to demonstrate the daily experience of the working-
class Britons in the periphery of the British Empire. 429  Richard 
Maurice Tinkler was born in 1898 in a poor family in Lancashire, 
England. He joined the army in 1915 and was sent to France to fight 
Germans in 1916. After the War, Tinkler could hardly find a job back 
home because of the economic downturn in England. Through an 
advertisement, Tinkler applied for the position of constable in the SMP 
and was enlisted. He arrived in Shanghai in 1919 and spent more than 
ten years in the police force. However, he was forced to quit due to his 
racist attitude against the Chinese and bad temper in 1931. Tinkler 
remained in Shanghai until he was killed by some Japanese soldiers in 
an incident in 1939.   
In many aspects, Isser Singh’s experience was similar to that of 
Tinkler. They both served in the armies. They offered themselves to 
the SMP mainly because of better working opportunities. They were 
troublesome and both lost their jobs due to poor performance. Through 
the case of Tinkler, Bickers argues that the identity of working-class 
Britons overseas was so ambiguous that it cannot be fit into the 
stereotyped dichotomy of colonizers and colonized. On one hand, the 
empire offered ordinary British opportunities and privileges that they 
might never obtain in Britain; on the other, they were sandwiched 
between upper-class British expatriates and indigenous societies, and 
thereby marginalized. Bickers further argues that it is the very context 																																																								
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of the empire that complicated the identity of those white-skin but 
lower-class people.430 So did the identity of Sikh policemen such as 
Isser Singh. In the Punjab, Isser Singh was a peasant with few accesses 
to modernity, while in Shanghai he became both the executor and 
subject of the SMP’s modernization project. In this sense, it seems that 
the empire had similar effects on the life of lower-class Englishmen 
and colonized subjects alike.  
Although there are sufficient studies of how colonialism 
influenced people living in the metropole and colonies, the two streams 
of scholarships have no conjunction. It is assumed that Westerners, 
even if they were working-class people, would have quite different 
experience from the colonized in the context of empire. The colonized 
were assumed to be static and passive subjects of the colonial structure. 
Even if they travelled abroad, their migration was viewed as unfree 
and indentured.431 On the contrary, non-elite colonists such as Tinkler 
has been described to have the freewill to travel extensively and have 
the privilege to find jobs in colonial authorities.432  
This chapter shows that the British Empire was composed of 
translocal networks such as the colonial network and the Sikh 
diasporic network. This colonial structure constantly influenced people 																																																								
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living in the metropole and colonies alike. For example, the colonial 
network helped the SMC to post advertisements in Lancashire to 
employ working-class Englishmen and to learn and introduce highly 
customized supplies and facilities to accommodate its Sikh staff. 
Furthermore, colonized subjects, like their Western counterparts, were 
able to make good use of the empire to facilitate the circulation of 
information in order to pursue more economic interests. There 
appeared no difference between Isser Singh and Tinkler in the way of 
their calculation and planning for their career overseas.  
Isser Singh and his colleagues not only actively took part in the 
colonial enterprise, but also transformed the empire in their own way. 
The Sikh branch, amongst all sections in the SMP, was the second 
largest (following the Chinese branch).433 From 1884 to 1941, the Sikh 
branch was seen by the SMC to be the backbone of the local 
defense.434 Furthermore, Sikh policemen such as Isser Singh were 
actively involved in population disciplining, riot control, and social 
order duties.435 As labor strikes became the greatest danger to the 
stability of the Settlement in the 1920s and 1930s, Sikhs were enlisted 
into the Reserve Unit of the SMP for checking furious workers on the 
streets. This unit was later identified by Leroy Thompson as the 
world’s first SWAT (Strategic Weapons and Tactics) team. Its 
ideologies, tactics, equipment, and organization influenced later 
established SWAT teams in other parts of the world until today. Sikhs 
accounted for one third of this force. Different from Chinese and 																																																								
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Western constables in this unit, who carried concealed pistols and 
batons, Sikhs carried carbines and lathes and were put as the backbone 
of the formation.436 In summary, whether it was a street brawl, a traffic 
jam, an act of unsanitary behavior, or a labor strike, red-turbaned Sikh 
policemen were often on the scene. In fact, their work had greatly 
transformed the landscape of the Settlement through maintaining social 
order and regulating residents’ everyday practices.  
In addition to being a part of Shanghai’s modernization process, 
red-turbaned Sikhs influenced the Chinese in two aspects. First, their 
rude attitude toward the Chinese residents while performing duties 
stirred up strong animosity. This feeling was furthered by the Chinese 
racism. In an article published in Shanghai in 1930, the Chinese author 
wrote:  
“For the red-turbaned Sikhs, I always hold a feeling 
of disgust, with no reason. Their huge bodies, silly heads, 
and curly beards left people a long-standing nasty 
impression.”437 
This racist discourse was widely seen in Shanghai at that time. Frank 
Dikotter argues that the discourse of race in modern China was a 
combination of traditional Sino-barbarian dichotomy ideology and 
social Darwinism. The black-skin Sikhs were assumed to be inferior to 
the white and the yellow in the racial hierarchy.438 Since the Chinese 
were angered by the fact that they were policed by a rude but inferior 																																																								
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race, nationalism had thereby aroused. For example, one author 
claimed in an article: 
“Red-turbaned Sikhs had lost their nation and been 
enslaved long ago. They were now working for the British 
in Shanghai and Hong Kong to police the Chinese. They 
were the most shameless people in the world. How could 
we Chinese be policed by this people and oppressed by 
imperialism? We should rise against the British and 
Japanese imperialism.”439 
In this way, Sikh policemen not only strengthened the British 
superiority in Shanghai, but also inflamed Chinese nationalism that 
weakened British interests.  
Second, even if the Chinese disdained Sikh policemen, their 
highly disciplined and efficient work impressed the Chinese 
nationalists and influenced the organization of the Public Security 
Bureau, the police force of the Special Municipality of Shanghai, 
which was administered by the Chinese nationalist government in the 
1930s.440 Just as Frederic Wakeman has noted: 
“Chinese police force in Shanghai modeled the SMP 
to try to cope efficiently with Shanghai’s public health, 
housing, traffic, commercial licensing, entertainment, 
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labor union, kidnapping, censorship, narcotics, 
prostitution, and racketeering problems, and controlling 
popular disorder and unrest.”441  
While it is clear that Sikhs were indispensable elements in the 
SMP, current scholarship has so far been preoccupied by studies on the 
European officers and men in the SMP.442 Little attention has been 
paid to the work and daily life of the Sikhs.443 Two reasons are behind 
this neglect. First, as symbols of imperial rule in China, the important 
role Sikhs played in Shanghai has been downplayed by the triumphant 
national history and the anti-imperial narrative. Second, although Sikhs 
were the backbone of the SMC’s effort in strengthening the Western 
superiority, enhancing social stability and carrying out the civilizing 
project, they were also subalterns, whom the conventional narrative of 
imperial history tends to overlook.444  
As Isser Singh’s story shows, a lot of Sikhs in Shanghai headed to 
North America in around 1910. Facing discrimination there, nationalist 
emotion was stirred and revolutionary parties were set up. Many North 
America-based Sikhs later returned to Asia to help with the liberation 
of India. The next chapter will explore how the Sikhs rode on the 																																																								
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diasporic network to facilitate their migration to North America and 
how this network was later employed by politicalized migrants for 




Kill Buddha Singh: The Indian Nationalist Movement in Shanghai, 
1914-1927 
 
Isser Singh left the Shanghai Municipal Police in 1911. At that 
time, there was a rush amongst Sikhs to go to Canada. Thousands of 
Sikhs came to Hong Kong and Shanghai to wait for ships that could 
take them to the other side of the Pacific. Isser Singh probably also 
harbored such a dream. However, he would soon find that it was 
almost impossible for Sikhs to travel to Canada, owing to the strict 
immigration laws imposed by the Canadian authorities. As an ex-
soldier who had served the British Empire for many years, he had good 
reasons to be angry. How could a loyal subject of the empire be 
rejected to enter into another territory within the same empire?445 This 
frustration was shared by many Sikhs around the world and led to the 
formation of the Ghadar Party, the most influential overseas Indian 
nationalist movement in the early twentieth century.   
This chapter demonstrates that the Sikh diasporic network is the 
key point for understanding the mechanism of the Ghadar Party’s 
campaign in Asia, and Shanghai was one of the principal centers of 
this network. From 1914 onwards, the Ghadar Party, under the 
endorsement of the Germans, the Comintern, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), and the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD), worked hard 
to build Shanghai into an anti-British stronghold, while the British 																																																								
445 For discussions of the identity of imperial subjects, see Daniel Gorman, Imperial 
Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2010).  
	 140	
authorities and pro-British collaborators responded with a heavy hand. 
The murder of Buddha Singh, the most influential Sikh in Shanghai in 
the 1920s, was one episode exemplifying this struggle. By exploring 
this case, this chapter attempts to demonstrate how Shanghai’s Sikh 
community was politicized in the context of the global anti-imperial 
movement and how the translocal movement of the Ghadar Party 
stimulated the formation of the British surveillance network that had 
gradually subdued its adversary in the late 1920s and 1930s.446    
 
Go	to	North	America!	
By the turn of the twentieth century, tens of thousands of Sikhs 
had migrated from the Punjab. Their settlements scattered across the 
globe, from Burma and British Malaya to Chinese treaty ports such as 
Shanghai and Hankou. Sikh communities in these areas were by no 
means segregated from one another, but instead were highly 
interconnected. Facilitated by steamships and trains, Sikh migrants 
could easily travel from one region to the other in just a few days. 
Moreover, news about Sikhs in one place could immediately be known 
to their coreligionists in other places with the help of the telegram. In a 
word, modern transportation and telecommunication had woven a web 
that tightly bound up the overseas Sikh communities with one another. 
This cross-boundary network was particularly discernible in Southeast 
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and East Asia where Sikh migrants had settled in considerable 
numbers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.447  
In around 1905, reports of highly paid jobs in the United States 
and Canada had begun circulating amongst Sikh migrants in Southeast 
and East Asia. It was believed that such information on the lucrative 
employment opportunities in North America was firstly noticed by 
Sikh troopers from India, Malaya and Hong Kong. On their way 
returning home via Canada after attending Queen Victoria’s Diamond 
Jubilee Celebration in London in 1897, they found that the payment in 
North America was much higher than they had been earning in Asia. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the daily wage for common 
laborers in North America was $1 to $2 (USD).448 Considering that 
one U.S. dollar could be equivalent to three Indian rupees at that time, 
an Indian laborer who worked twenty days a month was able to obtain 
60 to 120 rupees. Working as a policeman in Hong Kong in the 1900s, 
however, he could only expect to earn 30 rupees a month for the same 
amount of work.449    
As these Sikh troopers returned to Asia, news of better financial 
prospects in North America was widely spread. The interest in the 
possible chance of getting rich in North America was further fuelled by 
shipping companies’ advertisements.450 Learning both that the Sikh 																																																								
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population was anxious to seek a better livelihood and employers of 
the sparsely populated western regions of North America were 
desperate for cheap laborers, shipping agents found a way to make 
profits by transporting Sikhs to the other side of the Pacific Ocean.451 
Advertisements depicting North America as a heaven were posted 
prominently in cities wherever Sikh migrants were working.452  
Seduced by such prospects, large numbers of Sikhs in Southeast 
and East Asia embarked on journeys to the west coast of Canada and 
America from 1906 onwards. In Shanghai, it was reported that many 
Sikh policemen working for the SMC deliberately violated rules to 
secure their dismissal so that they could make a bid for North 
America.453 By the end of 1909, the SMC even complained that the 
recruitment of Sikhs for its police force was practically at a standstill, 
mainly because news, rumors, and stories about the high pay in North 
America had dissuaded potential migrants from seeking employment 
in Shanghai.454  
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Figure 17. Early Sikh immigrants in North America, 1907 (Courtesy of South Asian 
American Digital Archive). 
 
In the process of the Sikh migration to North America in the early 
twentieth century, the circulation of employment information preceded 
a large-scale mobilization of the Sikh diasporic network in Asia. 
Shipping agents made use of the network to advertise their tickets 
while potential migrants in different regions employed their 
connections to coordinate their plans and schedules. The journey of the 
Komagata Maru from Hong Kong to Vancouver in 1914 illustrates 
well the mechanism of the Sikh migration network.455  
Frustrated by the Canadian and American authorities that 
discouraged shipping companies from transporting Indians to North 
America, some Sikh businessmen hatched an idea to launch their own 
enterprise in 1913.456 Sikh communities in Singapore, Hong Kong, 																																																								
455 The classic account about the journey of Komagata Maru is Hugh Johnston, The 
Voyage of the “Komagata Maru”: The Sikh Challenge to Canada’s Colour Bar 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979).  
456 Linda Kerber, “The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United 
States,” The American Historical Review 112 (2007): 20.  
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Malaya, Manila, and Shanghai were all contacted towards this effort 
and all of them agreed to cooperate with one another to post 
advertisements, organize migrants, and coordinate schedules for a Sikh 
shipping company. With the support of the diasporic network, the 
Guru Nanak Steamship Company was set up in Hong Kong in January 
1914. Gurdit Singh was appointed as the managing director.457 
Gurdit Singh was himself a Sikh migrant. He was born in 
Amritsar, Punjab in 1860. Following his father and brother, he went to 
Malaya and Singapore in the 1880s and became a successful 
businessman in the food industry. 458  He was in Hong Kong in 
December 1913 when some Sikhs there were planning to set up a Sikh 
shipping company. Gurdit Singh supported this idea and was asked to 
lead this initiative. In January 1914, he went to Calcutta in an attempt 
to secure a ship that could sail from Calcutta to Vancouver. However, 
for fear that such a ship that took Indians to Canada would violate 
Canadian immigration laws, the Government of India rejected Gurdit’s 
application. Disappointed with this decision, Gurdit Singh returned to 
Hong Kong in March 1914, where he successfully chartered a Japanese 
ship, the Komagata Maru, through a German agent.459  
Once the ship had been secured, the Sikh diasporic network was 
mobilized into supporting the migration business. Agents were sent to 
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Shanghai, Manila, and Yokohama to post advertisements. Information 
was then widely circulated amongst overseas Sikh communities by 
telegrams and through travellers. After hearing the news about this 
new opportunity to get to North America, hopeful migrants flocked to 
the agents’ offices to buy tickets. 460  Drawing on the spread of 
communities in Southeast and East Asia, Gurdit Singh drew out a route 
that covered most parts of this network in order to pick up as many 
passengers as possible. 
On 4 April 1914, the Komagata Maru left Hong Kong with 165 
local Indians. It stopped at Shanghai from 8 to 14 April and picked up 
another 111 Indians. It then sailed for Japan and stopped at Moji and 
Yokohama, where 100 Indians, most of whom came from Manila and 
who had been waiting in Japan for a transfer, boarded the ship. By the 
night of 22 May 1914 when the Komagata Maru reached the coast of 
Vancouver, there were 376 passengers in total on board, of whom all 
but 30 were Sikhs. In this sense, the journey of the Komagata Maru 
from Hong Kong to Vancouver sheds light on how Sikh migrants 
consciously took advantage of their diasporic network in Asia to gain 
information and thence plan their migration to North America in the 
early twentieth century.  
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Figure 18. Komagata Maru near the coast of Vancouver, 1914 (Courtesy of City of 
Vancouver Archives). 
 
The Rise of the Ghadar Party 
The Komagata Maru, however, did not end up berthing in 
Vancouver. The Canadian government prohibited its passengers from 
landing. After two months’ fruitless waiting in Canadian waters, the 
Komagata Maru had to return to Calcutta in July 1914. On 29 
September 1914, when the ship arrived at Budge Budge, seventeen 
miles from Calcutta, the frustrated passengers landed and attempted to 
march to Calcutta in a procession to express their anger towards the 
Indian and Canadian authorities. As policemen tried to stop the 
procession, a riot broke out in which fifteen passengers were killed.461  
The tragedy of the Komagata Maru in fact marked the climax of 
the anti-Indian movements in North America in the early twentieth 
century. From 1905 onwards, the number of Indian immigrants in 
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Canada increased dramatically from just less than one hundred to more 
than five thousand.462 
 
Table 8. Indian Immigration into Canada, 1905-1908463 
 







It is estimated that over ninety percent of the Indian immigrants in 
Canada at that time were Sikhs who had previously worked in 
Southeast Asia and coastal areas of China. Most of them were 
employed by the Canadian Pacific Railways, lumber mills, and 
coalmines.464 The influx of Indians agitated local Canadian workers, 
whose opportunities had already been squeezed by Chinese and 
Japanese immigrants. In the first decade of the twentieth century, one 
Sikh laborer in British Columbia could earn $1 to $2 (Canadian dollars) 
a day while their white counterparts’ daily salary was as high as $6. 
Furthermore, Sikh laborers were able to work for longer hours and in 
harsher conditions.465 Sikh immigrants challenged the position of local 
workers. The conflict over economic issues was furthered by 
discrimination against colored races. Sikhs gained the spurious 																																																								
462 It was reported that 90% Sikh migration to Canada settled down in British 
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reputation of being people who covered dead bodies with butter and 
severed heads with swords. 466  Politicians such as Henry Hubert 
Stevens (MP for Vancouver, 1911-1917) likened the immigration of 
Indians in Canada to an invasion of a corrupted civilization.467 As a 
result, Canadian trade unions and political parties set out to lobby the 
government to revise the immigration laws to put an end to the Indian 
immigration.  
After consulting the British and Indian governments, the 
Canadian authorities issued two Orders-in-Council in 1908 aimed at 
restricting the immigration. Firstly, the sum of the money that a 
migrant must possess when boarding a vessel for Canada was raised 
from $25 to $200. Since few migrants were able to raise such a sum, 
this measure effectively closed the door on their emigration to Canada. 
Furthermore, the same order required all immigrants to have come 
directly from their country of birth or citizenship on a continuous 
journey. In other words, migrants who did not travel from their native 
country were prohibited from entering.468 Since most Canada-bound 
Indian migrants were from Southeast and East Asia and there was no 
direct shipping route from India to Canada at that time, this order 
further blocked the prospect of migration.469 The effect of the new 
policies was so discernible that between 1909 and 1913 only twenty-
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nine Indians managed to enter Canada’s territory.470 The disapproval at 
the attempted landing of passengers from the Komagata Maru in 1914 
was a direct consequence of anti-Indian migration policies.  
Facing discrimination in Canada, Sikhs firstly placed their hope in 
clemency from the British and Indian governments. As subjects of the 
British Empire, Sikh migrants assumed that the imperial governments 
had the responsibility to protect their interests when they faced trouble 
entering another territory within the empire. However, both the British 
government in London and the Government of India in Calcutta 
maintained an intentional silence on Canada’s exclusion plan, on the 
grounds that they too were uneasy about the global movement of the 
Indian population.471 
The discrimination met with from the Canadians and the 
indifferent attitude of the British and Indian governments stirred up 
anti-British sentiments amongst Sikhs in Canada. This sentiment was 
then spread to the United States, California in particular, by migrants 
who crossed into the United States from Canada in around 1909.472 By 
then, it was widely believed amongst the Sikh migrants in North 
America that the ill-treatment and racial discrimination they suffered 
abroad should be attributed to the colonial subjugation at home and 
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that their struggle against political repression in North America should 
become related to the independence struggle of India.473 
Anti-British organizations sprang up in America and Canada in 
around 1910. To coordinate the activities of the various groups and to 
increase influence, a number of meetings were arranged in Oregon and 
California to set up a united organization. Consequently, the Pacific 
Coast Hindi Association (PCHA) was inaugurated in Astoria in early 
June 1914.474 Lala Har Dayal, an influential Indian nationalist who was 
then a lecturer at Stanford University, was elected as the secretary of 
the association. Owing to Har Dayal’s great influence in San Francesco 
and the freedom of expression political parties enjoyed in the United 
States, it was decided that this city should be the publishing and 
propaganda base for the PCHA. 475 In November 1914, a weekly 
newspaper, the Ghadar, was published by the PCHA to broadcast its 
ideas. Because of the newspaper’s enormous influence around the 
world, the PCHA was later known as the Ghadar Party.476  
In the first issue of the Ghadar, the objectives of this party were 
clearly stated:  
																																																								
473 Deol, The Role of the Ghadar Party in the National Movement, 48. 
474 F. C. Isemonger and James Slattery, An Account of the Ghadar Conspiracy, 1913-
1915 (Berkeley: Folklore Institute, 1998), 13-15.  
475 For Lala Har Dayal’s effort in organizing a transnational anti-British network, see 
Henrik Chetan Aspengren, “Indian Revolutionaries Abroad: Revising Their Silent 
Moments,” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 15 (2014), accessed 
10.1353/cch.2014.0045.  
476 Ghadar is an Urdu word that refers to rebellion or revolt. By using this word to 
name their newspaper, the Ghadarites expressed their determination to overthrow the 
British rule in India. For general studies of the Ghdar Party, see Harish Puri, Ghadar 
Movement: Ideology, Organization, and Strategy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev 
University, 1993); Maia Ramnath, Hai to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement 
Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
	 151	
“Today, there begins in foreign lands, but in our 
country’s language, a war against the British Raj. What is 
our name? Ghadar. What is our work? Ghadar. Where will 
Ghadar break out? In India. The time will soon come 
when rifles and blood will take the place of pen and 
ink.”477  
The ultimate goal of the movement was to end British rule in India 
through a violent revolution and to establish a republican government 
based on liberty and equality. However, the Ghadarites also realized 
that the success of their revolution depended very much on how well 
they could propagate their ideas and deepen their influence amongst 
Indians across the globe.478 
 
The Politicization of Sikhs in Shanghai 
Looking for a way to win over sympathy and supporters for their 
political goals, the Ghadar Party had turned their attention to Southeast 
and East Asia since 1914. There were three reasons behind this focus. 
Firstly, most Ghadarites had resided in Southeast and East Asia for 
some time before they left for North America, so their knowledge of 
this region would remarkably facilitate the propaganda and recruitment 
work. Secondly, in the early twentieth century, large numbers of Sikh 
soldiers and policemen were serving in colonies and settlements such 
as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. The Ghadar Party reasoned 
that these servicemen could become the backbone of the planned 																																																								
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revolution in India if the party could successfully win over their loyalty 
to the British. Lastly but importantly, Southeast and East Asia were 
geographically closer to India than North America. If the Ghadarites 
could build up strongholds in this area, it would become easier for 
them to transport agents, arms, and other supplies into India for the 
cause of the revolution.479  
Prior to the 1910s, Sikhs in Shanghai were generally not exposed 
to radical Indian nationalist thinking. Whereas cases of insubordination 
were not uncommon, few were related to the agenda of Indian 
independence and the anti-colonial struggle.480 In fact, the SMC’s 
annual report of 1913 indicated that the discipline of its Sikh police 
unit was very good.481 Nevertheless, the Sikh attitude towards the 
British totally changed after the Komagata Maru incident, which made 
Indians overseas to realize that they would be disgraced in all parts of 
the world because they did not have their own government to protect 
their interests.482 This feeling was especially strong in Shanghai, as 
almost one third of the passengers on board the Komagata Maru were 
Sikhs who had once stayed in this city. When these passengers were 
rejected by the Canadian government and directly deported to India, 
their fellow Sikhs in Shanghai felt that Sikhs as a whole had been 
betrayed by the British. Sikhs complained that they were not allowed 
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to travel freely within the British Empire even though Sikh soldiers 
had fought bravely for the British around the world and shown loyalty 
to the Raj from the Mutiny onwards.  
The Ghadar Party seized this opportunity to expand its influence 
to Shanghai. In July 1914, copies of the Ghadar newspaper were found 
in the North Sichuan Road gurdwara.483 As increasing number of Sikhs 
in Shanghai joined the Ghadar Party and a Shanghai branch of Ghadar 
was thereby formed in late 1914. 484  Bhagwan Singh, a veteran 
Ghadarite, was dispatched from San Francisco to Shanghai to lead this 
branch.485 Taking the gurdwara as the center, Ghadarities started to 
distribute seditious publications, make speeches, collect donations, and 
call for local Sikhs to return to India to overthrow the Raj.486 Not just 
operating in Shanghai, Bhagwan Singh also supervised the formation 
of Ghadar branches in Manila, Hong Kong, Hankou, Singapore, 
Yokohama, the Malay States, and Bangkok from late 1914 to 1915.487 
As he later admitted, these hubs were interconnected with one another 
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so that collected money, arms, seditious publications, intelligence, as 
well as revolutionaries could move back and forth within this 
network.488  
 
Figure 19. Bhagwan Singh, 1919 (Courtesy of South Asian American Digital 
Archive). 
 
The outbreak of World War I in July 1914 dramatically 
accelerated the ongoing process of returning to Asia. As most British 
military forces were entrapped in Europe, the Ghadar Party believed 
that it was a golden opportunity for revolutionaries to take action, 
especially when they secured Germany’s promise that materials would 
be provided.489 Because Shanghai was a free port at the middle point 																																																								
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between North America and India and harbored large numbers of 
Sikhs, it became the center of the Ghadar Party’s conspiracy. All 
returning Ghadarities were asked to assemble in Shanghai before 
making their way back to India.490 The German consul-general in 
Shanghai was authorized by the German government to provide these 
revolutionaries with military training, weapons, and money and to 
supervise their plans.491 
Not all Sikhs in Shanghai supported the Ghadar movement, and 
the German-Ghadar conspiracy was seriously thwarted by Buddha 
Singh, the secretary of the Sikh community in Shanghai. Buddha Singh 
was born in the Majha region of the Punjab in the 1870s. He came to 
Shanghai and joined the SMP as a constable in February 1902. 
According to the Terms of Service for the Indian Branch of the SMP, a 
constable had to spend at least five years before he had a chance to be 
promoted to the rank of Havildar (equal to Sergeant) and it was nearly 
impossible for a common constable to obtain the position of Jemadar 
(equal to Inspector), the highest rank for any Sikh serving in the 
SMP.492 Buddha Singh, however, did not want to bow to this fate. 
Apart from completing his own work in an exemplary way, he also 
served as the treasurer of the local Sikh community and was very 
active in organizing religious festivals, such as the Singh Sabha 																																																																																																																																																	
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Celebration, which gained him considerable respect amongst his 
countrymen.493 The SMC felt Buddha Singh’s rising influence and 
were all too ready to utilize him for their own ends. In February 1906, 
Buddha Singh was made Havildar by the SMP.494 Two years later, he 
was already the secretary of the Sikh community in Shanghai.495The 
insubordination of Sikh policemen in July 1910 that resulted from the 
strife between Majha Sikh and Malwa Sikh furthered Buddha Singh’s 
career.496 Since Naurang Singh, the Jemadar of the Sikh branch and 
also the ringleader of the Majha sect, had been blamed for causing the 
trouble, he was thereby dismissed from the SMP in January 1911.497 
Buddha Singh was then promoted to Jemadar, in place of Naurang 
Singh, to be in charge of the Sikh branch.498 
When the War broke out, Buddha Singh felt the expediency to 
check anti-British elements. In July 1914, he began to investigate the 
circulation of the Ghadar newspaper in Shanghai. He later found that 
these seditious publications were being distributed by seven Ghadar 
Party members, who were also responsible for recruiting local Sikhs 
and transporting them to India. Buddha Singh forwarded the names of 
these men to the SMC, adding that those involved should be arrested. 
Alerted to a possible British crackdown, Ghadarities had to burn all 
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copies of the newspaper in the gurdwara and flee from Shanghai.499 
Even Bhagwan Singh was pressed to leave Shanghai in early 1915.500 
To counter the propaganda of the Ghadar Party, Buddha Singh 
took measures to reinforce Sikh loyalty to the British Empire in 
Shanghai. On 21 November 1915, he presided over the anniversary of 
the birthday of Guru Nanak Singh in the North Sichuan Road 
gurdwara, in which a resolution that called on all Sikhs in Shanghai to 
express their loyalty to the British Raj and to devote their energy and 
means to assist the British government in the war had been passed.501 
To strengthen patriotism and to nurture the sense of obedience 
amongst young Sikhs, Buddha Singh helped to set up the Shanghai 
Sikh Scout Troop in August 1917. Around twenty-five Sikh boys were 
enlisted and received training during World War I.502 Additionally, he 
initiated a movement in late 1917 to exhort Sikhs in Shanghai to 
donate money to the Red Cross in India for the benefit of wounded 
Sikh soldiers who were loyal to and had fought for the British Empire 
during the War.503  
It seems that Buddha Singh’s work outweighed the effort of the 
Ghadar Party in Shanghai. During the War, not a single case of 
insubordination was reported and the discipline of the Sikh police unit 
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was judged to be excellent.504 As a reward for his contribution, Buddha 
Singh was conferred the title of Sirdar Sahib, the most honorable title a 
Sikh had ever been offered in Shanghai, by the Viceroy and Governor-
General of India on 24 November 1917. To glorify this achievement, 
all high-profile British officials in Shanghai attended the ceremony in 
the British Consulate. A procession, which was composed of mounted 
Sikh policemen, European policemen, and Sikh Boy Scouts, was held 
to greet the titleholder. The British Consul-General, Sir Everard Fraser, 
presented the insignia to him in person.505 
 
Turning to the Left 
The Ghadarities did not succeed in building Shanghai into a 
revolutionary hub during World War I, nor did they do so in India. 
Although more than eight thousand Ghadarites returned to India from 
North America and the Far East in the first two years of World War 
I,506 the tightened surveillance implemented by the British authorities 
around the world made the importation of arms into India very 
difficult.507 Without adequate arms, returning Ghadarites failed to put 
their plan into action. Furthermore, when the Ghadarites attempted to 
mobilize the peasants in the Punjab to support their cause, they 
frustratingly found that the Punjabi masses were not ready for a 
revolution. Indeed, most Punjabis were inspired by the patriotism to 
support the Government of India’s involvement in the War instead of 																																																								
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seizing the opportunity to overthrow it.508 The Ghadarites then turned 
their energy to induce a mutiny of the Indian troops in the Punjab. 
However, the lack of coordination and the leak of the information led 
to the breakdown of that plan in February 1915. Sixty-three Ghadarites 
were arrested and the rest fled from India.509 
The breakdown of the 1915 conspiracy marked the end of active 
movement of the Ghadar Party in India. Meanwhile, in the United 
States, factions broke out within the Ghadar Party and seriously 
weakened its strength.510 In April 1917, the United States entered the 
War. As an ally of the British, the U.S. government immediately took 
action against the Ghadar Party in its territory. When its headquarters 
in San Francisco was closed down and its key members were arrested, 
the party went underground.511   
As World War I ended in 1918, the Ghadarites had to admit that 
their golden opportunity of ousting the British had lost. The failure of 
the revolutionary movement resulted in a self-critical review amongst 
the Ghadarites. The experience of the successful Bolshevik revolution 
in Russia was appraised.512 Most Ghadarites agreed that their problem 
could be attributed to the lack of a politically conscious mass base in 
the Punjab. And to politicalize the population, their party should be 
more systematic and organized and should have an appealing political 																																																								
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agenda. In the years following World War I, the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology was a must-try choice.513 
In fact, since the very beginning of the Ghadar Party, its leaders 
had realized that their struggle against racial discrimination in North 
America and colonial subjugation in India was a part of a broader 
movement against colonialism across the globe. As Seema Sohi 
observes, Ghadarities sought to establish an independent India in a new 
world order that embraced the liberation of all colonized nations.514 
This agenda was highly compatible with the Bolshevik call for a global 
revolution and thereby drew the two parties closer.  
As the Ghadar Party turned towards the left, the Comintern (The 
Communist International) also turned to Asia in an attempt to discover 
a breach that would destroy world capitalism.515 It immediately located 
India’s essential role not only for the British Empire, but also for the 
global capita1ist system. It was then believed that a communist 
revolution in India would bring down the economy of Britain and also 
set an example to other colonized people in Asia. Nevertheless, the 
dominant nationalist political power in India then was the Indian 
National Congress, which neither favored the communist ideology nor 
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supported any violent revolution. The Ghadar Party, with its workers’ 
backgrounds and its aspiration for a military revolution, was soon 
taken by Moscow as a potential ally. Moreover, the cosmopolitan 
outlook of the Ghadar Pary, especially its network in Southeast and 
East Asia, was much appreciated by the Comintern, owing to 
Moscow’s vision of a global revolution that required worldwide 
outposts.516  
Around 1920, the Ghadar Party in the United States established a 
direct contact with the Comintern. Emissaries were sent to Moscow to 
report on the Ghadar activities in America and to ask for support.517 
From 1926, almost one hundred Ghadarites from Canada, America, 
and China were dispatched to Moscow for education and training in 
the University of the East (Communist University of the Toilers of the 
East).518 The trainees had to attend courses on the Russian language, 
revolutionary history, the political economy, tactics and strategies of 
the proletarian revolution, party-building, and Marxism for almost one 
year. In addition, military training and factory work were also provided 
for practical experience.519 When courses and trainings were complete, 
many Ghadarites went on to Kabul, Afghanistan, whence they would 
look for a way to infiltrate back into the Punjab.520  
The Ghadar base in Kabul, however, did not cause much trouble 
to the Raj on the grounds that their support from Moscow was very 																																																								
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limited. In fact, since the Comintern-supported Islamic movement, the 
Khilafat, had failed in Central Asia in 1924, Moscow’s focus had 
gradually shifted from Afghanistan and India to China. 521  This 
strategic shift had been expedited by the change in China’s domestic 
politics. In 1923, the Sun Yat-sen-led Guomindang (GMD) chose to 
operate alongside with the Soviet Union, in the hope that the Soviet 
Union’s support would help it defeat warlords and unify China. In 
exchange, the GMD agreed that members of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) could join its organization. Agents of the Comintern such 
as Mikhail Borodin were dispatched to assist the GMD.522  
The May Thirtieth Movement that happened in Shanghai in mid-
1925 opened the window for the cooperation between Chinese 
nationalists and the Ghadar Party. In 1925, the GMD-CCP alliance was 
very active in organizing labor unions in Shanghai. Conflicts were 
intensified between foreign factory managers and Chinese workers. On 
15 May 1925, a Chinese worker was killed by a Japanese security 
guard during a strike at a Japanese cotton mill in Shanghai. On 30 May, 
thousands of Chinese students amassed in front of the Louza police 
station of the International Settlement to ask for the punishment of the 
murderer and the release of students who involved in previous protests. 																																																								
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British police officers gave the order to fire at the crowd, killed 
thirteen Chinese and wounded more than one hundred.523 Thanks to the 
organization of the GMD-CCP alliance, this incident triggered strong 
anti-British sentiment across the country, as mass anti-British 
demonstrations were staged in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Hankou and 
other big cities. 524  The GMD-CCP alliance benefited from this 
movement at the cost of warlords. Their propaganda made many 
contemporary Chinese believe that a unified China under the rule of a 
strong political party was necessary for getting rid of British 
imperialism.525 Inspired by this popularity, the GMD-CCP alliance 
initiated the Northern Expedition in 1926, which intended to reunify 
China by force. Sharing a similar pro-communist and anti-British 
agenda with the Chinese nationalists, the Ghadarites were all too ready 
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From Hankou to Shanghai: The Ghadar Hubs in China 
In October 1926, the National Revolutionary Army (the military 
force of the GMD) took Hankou (except this city’s foreign concessions) 
from a warlord, General Wu Peifu. Hankou was a treaty port along the 
Yangtze River. In 1862, British expatriates set up the Hankou 
Municipal Council to manage the British concession in this city.527 A 
police unit was also established that year. 528  Frustrated by the 
corruption and low efficiency of Chinese policemen in the 1890s, the 
Hankou Municipal Council decided to follow the SMC’s model to set 
up a Sikh police unit.529 In 1894, sixteen Sikhs were enlisted from 
Shanghai.530 Since the British authorities there were satisfied with the 
performance of Sikh policemen, more Sikhs had been brought to 
Hankou in following years. 
Table 9. Sikh Policemen Serving in Hankou’s British Concession 
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In addition to working in the police force, more than one hundred 
Sikhs were employed as watchmen and guards in Hankou. In 1925 
Hankou was the largest concentration of Sikhs in Mainland China 
apart from Shanghai.535 However, the Ghadar Party failed to expand its 
influence in Hankou before 1926, owing to the surveillance of the 
British authorities. As Hankou fell into the hands of the nationalists, 
many Ghadarites went there to establish contact with the Chinese 
nationalists. With the support of the GMD and the CCP, a Ghadar 
stronghold was founded in Hankou in early 1927 under the leadership 
of Dasundha Singh.536  
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Dasundha Singh was a North America-based Ghadarite, who had 
studied in the University of British Columbia. He terminated his 
studies and went to China in 1926.537 After he had stayed several 
months in Beijing, the Comintern suggested that he should move to 
Hankou to promote a revolutionary struggle there. Dasundha Singh 
arrived in Hankou in January 1927 and soon set up a printing press to 
publish the seditious newspaper Hindustan Ghadar Dhandora. With 
this newspaper, Dasundha Singh attempted to promote the Sino-Indian 
friendship by highlighting the shared fate of the two nations and called 
for Indian soldiers, policemen, and watchmen in China to subvert their 
service to the British and join the Chinese nationalist movement.538 For 
example, one issue of this newspaper claimed, “The dutiful sons of 
China are fighting for the freedom of their country. The freedom of 
India and the freedom of China have a close connection with each 
other. By the freedom of China the day of the freedom of India will 
draw near.”539 In another issue, it called on the Indians in China “to 
create a general mutiny and exterminate the unjust British rule with the 
power of their military knowledge and having cut the chains of slavery 
of their mother country”.540 In addition to circulating propagandist 
newspapers, Dasundha Singh also maintained a close relationship with 
the GMD and thus obtained substantial support. At his request, more 																																																								
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than eighty Sikhs received military training from the GMD in early 
1927 and were ready to fight for the Chinese Nationalist 
Government.541 To buoy up the Northern Expedition (1926 to 1928) 
that aimed to annihilate warlords and foreign imperialists, Ghadarites 
in Hankou went onto streets to denounce evil deeds perpetrated by the 
British both in India and China in an effort to win over Sikh soldiers 
and policemen serving for the British in China.542 
Between late 1926 and early 1927, large-scale anti-British 
demonstrations that called for boycotting British commodities, 
terminating the extraterritoriality, and reclaiming the British 
concession were organized by the GMD-CCP alliance across China. 
Clashes between Chinese protestors and British marines and policemen 
occurred time and again.543 As a response to the tension, the British 
authorities dispatched a Punjabi regiment from Calcutta to Shanghai in 
January 1927.544 Sikh soldiers of that regiment soon became the targets 
of the Ghadar Party, as Ghadar leaders masterminded a plan to induce 
these soldiers to desert to Hankou.545  On 21 March 1927, a Ghadar 
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Party member, Sangat Singh, tried to seduce some Sikh soldiers in 
Shanghai to desert. Sangat Singh claimed that soldiers in the Indian 
Army were just like slaves of the British. He left the army long ago for 
freedom, and the soldiers should do the same. Furthermore, he added 
that the Chinese would soon take over the International Settlement and 
that Indians who fought for the British would all be killed. Sangat 
Singh also presented a song that was full of anti-British sentiments.546 
Although Sangat Singh failed to persuade the soldiers, this move 
greatly worried the British authorities. In fear that Indian soldiers were 
likely to be exposed to nationalist propaganda, the British authorities 
cut down the reinforcement and confined them within the barracks in 
Shanghai.547 
On 4 January 1927, tens of thousands of Chinese demonstrators 
flocked into the British concession in Hankou, Realizing that they 
could not obtain the reinforcement from Shanghai’s Indian regiment 
and that their forces were totally outnumbered, the British authorities 
gave up their concession and withdrew all of their expatriates, soldiers, 
and policemen to Shanghai.548 Greatly inspired by the success in 
Hankou, Chinese nationalists and the Ghadarities turned their attention 
to Shanghai, the epicenter of British interests in China. The Ghadar 
Party even worked up a plan to seduce Sikh policemen in Shanghai 
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and help the Chinese nationalists to retake the International Settlement. 
According to this plan, those converted Shanghai Sikhs would later be 
transported to India via Tibet under the auspices of the Chinese and the 
Comintern.549 
As stated earlier, Shanghai was the stronghold of the Ghadar 
movement in East Asia during World War I. As the Ghadar movement 
revived and allied itself with the Comintern in early 1920s, Shanghai 
again became one of the main arenas. In March 1923, the Comintern 
suggested that a certain amount of Communist propaganda be carried 
out amongst the Indians in China and that pamphlets published in some 
Indian languages be brought out particularly appealing to Sikhs.550 
Since Shanghai harbored the largest Indian community in China 
(numbering 1, 076 in the International Settlement alone in 1927), it 
immediately drew the attention of the Comintern.551 Indians who were 
openly Bolshevik in tendency were dispatched to Shanghai to breed 
anti-British sentiment among Sikh policemen and watchmen there.552  
In June 1923, seditious publications were found in the Sikh 
Branch of the SMP. It was reported that prints that depicted how 
Indian nationalists fought against the British and how Indians were ill 
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treated by the British had been hung on the wall of the rooms in the 
Sikh barracks.553 
To expedite anti-British activities in Shanghai, the Hindustan 
Association was set up in the French concession by Harbaksh Singh, 
the ringleader of Shanghai’s Indian nationalist movement in December 
1923.554 Harbaksh Singh set out to edit a newspaper called Hindu 
Jagawa that published articles such as “British Barbarism in India” 
and “British Justice gone Bankrupt”, which aimed to subvert the 
loyalty of Sikhs serving in the SMP. By April 1924, almost six 
hundred copies of the newspaper had been printed in the printing 
establishment of E. Shing & Co. at Sichuan Road.555  
It seems that Harbaksh Singh’s work was very effective. When he 
was prosecuted in the British Police Court on the charge of publishing 
seditious matter in April 1924, several hundred local Sikhs went to the 
court to express their support for the accused. Many Sikhs appeared 
with black turbans on their heads, signifying their adherence to the 
Indian nationalist movement. As the court sentenced Harbaksh Singh 
to two months in prison with hard labor, the Sikh crowd cheered him 
as a martyr.556  
As Harbaksh Singh, together with some of his principal 
colleagues, had been deported back to India in October 1924, Indian 
nationalist activities were on the wane in Shanghai in the following 																																																								
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two years.557 Nevertheless, Harbaksh Singh had paved the way for the 
full mobilization of the Sikhs in Shanghai for the nationalist cause and 
his enterprise was about to be fueled by the Chinese nationalist 
revolution and its Northern Expedition. 
Despite the fact that the strength of the Indian nationalist 
movement in Shanghai had been dramatically weakened since the 
deportation of Harbaksh Singh, the Ghadar Party, under the instruction 
of the Comintern, dispatched its members from Hankou and San 
Francisco to Shanghai to implement the scheme of helping the Chinese 
retake the International Settlement. In February 1927, nearly forty 
Ghadarites, led by two prominent nationalists, Puram Singh and Jaghat 
Singh, left San Francisco for Shanghai. 558  To circumvent the 
interception of British intelligence officers in the west coast of the 
United States, most returning Ghadarites went to Mexico and produced 
false passports there before made their way to Shanghai.559 Around the 
same time, a Ghadar emissary, Dasawandha Singh of Hoshiarpur, 
accompanied by an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence, went to 
Shanghai from Hankou to collaborate with all relevant elements.560 
On landing in Shanghai, the Ghadarities immediately learned that 
certain influential individuals in the SMP had thwarted efforts made by 
their comrades, including Harbaksh Singh, to build Shanghai into an 
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anti-British stronghold. Amongst those collaborators, the Jemadar of 
the Sikh Branch of the SMP, Buddha Singh, had played a central role.  
 
“I kill Him Because He was a Bad Man” 
After World War I, Buddha Singh was made the leader of the 
Sikh community in Shanghai. Nevertheless, his pro-British policies 
and heavy-handed approach towards the nationalist movement agitated 
many revolutionaries. In January 1923, copies of the newspaper Hindu 
Jagawa were seized by the SMP in the headquarters of the Hindustan 
Association in Rue du Consulat, the French concession of Shanghai. 
The editor of this newspaper, Harbaksh Singh, who was viewed as the 
ringleader of the Indian nationalist movement in Shanghai at that time, 
was then charged with publishing seditious papers that would result in 
a breach of public peace. The evidence for this charge lay in an article 
entitled “One Who Seeks the Blood of His Brethren for His Own 
Personal Benefit”. The article blamed Buddha Singh for using the 
Gurdwara’s money to buy gifts for his British officers in order to 
flatter them. It alleged, “Outwardly he [Buddha Singh] seems to love 
his people, but inwardly he is against them and on the side of the 
government”. Furthermore, the article described Buddha Singh as a 
traitor and a killer of the Indian nation and “to love him is like giving 
milk to a poisonous snake”.561  
In fact, the Ghadar Party had long regarded Buddha Singh as a 
thorn in their side. In June 1914, Buddha Singh received a letter from 
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the Ghadar Party that threatened to kill him for his disloyalty to the 
Indian people.562 On the morning of 15 July 1914, days after Buddha 
Singh had forwarded the names of seven Ghadarities to the SMC, he 
was assaulted by ex-policeman, Lal Singh, in Yuanfang Road. Lal 
Singh hit his leg with a heavy stick. A later investigation found that 
Lal Singh was a friend of those on the name list and might well be a 
Ghadar member.563 Ten days later, Buddha Singh was again attacked 
in Yuanfang Road. Three assailants, who were alleged Ghadarites, 
intercepted Buddha Singh when he was passing through a certain 
alleyway and knocked him down. They tried to blind him by fiercely 
attacking his eyes and head. Buddha Singh was so serious injured that 
he was unconscious for several days.564 On 3 October 1923 when he 
was on a ship bound for Hong Kong, four Sikhs approached and came 
to inform him that one day, someone would kill him and that killer was 
willing to become a martyr for the cause.565 Buddha Singh understood 
that these threats were real and told his friends on numerous occasions 
that he would meet his fate by being assassinated by these 
revolutionaries.566 
In early 1927, Shanghai had become the battlefield between the 
British authorities, represented by the SMC, and various kinds of anti-
British elements, including the GMD, the Comintern, the CCP-backed 
Shanghai General Labor Union (the Labor Union thereafter), and the 																																																								
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Ghadar Party. Meetings had frequently been held by these elements to 
discuss how to collaborate with one another to weaken and overthrow 
the dominating imperialists in Shanghai.567 With the help of the Labor 
Union, the Ghadarites set up their headquarters in Zhabei, an area 
outside the British-controlled International Settlement.568 The local 
GMD branch also offered protection to the Ghadarites.569 All parties 
agreed that the Ghadarites should work hard to provoke a strike 
amongst the Sikh policemen. It was believed that such a strike would 
not only showcase the unity of the Chinese and Indian people in 
fighting against the imperialism, but would effectively put an end to 
Western rule, which relied on the policing work of Sikhs in the 
International Settlement.570 
The challenge now lay on how to stir up an appropriate strike.571 
In January 1927, the Labor Union hatched a plan to call on the Chinese 
in the Tramways Company (Shanghai Electric Construction Company) 
to go on strike, with the idea that the strike would totally disrupt traffic 
and thus cause chaos in the International Settlement. Nevertheless, 
Nyeh Tien-sung, the manager of the company’s Chinese staff and one 
of the most influential Chinese in the company, refused to cooperate 
with the Labor Union and discouraged workers from holding 
demonstrations. On the morning of 12 January 1927, Nyeh was shot 
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dead by three union members in Bubbling Well Road.572 Only one day 
after this assassination, the strike actually took place and caused great 
disorder to the SMC.573   
The methods used by the Labor Union to initiate the strike were 
closely studied by the Ghadarites. What the Ghadarites learned from 
Nyeh’s case was that the assassination of certain key people who were 
amongst the opposition would intimidate others and clear the way for 
the strike.574 Buddha Singh, a counterpart of Nyeh Tien-sung in the 
SMP, was set as the primary target.  
 
Figure 21. Shanghai residents welcoming the nationalist troops, 1927 (Courtesy of 
Adam Scott Armstrong). 
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On 23 March 1927, one day after the Labor Union workers had 
defeated the troops of the warlord and controlled most parts of 
Shanghai (except for the International Settlement and the French 
Concession), two Chinese workers visited the gurdwara in North 
Sichuan Road. A letter, which was written in the Gurmukhi language 
and which was probably penned by an Indian agent of the Comintern 
in Shanghai, was shown to Gurbakh Singh, a local Ghadarite who lived 
in the gurdwara. After a short while, Gajjan Singh, the leader of the 
Ghadar Party’s Shanghai branch, appeared and led the two Chinese 
into the temple library. In the ensuing meeting, the Chinese men 
showed a .32 calibre Browning automatic pistol to the Sikhs. A trial 
shooting was made and this left a bullet hole in the corrugated iron 
roof. After handing over the pistol to the Sikhs, the Chinese left.575 As 
the gun was prepared, the Ghadarties were looking for an assassin to 
carry out this task. 
As discussed earlier, the Sikh insubordination incident on 15 July 
1910 facilitated Buddha Singh’s promotion as the Jemadar of the Sikh 
branch. This incident, however, also influenced the fate of another man, 
Harbant Singh. On the afternoon of 15 July 1910, Harbant Singh, a 
Majha Sikh policeman, joined his fellows (including Isser Singh, who 
is the protagonist of Chapter 2) to protest about the SMP’s decision to 
lay off a Majha interpreter and refused to carry out the officer’s 
orders.576 As a result of this insubordination, the SMC refused to 																																																								
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recontract him by the end of his five-year service. Harbant Singh then 
found a job in the Shanghai Custom but was soon dismissed for 
bribery. He worked as a watchman afterward and maintained a close 
relationship with Indian nationalists such as Harbaksh Singh, Harnam 
Singh, and Gajjan Singh. Influenced by Harbaksh Singh, Harbant 
Singh also made several attempts to undermine the influence of Sikh 
police officers serving in the SMP by accusing them of unfair 
treatment of their countrymen and loyalty to British imperialism.577 
Nevertheless, it seems that these efforts failed to work very well, and 
Buddha Singh still enjoyed great popularity amongst some of the Sikh 
policemen. 
In January 1927, Harbant Singh resigned his work and moved to 
the North Sichuan Road gurdwara. From then on, he remained there, 
prepared food for the committee of the gurdwara, and subsisted on 
assistance from some Ghadarites.578  
On 24 March, one day after the Chinese man had presented the 
pistol to Gajjan Singh, Harbant Singh told Harnam Singh and Ishar 
Snigh, both of whom were important Ghadarites, that he would 
volunteer to assassinate Buddha Singh and promised that he would do 
the job courageously.579 
 As the gun and the assassin had both been organized, Gajjan 
Singh and Harbant Singh went to the Central Police Station in Fuzhou 
Road on March 28 to familiarize themselves with the locations that 
Buddha Singh frequented. Gajjan Singh also asked a Sikh policeman 																																																								
577 SMA, U1-3-2429, “Prosecution of Harbaksh Singh,” Jan. 19, 1924. 
578 “SMP v. Harnam Singh, et al.,” North China Herald, May 14, 1927. 
579 “REX v. Harnam Singh, et al.,” North China Herald, May 21, 1927. 
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questions about the times when Buddha Singh arrived and left his 
office.580  
 
Figure 22. Map of the International Settlement, Shanghai, 1920s (Courtesy of 
Shanghai Municipal Archives). The arrow in the map indicates how Harban Singh 
walked from Nanjing Road to the Central Station. The star is the location where the 
shooting happened. 
 
At about 8:45 a.m., 6 April 1927 (Wednesday), Harbant Singh 
arrived on the corner of Nanjing (Nanking) Road. He stopped there for 
about ten minutes and turned in to Henan (Honan) Road. He continued 
lingering in Henan Road until 9:50 a.m. when he saw Buddha Singh 
appear from the direction of Nanjing Road. Buddha Singh was walking 
on the right side of the road while Harbant Singh was on the left side. 
As Buddha Singh reached the crossroads of Henan Road and Fuzhou 
(Foochow) Road and turned towards the gate of the station, Harbant 




Sikh watchmen in the International Settlement, there were nearly thirty 
Sikhs around in the vicinity of the police station waiting to get their 
monthly salaries when Harbant Singh approached to Buddha Singh. 
Because of this situation, Buddha Singh failed to pay special attention 
to the oncoming man. Just as Buddha Singh arrived at the gate, 
Harbant Singh drew the pistol and shouted, “I have come!” Buddha 
Singh turned around and tried to use the stick in his hand to hit 
Harbant Singh. However, it was too late as Harbant Singh had shot 
him three times.581  
 
Figure 23. The SMP Central Station, 1930s (Courtesy of Historical Photographs of 
China Project). 
 
The first bullet penetrated the chest of Buddha Singh through the 
second right rib and entered the large blood vessel near the heart and 
finally came to rest in the spine. The second bullet entered the left side 
of the chest. It came in through the back and crossed through the left 																																																								
581 “REX v. Harbant Singh,” North China Herald, May 21, 1927.  
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lung, finally making its exit through the upper left part of the chest. 
The third bullet failed to penetrate Buddha Singh’s body but just 
grazed the left shoulder blade.582  
When the shooting occurred at around 10:00 a.m., Bhan Singh, a 
Sikh policeman, was walking through the crowds who were going into 
the police station gate. Surprised by the shots, Bhan Singh turned his 
head and saw Harbant Singh stood on the footpath halfway between 
the gate and Henan Road with a pistol in his hand. At the same time, 
he saw Buddha Singh lying on the footpath, raising his hands and 
crying, “Call for help, I am dying.” Bhan Singh rushed to Harbant 
Singh and caught hold of him from behind. 583 
The Sub-Inspector of the SMP, C. S. Philips, was in the general 
office of the Central Police Station when he heard the first shot. He 
rushed into the compound to see if someone had accidently fired off a 
round when the other two shots rang out. He located the firing in 
Fuzhou Road and dashed to the location. When Philips arrived there, 
he saw Harbant Singh struggling in the arms of Bhan Singh. He 
immediately covered Harbant Singh with his gun and got hold of 
Harbant Singh’s pistol. Harbant Singh had now been totally overcome 
by Bhan Singh and Philips and was taken to the station charge room. 
Throughout the process Harbant Singh said nothing.584 
While Bhan Singh and Philips were grappling with Harbant Singh, 
Ahjan Singh, a police interpreter, attended to Buddha Singh. Although 
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he found Buddha Singh was still breathing on the ground, the wounded 
man died on the way to the General Hospital.585 
The assassination of Buddha Singh appalled the SMP. Asserting 
that the murder was of a “seditious” nature rather than a common feud, 
a strong reaction had to be taken immediately. In the afternoon on the 
day, British soldiers raided the North Sichuan Road gurdwara under 
the directions of the Assistant Commissioner of the SMP, W. Beatty, 
who was in charge of the Sikh branch. A total of eleven Sikhs were 
arrested.586 However, due to the help of the Labor Union, key players 
such as Gajjan Singh and Haram Singh fled into Zhabei and were 
protected by the communists.587 
In the afternoon of 8 April 1927, the SMC held one of the most 
impressive funerals ever seen in Shanghai for Buddha Singh. His 
remains were moved from the Public Mortuary in Fearon Road to the 
Sikh Crematorium on the Settlement side of Jiangwan Road. The 
procession was headed by eight Sikh troops, followed by the municipal 
band, who were succeeded by Sikh granthis. The hearse was loaded 
with wreaths. The coffin was shrouded with the municipal flag, on 
which reposed Buddha Singh’s sword and his long service medal.588 
Investigations and prosecutions on this case were carried out in 
the next two months. Harbant Singh did not reveal anything about his 
accessories in court but only claimed, “I kill him [Buddha Singh] 																																																								
585 “REX v. Harbant Singh,” North China Herald, Apr. 16, 1927. 
586 “Yindu gemindang kaihui beiju” (Indian revolutionaries being arrested), Shenbao, 
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because he was a bad man”. He was then sentenced to death and was 
hanged on 18 June 1927. 
The SMP, however, did not stop hunting down those who were 
suspected of being involved in this case. On 12 April 1927, Chiang 
Kai-shek openly set out to purge communists and labor union members 
in Shanghai. Losing the protection from the communists, the position 
of the Ghadarites became very vulnerable. On 9 May 1927, the SMP 
made a sudden raid on the headquarters of the Ghadar branch in 
Zhabei and arrested eleven Sikhs. Important figures such as Gajjan 
Singh, Harnam Singh, and the Comintern agent Daswandha Singh 
were amongst those arrested and sentences ranging from twelve to 
eighteen months imprisonment with deportation were passed on 
them.589 
 
The Rise of a Surveillance Network 
Although Buddha Singh was murdered, the proposed strike of the 
Sikh policemen never took place. Immediately following the 
assassination, the SMP took action to hunt down Indian nationalists in 
Shanghai. Within two months, almost all important Ghadarites had 
been located and placed in custody. 
In terms of the cosmopolitan feature of this conspiracy, it comes 
as a surprise that the SMP could spot the Ghadarites’ identities and 
activities in such an accurate and prompt way. Through the use of what 
kind of mechanism did the SMP obtain the relevant information about 																																																								
589  FO 371/12460, “Indian Sedition in Shanghai,” May 10, 1927, 359-361; 
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their targets? In 1926, an intelligence officer working for the 
Government of India reported that the SMP’s own sources of 
information were extremely limited.590 If this officer’s observation was 
fair, the question becomes more interesting as to how the SMP made a 
successful raid based on their poor information gathering system?591 
Was that mechanism only confined within the International Settlement 
of Shanghai or of multilateral elements that cooperated with one 
another? 
In February 1927, the British Consulate-General in San Francisco 
was then informed by an insider that certain important figures in the 
Ghadar Party had left for Shanghai to organize an anti-British 
movement there. It was further specified that these Ghadarites had 
been in correspondence with an Indian “agitator” in Shanghai by the 
name of Gajjan Singh. A telegram was soon dispatched to the British 
Embassy in Washington D.C. and was forwarded to the British 
Consulate-General in Shanghai.592 The SMP also received a copy of 
this information and was asked to keep a close watch over these 
Indians. As a result, the SMP actually did have adequate knowledge 
																																																								
590 FO 371/11688, From V .M. Smith to D. Petrie, Mar. 28, 1926, 263.  
591 The political intelligence-gathering unit was established by the SMP in 1898 and 
it was renamed as the Special Branch in 1925. Firstly, it was responsible for colleting 
information of the Chinese authorities and anti-British activities in Chinese territory. 
Since 1925, it had turned its attention to communist movement in China, especially 
Comintern agents and CCP members. An Indian unit of the Special Branch was set 
up in 1927 to check Indian nationalists in Shanghai, see Wakeman, Policing 
Shanghai, 142-145.  
592 FO 371/12470, From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State fro India, 
Jan. 28, 1927, 180; FO 371/12487, “Activities of Ghadar Party in United States of 
America,” Apr. 25, 1927, 183.  
	 184	
about whom they should pay specific attention to and where to make 
the arrest if a situation suddenly developed.593 
The inter-war period between 1919 and 1939 witnessed the rise of 
internationalism. Whether it be the nationalist, anarchist, communist, 
fascist, or Pan-Islamic movement, they all attempted to resist the 
confines of states and seek support and legitimacy across the globe. 
Internationalism stimulated strong reactions from colonial powers as 
cooperation between police forces, the institution of passport and visa 
regimes, and the restrictions on international travel were 
materialized. 594  The Buddha Singh case was a part of this 
internationalist moment as it illustrates how the British authorities in 
different areas used cooperation to check on the Ghadarites flowing in. 
What helped the SMP in this case were not only its own intelligence 
agents, but also an information gathering and sharing network that 
stretched from India to North America. The rise of this surveillance 
network was inseparable with the cross-boundary movement of the 
Ghadarites.595 
As discussed, the expansion of the Ghadar Party was largely 
based on the network of the Sikh diaspora. Its branches were mostly in 
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cities where large numbers of Sikh migrants stayed. British authorities 
in these cities, however, failed to follow this pattern of global 
revolution in the early 1920s. Colonial governments, consulates, and 
embassies were merely responsible for checking anti-British activities 
within their specific jurisdictions, and did not have mechanisms to 
express concerns, share information or conduct cooperative missions. 
Sometimes, they even quarreled with one another.596 
On 19 August 1920, two Indians, Kala Khan and Fazal Elahi, 
were arrested in Hong Kong as destitute. The report showed that both 
men had been warders in the SMP before they were dismissed for 
insubordination, and were sent by the SMC to Hong Kong in July 1920. 
A complaining letter was immediately dispatched by the Captain 
Superintendent of the Hong Kong Police to his counterpart in Shanghai 
to protest against the SMP’s irresponsible policy of allowing dismissed 
troublemakers to move on to Hong Kong. The letter even warned that 
the Hong Kong Government would no longer allow any Indian from 
Shanghai to land if the Shanghai authorities did not provide them with 
passage tickets to India.597 For Kala Khan and Fazal Elahi, the Hong 
Kong government asked the SMC to pay $107 (Mexican dollars) for 
the cost of two passages from Hong Kong to India.598 
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This request, however, was firmly rejected by the SMC. In reply 
to Hong Kong’s charge, K. J. McEuen, the Commissioner of the SMP, 
argued that it was reasonable to issue passports to the dismissed Indian 
policemen who intended to go to Hong Kong, mainly because large 
Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communities there could provide help for 
them. He also stressed that the Hong Kong government should resort 
to the Government of India for the funds for deportation.599  
Frustrated by the SMC’s stubbornness, the Hong Kong 
government decided to take harsher action. In March 1921, the Hong 
Kong Police detained another arriving Indian who was a dismissed 
warder from Shanghai. This time, they directly deported this man back 
to Shanghai and asked the shipping company to collect the fees from 
the SMC.600 
From the perspective of the SMC, however, Hong Kong’s 
reaction was neither justified nor fair, mainly because the Hong Kong 
authorities did the same thing to the SMC. In October 1920, two 
Indians, Gaya Din and Charam Singh, were arrested in Shanghai for 
organizing anti-British activities. It was found that both men were 
members of the Ghadar branch in Shanghai and were deported from 
Shanghai to India in 1918. In May 1920, Charam Singh successfully 
obtained a passport for Hong Kong in Simla. Four months later, Gaya 
Din also secured a passport for Hong Kong in Calcutta. Once they 
arrived in Hong Kong in September 1920, they applied to continue 																																																								
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their trip to Shanghai. Without any serious inquiry, the Hong Kong 
government approved their application.601  
In the eyes of the SMC, it was the fault of the Hong Kong 
government that led to the return of these deportees. If the Hong Kong 
government allowed deported Indian revolutionaries to return to 
Shanghai, how could it blame the SMC for granting dismissed 
policemen and warders a passage to Hong Kong?602 
To settle these disputes, G. C. Denham, the envoy of the SMC, 
went to Hong Kong in June 1921. Denham highlighted that a 
mechanism for dealing with Indians in China should be established 
amongst authorities in India, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. 603  This 
proposal, however, failed to draw adequate attention at that time as 
Hong Kong and Shanghai kept accusing each other. 
In June 1924, the British Consul at Changsha reported to the 
Consul-General at Shanghai on the anti-British activities of an Indian 
nationalist, Jewan Singh, in Changsha.604 An investigation revealed 
that Jewan Singh was an active Ghadar member in Shanghai in the 
1910s and had been deported to India in July 1918. Imitating his 
comrades such as Gaya Din and Charam Singh, he applied in Lahore 
for a passport to travel to Hong Kong in October 1920. In Hong Kong, 
he concealed the fact of his deportation and successfully made his way 
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to Shanghai, from where he travelled extensively to breed anti-British 
sentiments amongst Indians across China.605  
The increasing number of returned deportees, especially the return 
of such influential figures as Jewan Singh, greatly concerned the 
British authorities. In August 1924, a scheme to check deportees from 
Shanghai was initiated by the British Foreign Office. The SMP was 
required to provide a complete list of all deportation from 1912 to 
1924. A total of fifty individuals, together with their photographs and 
identification particulars, were produced. Copies of the deportees’ 
information were then circulated to India, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
Authorities in the three colonies were requested to intercept any 
deportee who attempted to return to Shanghai using this shared 
information.606 
This mechanism of checking deportees, however, was unable to 
rein in the large-scale flow of Indian nationalists in the 1920s. As more 
and more North America-based Ghadarites slipped into China, the 
Government of India had gradually developed a sense of the scale of 
the emergency. In early 1926, V. M. Smith, a police officer working in 
India, was dispatched to Southeast and East Asia to evaluate the 
information gathering work pertaining to the Indian nationalist 
movement there.   
Smith was disappointed by the fact that the means of collecting 
intelligence in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore were extremely 
limited and that there existed no cooperation amongst the colonies and 																																																								
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settlements. In Shanghai, he observed that the SMP had inadequate 
sources of information in spite of Shanghai’s essential role as a 
political hub. Because Hong Kong did not have a centralized provision 
for the systematic collection of information, it had been classified as 
the weakest link in the chain of information-gathering work in East 
Asia. Although Singapore had an officer who was responsible for 
collecting political intelligence from India, Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, 
and the Dutch East Indies, he had no executive staff of his own, and 
was usually overworked.607  
To strengthen these outposts’ surveillance capability, Smith 
suggested that the Government of India could initiate an information 
distribution framework between itself and all these three ports. 
Through sharing information about the movements and identities of 
suspected Indian nationalists with one another, it was expected that the 
Ghadar-led anti-British activities in Shanghai could be kept under 
close watch. 608 
The Government of India not only accepted Smith’s proposal, but 
also authorized him to take charge of realizing this surveillance 
network. From January 1927, Smith was in Shanghai censoring Indian 
correspondence, both from Shanghai to the outside and from other 
areas to Shanghai. Additionally, he watched the attitude of the Indian 
community, Sikhs in particular, towards the British authorities and 
helped in the supervision of the passenger traffic from the Far East to 
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India. Last but not least, he paid special attention to the Bolshevik 
propaganda in Shanghai and its influence over Sikhs.609  
However, without the help of the British Consul-General at 
Shanghai and the SMC, Smith could hardly get very far with his work. 
A cooperating mechanism was therefore set up. The Government of 
India requested the Consul-General and the SMC to render Smith all 
possible assistance in the matter of supervising the activities of Indian 
nationalists. In turn, Smith’s findings would also be shared with these 
authorities.610 
The Government of India understood that it was far from 
sufficient to simply keep its eyes on Shanghai to keep the continuing 
influx of nationalists at bay. In February 1927, it asked the ambassador 
and British consuls in the United States to use every effort to obtain 
and communicate promptly with the Government of India and the SMP 
any information on the departure to Shanghai of prominent Indians.611 
Furthermore, with the help of the British Embassy, the Government of 
India set up the efficient censorship of telegrams and postal matter 
from America, addressed to Indians in Shanghai.612 
In addition to the United States, nationalists and seditious 
publications also came to Shanghai from India. To intercept these 
elements, the Government of India approached the authorities in Hong 
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Kong and Singapore, as the two colonies that played essential roles for 
Indians travelling between Shanghai and India. Cooperation from these 
two colonies was soon offered as Hong Kong and Singapore agreed to 
establish the censorship of telegrams and postal matter addressed to 
Indians in Shanghai. The information the Government of India 
obtained from Shanghai and the U.S. would be forwarded to Hong 
Kong and Singapore to facilitate their interception of nationalists on 
their way to or from Shanghai.613  
In early 1927, a surveillance network that connected Shanghai 
with India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States took shape. 
Information about the movement of Indian nationalists and seditious 
publications in these places had been shared between them. It was 
under the auspices of this network that the SMP was well prepared for 
the conspiracy in 1927. Even before most Ghadarites, whether they 
were coming from Hong Kong, India, or San Francisco, landed in 
Shanghai, their movements had been tracked. After their arrival, the 
locations of their accommodation as well as the contacts made and 
meetings they had with various persons all occurred under the close 
watch of the SMP.614  
In the case of Buddha Singh, the SMP had long had information 
of a possible assassination. As a precautionary measure, Buddha Singh 
had been requested by British officials not to go out without a trusty 
bodyguard from early 1927 onwards. The assassination on the morning 
of 6 April 1927 was not the failure of that surveillance network, but of 																																																								
613 FO 371/12470, From W. Daurawn to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, Feb. 12, 1927, 15-16. 
614 Shanghai Municipal Police Files (SMPF), D8/8, “Indian Sedition,” June 17, 1920.  
	 192	
the carelessness of Buddha Singh himself, as he did not take his 
bodyguards with him that morning.615 The prompt reaction of the SMC 
immediately following the incident and the arrests of most conspirators 
demonstrated how strong the surveillance network had become. 
 
Conclusion 
After the 1927 crackdown, important Ghadar figures were either 
deported or fled from Shanghai. It was not until the 1930s that the 
Ghadar Party resumed its activities there.616 Nevertheless, they never 
managed to restore the influence they had once exerted on Shanghai’s 
Sikh community in the 1920s.617  
This declining influence may be attributed to two factors. On the 
one hand, the SMP set up an Indian section in the Special Branch that 
was specifically responsible for checking subversive political activities. 
This move, together with the strengthening of the surveillance network, 
made the infiltration of the Ghadarites into Shanghai more and more 
difficult. On the other hand, the SMC set out to increase the payment 
of its Sikh policemen, watchmen, and warders.618 And a retirement 
bonus and free rations of food were provided to the Sikh branch.619 
With such benefits, the SMC successfully appeased most Sikhs and 																																																								
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therefore blocked the channel for Ghadar propaganda and recruitment. 
In this sense, the assassination of Buddha Singh marked both the 
climax and the end of a decade-long Ghadar conspiracy in Shanghai.  
Ironically, this episode, with its dramatic events and panorama, 
has drawn very limited attention from scholars of modern Chinese 
history. For practitioners of the field, the 1920s was the age when the 
Soviet-style mass-mobilization regimes were established, and the 
blossoming modernity in some big cities such as Shanghai and 
Chengdu and the still dominant popular cultures in rural China 
coexisted, as did the desire for Western modernity and the nostalgia for 
Chinese tradition. In sum, most enquiries are confined within the 
specific realm of the Chinese nation-state to discuss issues such as how 
the Chinese people at that time attempted to safeguard the Chinese 
nation, and how this age transformed the Chinese nation. It has been 
admitted that foreign elements (Western elements primarily, and 
sometimes Japanese elements) are frequently referred to in writings on 
modern Chinese history. Nevertheless, the interest of practitioners in 
these elements depends on how the elements came to influence the 
eventful course of Chinese national history. For those that played a 
seemingly minimal role in national history, practitioners tend to play 
down if not neglect them.620  
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Since the Ghadar movement in Shanghai was neither a part of the 
Chinese tradition nor a representation of Western modernity, nor did it 
play any substantial role in Chinese national history, its story has little 
meaning, if any, to practitioners working from the perspective of 
national history. Nevertheless, this episode bears some significance 
when we come to observe and interpret it from a translocal angle. To 
rethink Chinese national history from this alternative perspective, its 
monopoly status in the study of modern Chinese history must be called 
into question. 
A statement published by the Ghadar Party in San Francisco on 
17 February 1927 claimed: 
“British imperialism is the common enemy of China 
and India. The Chinese people are struggling to free 
themselves from this imperialism. It is in the interest of 
humanity at large that British imperialism must be 
destroyed at all costs. Therefore, be it resolved, that we, 
the Hindustan Ghadar Party sympathize with, and endorse, 
in its entirety, the national program adopted by the Kuo 
Min Tang [Goumindang] Party of China. We disclaim and 
disapprove of any and all acts of brutality committed by 
the Indians, in the British service, brought to China under 
brute force, to hinder in any way, shape or form the 
movement for the national freedom of China”.621 
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To keep its promise of support for the Chinese nationalist movement, 
the Ghadar Party indeed had mobilized its network in Asia and North 
America to transport cadres as well as propagandist publications to 
China to fuel anti-British activities from 1926 onwards. The network 
that the Ghadar Party employed was actually based on the network of 
the Sikh diaspora that could be traced back to the 1900s when Sikh 
policemen and watchmen in China flocked to North America after 
hearing of the prosperous opportunities there. This shows how the 
Chinese nationalist revolution in the 1920s was related to the Sikh 
diaspora and the Indian nationalist movement. Here, the history of the 
Chinese nationalist revolution appears not merely as a part of Chinese 
national history, but also as a part of Indian history or global history. In 
this sense, it seems that the exclusive nature of national history has 
posed some obstacles preventing scholars from further exploring 
certain cosmopolitan features of modern Chinese history. This research 
based on a local event, but highlighting translocal connections such as 
the Sikh diaspora, the Ghadar movement, and the British surveillance 
network, therefore tries to make an effort to contextualize modern 




A Lone Islet or A Center of Communications? 
Shanghai Sikhs and The Indian National Army 
 
Owing to the surveillance measures imposed by the British authorities, 
Indian revolutionaries failed to reorganize their anti-British activities in 
Shanghai after the 1927 crackdown. This situation totally changed after the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. As the British hegemony collapsed in 
Southeast and East Asia, Indian nationalist movement quickly revived in this 
region. Amongst all revolutionary organizations, the Indian National Army 
(INA) became the most influential one. By mining sources from the Japanese-
occupied period collection of the SMA and relating them to the extant INA 
documents, this chapter attempts to elucidate Shanghai’s position in the INA 
movement. It argues that although Shanghai has long been regarded as the 
lone islet during the Japanese occupied period from the perspective of the 
Allied forces, it was one of the key centers of communications for the INA. 
Furthermore, this chapter contends that the INA drew on the Japanese-initiated 
military highway and the Indian diasporic networks to carry out its 
propaganda, recruiting, and training work in Shanghai. Meanwhile, 
Shanghai’s Sikh community contributed a great deal of money and manpower 
to the cause of the INA. By putting the wartime experience of the Sikhs in 
Shanghai in the context of the INA movement, this chapter not only sheds 
lights on the mobilization mechanism of the INA, but also opens a new 
window for observing Shanghai’s history during the Pacific War.  
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The Birth of the INA and the Unification of Shanghai Sikhs 
The subversive activities of the Ghadar Party in Shanghai and the murder 
of Buddha Singh convinced the SMC that they should work hard to cooperate 
with British authorities around the world to check the flow and activities of 
Indian revolutionaries. In May 1927, an Indian section was established in the 
Special Branch of the SMP. This section was responsible for three sorts of 
duties. First, it collected personal information of all suspected Indian radicals 
in Shanghai. Second, it investigated political activities of local Indians. Third, 
it analyzed documents and files of Indian passengers who tried to visit 
Shanghai. Through these efforts, the Indian section had collected the 
biographies of 250 revolutionaries, 120 sympathizers, and 3, 500 Indian 
residents in Shanghai by 1935.622 Thanks to the cooperation between the SMP 
and the British Consul-General at Shanghai, the photographs, particulars, and 
even information of parents of Indians who applied for passports to visit 
Shanghai were all transferred to the Indian section for screening.623 Ships that 
took Indian passengers from North America to Shanghai were frequently 
checked by the Indian section.624 In so doing, neither revolutionaries nor 
seditious publications and weapons could be easily transported to Shanghai 
from 1928 onwards.  
For revolutionaries who stayed in Shanghai, their situation was also 
pessimistic. After the 1927 crackdown, those who escaped the arrest 
reorganized their struggle and had their base in the gurdwara of North Sichuan 
Road. However, this gurdwara was kept under the surveillance of the Indian 
section. Two Sikh members of the Indian section were instructed to attend all 																																																								
622 SMPF, D8/8, “From D.C. Special Branch to D.S.I. Golder,” 27 Feb. 1936.  
623 SMPF, D8/8, “Indian Sedition,” 17 Feb. 1929. 
624 SMPF, D8/8, “Enquires concerning Indians by Special Branch,” 27 Feb. 1936. 
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meetings from time to time held therein for the purpose of reporting, in their 
own vernacular, the speeches delivered. This procedure resulted in the arrest 
of five individuals named Ishar Singh, Indar Singh, Narain Singh, Asa Singh, 
and Hukam Singh, who for a long time had been a thorn in the eyes of British 
authorities in Shanghai. They were all sentenced on 20 May 1929, to varying 
terms of imprisonment and deportation to India.625  
By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, Indian revolutionaries were unable 
to reach Shanghai, nor did their comrades in Shanghai can carry on the 
struggle. The SMP reported that actual sedition amongst Indians did not exist 
after 1929.626 In this sense, Shanghai became a lone islet for the Indian 
nationalist movement between 1929 and 1941.  
Instead of Shanghai, Bangkok had become the new base for Indian 
nationalists overseas in the 1930s and early 1940s. Radical revolutionaries 
such as Pritam Singh and Amar Singh organized the Indian Independent 
League (IIL) there with the aim of overthrowing British rule in India by 
force. 627  However, owing to the lack of support from the local Indian 
community, the strength of the IIL was limited.628  
While the IIL was looking for outside help, the Japanese government was 
also hatching a plan to ally itself with the Indian nationalists in order to 
weaken the position of the British in Asia.629 In October 1941, a Japanese 
intelligence agent, Fujiwara Iwaichi, was dispatched to Bangkok to hold talks 																																																								
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Movement (Meerut: Prakash Printing Press, 1969), 5-6.  
628 Ibid, 6.  
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with the IIL leaders.  Thanks to the shared anti-British agenda, the two sides 
soon established a cooperative relationship, with the Japanese side promising 
to provide facilities for the IIL to win over Indian soldiers in the British Indian 
Army in Malaya.630 
As the Pacific War broke out in December 1941, the IIL advanced into 
Malaya and Singapore alongside the Japanese army to promote the anti-British 
sentiment among Indian migrants. Meanwhile, the IIL had a plan to organize 
its own military force by employing surrendered or captured Indian soldiers.631 
Their chance came when the Major of the ¼ th Punjab Regiment, Mohan 
Singh, surrendered to the Japanese on 15 December 1941.632 In fact, Mohan 
Singh had long harbored a leaning toward the nationalist cause. After several 
talks with Fujiwara and Pritam Singh, Mohan Singh agreed to lead and 
reorganize Indian Prisoners of War (PoWs) so that he could not only further 
the cause of India’s freedom, but also save the Indians interred in the Japanese 
prison camps. 633  On 31 December 1941, the INA was established in 
Malaya.634  
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Figure 24. Fujiwara Iwaichi and Mohan Singh, 1942 (Courtesy of National Archives of 
Singapore). 
 
Although the INA did not engage in any military action in Malaya and 
Singapore directly, it worked hard to promote anti-British sentiment among 
the soldiers of the British Indian Army and win over their loyalty.635 By the 
time that Singapore was taken by the Japanese in February 1942, the INA had 
around 8, 000 fighters, almost all of whom were Indian PoWs, captured or 
surrendered to the Japanese in the Malaya Campaign and the Battle of 
Singapore.636  
Indian nationalists realized, however, that an army composed of PoWs 
was far from sufficient to conduct a competent campaign against the British in 
India. The independence struggle required a source of legitimacy that must 
come from the support of the people. But this was a huge challenge, given the 
fact that the Indian communities in Southeast and East Asia were so 
diversified and that there existed so many different nationalist organizations. 																																																								
635 Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center Report No. 31, 15 February 1942, in 
Indian National Army: A Documentary Study Vol. 1, 49-55. 
636  W. O. F. 208/810 (Public Record Office, London), in Indian National Army: A 
Documentary Study Vol. 1, 282. 
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The priority then, before confronting the British, was to unify all these diverse 
elements into a coherent order. From March to June 1942, representatives 
from Indian communities in China, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, 
Indo-China, and the Dutch East Indies were gathered in Tokyo and Bangkok 
to discuss coordination. Finally, all parties agreed to be affiliated with the IIL 
and its military wing, the INA.637  
To expand the influence and to mobilize all available sources, the IIL 
asked local communities to set up branches. Twelve territorial branches were 
identified, namely Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Borneo, 
Hong Kong, Shanghai, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, and the Andaman Islands. 
Each branch was asked to elect a territorial committee that took charge of 
local affairs. Selected members of the territorial committee formed the 
Committee of Representatives, which was responsible for making the general 
policy and program of the IIL. In so doing, almost all Indian communities in 
territories under Japanese control had been integrated into the INA network.638 
Indian migrants across Asia donated large amounts of money to Bangkok (the 
headquarters of the IIL) for the nationalist cause. Many even went to Rangoon 
(the advanced headquarters of the INA) to join the INA. Meanwhile, 
representatives of the IIL and INA were also dispatched to branches to instruct 
and supervise the local propaganda and mobilization work.639 
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The Sikhs in Shanghai were not exempted from the influence of this 
movement. Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese 
had taken over the International Settlement in Shanghai. The Sikhs were not at 
first much affected by this change of the regime as Sikh policemen and 
watchmen in the SMP maintained their usual duties.640 Nevertheless, as the 
INA had gained momentum and become the de-facto representative of Indians 
overseas with the support of the Japanese, the Sikhs in Shanghai were faced 
with this internal tensions.  
The Sikh community in Shanghai was far from being a unified one. In 
fact, divisions between Sikh police officers and common constables, and 
between Majha Sikhs and Malwa Sikhs had long existed. Since the 1930s, the 
Sikh branch of the SMP had had its own committee, which was composed of 
thirty-three Sikh police officers. This Sikh Committee was authorized to take 
care of all public issues for the welfare of Sikhs and to manage a fund of the 
gurdwara in Gordon Road for disabled and impecunious Sikhs who had no 
means of subsistence. However, Sikh constables had long been uneasy about 
the way the Sikh Committee had been using these funds. They blamed officers 
in the Sikh Committee for misusing the funds to please the British without 
consulting all members of the Sikh community. Furthermore, most constables 
considered themselves to be more pro-nationalist while the officers were 
thought to be lackeys of the British.641  
The dispute between Sikh constables and officers was fueled when the 
INA movement initiated its influence in Shanghai. From 28 to 30 March 1942, 																																																								
640 Robert Bickers, “Settlers and Diplomats: The End of British Hegemony in the International 
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Indian nationalists held a conference in Tokyo for formalizing the structure, 
aim, and strategies of the INA. It was then resolved that the INA should obtain 
the full support and cooperation of Indians across Asia and that Indians 
overseas should support the Japanese in the War.642 The resolution of the 
Tokyo Conference was brought back from Tokyo to Shanghai by a nationalist, 
Hari Singh Osman, who was met with an enthusiastic response from local 
Sikhs. 643  In early April 1942, a group of Sikh constables appealed to 
contribute a part of the gurdwara fund for the Japanese War Fund.644 This 
request, however, had been firmly rejected by officers of the Sikh Committee. 
Instead, the officers urged local Sikhs not to give any money to the Japanese 
War Fund because they thought that the Japanese were not doing any good 
from it for the Indian community.645 Dissatisfied with the officers’ handling of 
the funds, the Sikh constables pressed for a reorganization of the Sikh 
Committee by adding extra thirty-three constables in May 1942. Under the 
pressure of the Japanese authorities, Sikh officers yielded to this demand.646  
While the constables had now seized power of the Sikh Committee, a 
consensus on how to protect the welfare of Shanghai’s Sikh population during 
the War was still hard to reach, owing to the long-existing factional divide 
between Majha and Malwa Sikhs. Previous chapters have showed that the two 
sides frequently clashed with one another. They did not even share the 																																																								
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gurdwara, but maintained their own respective ones. 647 However, both sides 
felt the necessity of unification when they found that the Sikhs were 
marginalized in the INA movement. 
As the INA movement’s influence was spreading across Shanghai’s 
Indian population in early 1942, Jalal Rahman, a Shanghai-based Indian 
nationalist and chairman of the Indian National Association, was appointed as 
the chairman of the IIL’s Shanghai branch.648 When Rahman and other Indian 
representatives across Asia were invited to attend the Bangkok Conference in 
June 1942 to settle the constitutions of the IIL and INA, neither did he bring 
any local Sikhs with him nor consult any Shanghai Sikhs for their opinions. 
This move deeply frustrated the Sikhs as they realized that no one would pay 
any heed to their hardship until they were united with one strong voice.649   
The Malwa Sikhs were the first to act. On 14 June 1942, the Malwa Sikhs 
organized a meeting in their gurdwara in the Mandley Road. Most attendants 
agreed that the Pacific War had given Indians a golden opportunity to gain 
their freedom from the British. However, the division between Malwa and 
Majha Sikhs prevented them from playing a larger role in the independence 
struggle, even though Sikhs were born soldiers. The Malwa Sikhs finally 
resolved that they must compromise with the Majha Sikhs. A joint committee 
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that would speak for all Sikhs in Shanghai should be formed with equal 
numbers of representatives from both sides.650 The Majha Sikhs responded to 
this call of reconciliation with enthusiasm. A meeting of the Majha Sikhs in 
July 1942 seconded the plan to cooperate with the Malwa Sikhs.651 The two 
sides acknowledged that the priority for the Sikhs in Shanghai was to find 
ways to address the wartime difficulties and to contribute to India’s 
liberation.652 On 22 August 1942, almost five hundred Indian inhabitants 
attended a conference that resolved to put all Indian organizations in Shanghai 
under the instruction of the IIL and INA.653 
 
The INA in Crisis and the Hardship of Shanghai Sikhs 
Just as the Sikhs in Shanghai were preparing to do their part for the 
independence struggle, the INA fell into a crisis. At the Bangkok Conference 
in June 1942, Rash Behari Bose was elected as the president of the IIL and 
Mohan Singh was appointed as the commander of the INA.654 Rash Behari 
Bose was born in Bengal in 1886. He had taken part in the conspiracy against 
the British in the Punjab during World War I. When the conspiracy fell apart, 
he fled to Japan and became one of the most prominent Indian nationalists 
there. It was believed that he maintained intimate relationship with the 
Japanese government. 655  This connection, however, destroyed the trust 
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between Rash Behari Bose and Mohan Singh. Since the INA had been formed, 
Mohan Singh had harbored a suspicious attitude toward the sincerity of the 
Japanese government. He doubted that the Japanese wholeheartedly supported 
Indian independence, but believed instead that Japanese were just using the 
INA for propaganda and espionage purposes.656 Rash Behari Bose, in the eyes 
of Mohan Singh, was merely a puppet of the Japanese.657 This perception had 
been strengthened when the Japanese turned down Mohan Singh’s request to 
expand the INA and refused to recognize the INA as a Japanese allied army 
with equal status.658 Convinced that the Japanese were exploiting him and the 
INA, Mohan Singh drafted a plan to dissolve the INA in December 1942.659 
The open break between Mohan Singh and Rash Behari Bose and the former’s 
denunciation against the Japanese eventually gave rise to his arrest by the 
Japanese on 29 December 1942.660     
The rivalry greatly weakened the INA’s legitimacy and marred the 
morale of its soldiers.661 By February 1943, there remained just 8, 000 soldiers 
in the INA compared to the 45, 000-strong during Mohan Singh’s time.662 
Furthermore, many local branches of the IIL and INA, including the one in 
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Shanghai, lost their leadership and support in early 1943.663 At the same time, 
the Japanese army suffered heavy losses, firstly on the Midway Island, and 
then in Guadalcanal. The deteriorating military situation diverted Tokyo’s 
attention from Indian affairs. The loss of the Japanese support and the division 
of the INA shattered the livelihoods of the Sikh communities in Shanghai.  
Hyperinflation hit Shanghai by the end of 1942 when the Japanese 
confiscated most foodstuffs and fuels for military use.664 From 1942 to 1943, 
the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) in Shanghai increased by more than three 
times. 665  In early 1943, rationing had been imposed on all Shanghai 
inhabitants to alleviate the shortage of materials.666 It was stipulated that each 
Indian in Shanghai could only purchase twenty pounds of flour each month.667 
Not only was the amount of the staple not sufficient for an adult to live on for 
a month, but the flour was also set at an extremely high price, almost $2 per 
pound in 1943.668 To buy sufficient ration of flour, an Indian had to spend at 
least $40. Given the fact that the allowance in lieu of rations for one Sikh 
policeman was a mere $30 ($60 for married men) per month, many Sikhs 
suffered greatly.669 It was not until July 1943 when Subhas Chandra Bose 
arrived in Asia and the INA movement regained its momentum that the 
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allowance for Shanghai’s Sikh policemen was increased to $300 ($600 for 
married) per month.670 
 
Subhas Chandra Bose and the Total Mobilization 
In a talk with the Japanese agent Fujiwara Iwaichi in December 1941, 
Mohan Singh expressed great respect for an Indian nationalist called Subhas 
Chandra Bose. He believed that all Indians in Southeast and East Asia would 
unanimously place themselves under the leadership of Bose if he were to lead 
the INA.671 At the Bangkok Conference of June 1942, all representatives 
agreed that Bose should be invited to lead the INA and requested the Japanese 
to bring him to Southeast Asia.672  
Subhas Chandra Bose was born into a rich Bengali family in Cuttack, 
Orissa in 1897. In the 1920s, he became an active member of the Indian 
National Congress (INC) by participating in the civil disobedience 
movement. 673  His personal charisma, dedication to the cause, and 
determination earned him great fame.674 Gradually, he began to embrace the 
radical strategy for India’s independence--to confront the British Raj with 
violence.675 
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As the Gandhian movement reached a point of stagnation in the late 
1930s, Bose was elected as the president of the INC in 1938. At this time, he 
had already begun to regard fascism as the cure for India’s independence and a 
path for later development.676 After the outbreak of World War II in Europe, 
he further counted on the hope of the liberation with the assistance of the Axis 
power.677 He was arrested in Calcutta in July 1940 under the charges of 
sedition. With the help of his followers, Bose fled to Berlin through Kabul in 
early 1941. In Berlin, however, he was disappointed that Hitler did not want to 
contribute much to the struggle of India.678 Instead, Japan, frustrated over the 
factionalism of the INA, was desperately looking for someone who could 
reunite Indians in Southeast and East Asia. Bose was the perfect answer.679  
After several rounds of discussions, all sides agreed to transport Bose 
from Germany to Japan in early 1943. In February 1943, Bose boarded a 
German submarine and sailed to Madagascar where he was transferred to a 
Japanese submarine. The submarine took Bose to Sabang Island, North 
Sumatra before he left for Tokyo by aircraft in May 1943.680   
After successfully securing the commitment of all-out aid to the Indian 
independence movement from the Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo in 
Tokyo, Bose moved to Singapore in July 1943 to take over the leadership of 
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the IIL and INA.681 While he was still in Tokyo, Bose had stressed that the 
freedom of India could only be earned through sacrifice and that to achieve 
that goal all Indians should actively participate in the war against the 
British.682 In Singapore, he again called upon Indians overseas to put in their 
maximum effort. In order to legitimize the movement and coordinate support, 
Bose decided to set up the Provisional Government of Free India (Azad 
Hind). 683  Through the mechanism of the Azad Hind, Bose intended to 
mobilize all available resources, including money and manpower, of Indians 
living in Southeast and East Asia for the fight against the Raj. In his own 
words, it was a “total mobilization for a total war”.684 
 
Figure 25. Subhas Chandra Bose inspecting the INA soldiers in Singapore, 1943 (Courtesy of 
National Archives of Singapore). 
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To fully implement the mobilization policy, the Azad Hind government 
reactivated the Indian diasporic network that had previously been used by 
various kinds of migrants and revolutionaries. By early 1944, a network based 
on the flow of mobilization strategies, recruits, donated materials, and training 
institutes had been formed in Southeast and East Asia.  
Since August 1943, local officers of the IIL branches had been 
summoned to Singapore to learn about the mobilization strategies. They were 
told to seize every opportunity to organize mass gatherings, whether these be 
birthdays of certain national heroes or anniversaries of some political events, 
so as to promulgate the aims and ideologies of the Azad Hind government. In 
Hong Kong, meetings to celebrate the Baisakhi Festival, Azad Hind Day, the 
Commencement of the First Fight of the INA, and Netaji Week were launched 
consecutively from February to July 1944. All local Indians were required to 
attend these events as nationalist leaflets were distributed and patriotic 
speeches were delivered.685 The Azad Hind Day and Netaji Week celebrations 
were also held in Saigon where thousand of Indians living in southern 
Vietnam attended.686 In Rangoon, Indian inhabitants were called out by the IIL 
branch to celebrate the independence of Burma and were encouraged to 
struggle for the independence of India.687 Almost all Indians in Bangkok were 
rallied to pay their respects to the national flag of the Azad Hind government 
in October 1943.688 
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Figure 26. Mass gathering initiated by the INA in Singapore, 1944 (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
The efforts of this mobilization gradually bore fruit as donations flooded 
in for the Azad Hind government. For example, Indians in Saigon contributed 
2, 500, 000 rupees to the INA in November 1943. 689  In Malacca, the 
contribution reached more than 360, 000 yen,690 and the Manila branch of the 
IIL collected 100, 000 pesos among Indians in the Philippines.691  
In addition to collecting funding, the priority of the mobilization project 
was to strengthen the INA. In other words, Bose needed to recruit more 
soldiers. To achieve this goal, the Department of Recruitment was set up to 
recruit Indians in Southeast and East Asia in a systematic way. The chairman 
of each IIL branch was automatically appointed as the recruiting officer of his 
own area. Recruiting officers were encouraged to enlist all able-bodied men 
into the unit. There was even no age-restriction for recruits applying for 																																																								
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enlistment. To systemize the recruitment, all applicants were registered and 
medically checked. The particulars of the recruits were also required to be 
forwarded to the headquarters of the INA for the total coordination of 
manpower.692 The newly recruited civilians, however, needed to be trained 
before formally being enlisted into the army. The Department of Training was 
thereby established to provide military training for recruits.693   
Between late 1943 and early 1944, INA training schools and camps 
sprang up in Rangoon (Goashala Training School), Kuala Lumpur (Bharat 
Youth’s Training Centre), Bangkok (Bangkok Training School), Shanghai 
(Shanghai Training School) and some other Asian cities. INA instructors who 
received advanced training in the Azad School in Singapore were dispatched 
to local branches to take charge of the training. After three months of intensive 
training, recruits were transported to the front in the borderland between 
Burma and India.694 
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Figure 27. The INA training school (Azad School) in Singapore, 1944 (Courtesy of National 
Archives of Singapore). 
 
The Mobilization of the Sikhs in Shanghai 
In November 1943, Bose paid a visit to China at the invitation of the 
president of the Republic of China (the so-called Nanjing Puppet Regime by 
the GMD wartime government in Chongqing), Wang Jingwei. In Nanjing and 
Shanghai, he met leaders of the Nanjing regime, broadcasted propaganda to 
Chongqing, made speeches to the Indians living in China, and visited an INA 
camp.695 Addressing the Sikh community in Shanghai, Bose encouraged them 
to make use of Shanghai’s position as the nerve center of communications in 
Asia and to work hard for Indian independence.696 
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From the perspective of the Allied forces, Shanghai was by no means a 
nerve-center of communications between 1941 and 1945. Links from 
Shanghai to inland China, Europe, and North America were all cut off. 
Nevertheless, this judgment was only one side of the story. From the 
perspective of the Japanese, Shanghai was still closely connected to the sphere 
of the Japanese Empire. Meanwhile, from the perspective of Bose, Shanghai 
was a crucial site for the mobilization project of the Azad Hind government 
that rode on the Indian diasporic network in Southeast and East Asia. 
Since the very beginning of the total mobilization, the flow of the 
mobilization strategies, the recruits, and the training institutes in the network 
had greatly influenced Shanghai’s Sikh community. In July 1943, the 
chairman of the IIL’s Shanghai branch visited Singapore to study how to 
mobilize the population.697 Mass meetings had been frequently launched since 
then. In January 1944, Indians in Shanghai were required to attend a ceremony 
for the birthday of Subhas Chandra Bose. The heroic deeds of Bose had been 
read to the public and a call for contribution to the INA had also been made.698 
When the INA helped the Japanese army capture Imphal in April 1944, a rally 
was organized to celebrate this victory. Anti-British slogans were shouted and 
the bravery of INA soldiers was retold.699 Furthermore, to demonstrate the 
military strength of the independence movement, local INA recruits often 
paraded 200-300 strong and fully armed through the main streets of Shanghai. 
Indian residents were ordered to stand alongside the streets to cheer the 
																																																								
697 Office of Strategic Services Record Group 226 (Diet Library, Tokyo), in Indian National 
Army: A Documentary Study Vol. 3, 246. 
698 Ibid, 249.  
699 Ibid, 248.  
	 216	
march.700 One of the most dramatic mobilizations happened on 21 November 
1943 when Bose visited Shanghai. In the afternoon of that day, the whole 
Indian community (amounting to 2, 000 people) in Shanghai assembled in the 
Grand Cinema (one of Shanghai’s largest and best-known cinemas) to 
welcome Bose’s arrival. Attendants were required to sing the anthem of the 
Azad Hind government and to chant slogans supporting Indian independence. 
Bose highly praised the effort made by Indians in Shanghai for the enterprise 
of Indian independence and called for more monetary and manpower 
contributions.701 As a response to the appeal, all Indian nationals in Shanghai 
were required to join the IIL and to be enrolled into the reserve of the INA. 
The IIL branch in Shanghai even ruled that those who failed to register in time 
would be deprived of the right to obtain food rations and to conduct 
business.702  
To train the enrolled civilians into soldiers, a training camp was 
indispensable. In February 1944, a party of ten INA instructors, led by Captain 
Boo Narain, left Singapore for Shanghai. Their task was to establish a training 
camp in Shanghai.703 In fact, the Azad School in Singapore, which was 
responsible for training these instructors, had set a guideline on how to set up 
training schools and how to instruct civilians. The INA training schools in 
Rangoon, Saigon, Bangkok, and Hong Kong all followed the same guidelines. 
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By the time the instructors arrived in Shanghai, the institutional structure and 
training syllabus guidelines had also been introduced.704 
The camp was opened in Baoshan Road, Zhabei District in June 1944.705 
Captain Narain selected around three hundred people, most of whom were 
dismissed Sikh policemen and watchmen. 706  Rations and uniforms were 
provided to all trainees for free. The training lasted for three months, and in 
the first two months, trainees learned tasks such as digging trenches, wiring, 
and rafting. They were also required to study the geography of the Indo-
Burmese border, where they would be sent after the training was over. Tactics 
such as advance, rear and flank guards, outposts, street fighting, night work, 
and jungle warfare were taught according to the INA textbooks brought from 
Singapore. In the third month, weapon training was introduced. Although 
rifles and machine guns were secured from the Japanese army, not a single 
bullet was distributed to the camp, since trainees were only instructed to be 
familiar with different parts of the rifle and none were ever fired there.707  
 
The End of a Legend 
Ultimately, however, no trainees were taken to the front in the Indo-
Burmese borderland, owing to the lack of available transportation at a time 
when the situation in the War was turning against the Japanese. Since January 
1944, the headquarters of the INA had been moved from Singapore to 																																																								
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Rangoon to prepare for the upcoming planned military campaigns in India.708 
In the spring of 1944, the Japanese Burma Area Army hatched a plan to 
destroy the Allied forces in the city of Imphal, the capital of the state of 
Manipur in northeast India, in order to strengthen the defense of Burma.709 
Almost all INA troops were called to Burma to join hands with the 
Japanese.710 In February 1944, the INA crossed onto Indian soil from the 
Arakan and the Imphal borders. While the attack was initially successful, the 
Japanese and the INA suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Allied air 
forces and were driven back to Burma in May 1944.711 The INA never took 
any subsequent active military action. As the Allied forces made their way 
into Burma in early 1945, the INA troops either surrendered or disbanded. 
Knowing that the Japanese could no longer be counted on, Bose turned to 
the Soviet Union. He assumed that the possible conflict between the Soviet 
Union and Britain after World War II could be utilized to aid India’s 
independence. In May 1945, Bose had already harbored a plan to move all 
INA units to China before ultimately taking them to the Soviet Union. He 
even gave orders to strengthen the INA branch in Shanghai to prepare for the 
coming of his soldiers.712 This scheme, however, was never put into action as 
the Japanese surrendered just months later. 
When Bose heard the news of the Japanese surrender on 16 August 1945, 
he hurried to Saigon from Singapore. The commander of the Japanese army in 
Southeast Asia Hisaichi Terauchi then arranged a plane for Bose to fly to 
																																																								
708 Sisir Bose and Sugata Bose, eds., Chalo Delhi, 172. 
709 Ghosh, The Indian National Army, 166-168. 
710  W.O. 203/803 (Public Record of Office, London), in Indian National Army: A 
Documentary Study Vol. 3, 79-84. 
711 Pandit, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, 261-292. 
712 Lebra, Jungle Alliance, 194. 
	 219	
Dalian, Manchuria, where Bose could establish contact with the Russians. Due 
to the failure of the engine, the plane crashed in Taipei on 18 August 1945. 
Bose was seriously injured and died in hospital later that day.713   
The sudden death of Bose marked the end of the INA movement. INA 
officers in Shanghai were arrested by the Chinese authorities.714 In the court, 
they were accused of collaborating with the Japanese, making pro-Japanese 
speeches in public, and using their positions to extort money from their fellow 
Indians in Shanghai. Three ex-SMP Sikh police officers were also brought to 
the court to give their testimonies of how they were framed and prosecuted by 
these collaborators. However, all accused refused to plea guilty and insisted 
that their collaboration with the Japanese was not against the Chinese but for 
the national liberation of India.715 They were then repatriated to India as war 
criminals and detained in the Red Fort, Delhi. However, due to great pressure 
from the Indian public who saw the INA fighters as national heroes, the 
Government of India released all detainees on the eve of India’s 
independence.716  
The lives of ordinary Sikh residents did not improve much after the War. 
Since the SMC had ceased to exist, the Sikhs, who were mostly employed by 
the SMC as policemen and watchmen, lost their jobs. The rising Chinese 
nationalism further blocked any prospect of securing a job, as employers no 
longer dared to employ foreign policemen and watchmen on Chinese 
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territory.717 The hardships that the Sikh community faced in Shanghai even 
drew the attention of the Government of India. Lacking a better solution to 
address this issue, the Government of India decided to repatriate these Indian 
nationals. By the end of 1946, almost all Sikhs in Shanghai had left for India. 
The legend of the Sikhs of Shanghai had come to an end.718  
 
Conclusion 
In 1884, the International Settlement of Shanghai was under danger as 
anti-foreign sentiment had been inflamed by the Sino-French War. The SMC 
made the decision to employ some forty Sikhs to strengthen its police force. 
This was arguably the commencement of the Sikh existence in Shanghai.719 In 
the first decade of the twentieth century, influenced by the fever of migrations 
to North America, many Sikhs left Shanghai to pursue their dream on the 
other side of the Pacific. During World War I, the North America-based 
Ghadar Party infiltrated the Sikh community in Shanghai and used Shanghai 
as the transferring center for its revolutionary activities. In the 1920s, a 
remarkable number of Shanghai Sikhs were involved in the Chinese 
nationalist revolution. During the Pacific War, the INA movement gradually 
militarized the entire Sikh community in Shanghai in support of the Japanese 
occupation forces. 
Previous studies tend to take the Sikh experience in Shanghai as a local 
story.720 As is shown above, however, the local community was constantly 
influenced by and participated in what was happening in the outside world. 																																																								
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This interconnection sheds light on the mechanism of the Indian diasporic 
network. This network had not only been employed by the migrants for 
pursuing a better livelihood, but had also been utilized by nationalists and 
revolutionaries in their struggle for the independence of their motherland. 
Nevertheless, current scholarship of the INA rarely takes the diasporic 
network into account.  
To date, there exist a rich body of literature on the INA. In addition to 
memoirs written by ex-INA members, historians have brought out a large 
number of publications on the INA’S history.721 Topics such as the origin of 
the INA, the trajectory of its development, its reorganization presided by 
Subhas Chandra Bose, its campaigns in Burma, and the ultimate trial in the 
Red Fort have all been well studied. Furthermore, scholars have long tried to 
figure out the effect and nature of the INA. Although no one doubts that the 
military effect of the INA was not impressive, some practitioners contend that 
the INA has left a significant legacy on the post-independence India.722 For the 
nature of this movement, some insist that the INA was purely a product of a 
rising nationalism among Indian population overseas, while others incline 
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toward highlighting the role that the Japanese played in the course of the 
movement.723  
Whether or not Indians joined the INA voluntarily, more than 40, 000 
soldiers were in the INA force at its peak.724 Furthermore, training camps were 
established in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai when 
hundreds of thousands of civilians were put into barracks.725 Given the 
diversified backgrounds of the various Indian communities in this area and 
their geographical separateness, it seems unlikely for the INA to have 
coordinated so many different elements and to have appropriated them into 
one unified agenda. Through what means, then, could such a large-scale 
mobilization have been achieved? As this chapter shows, it was the Sikh 
diasporic network that facilitated the mobilization work of the INA in 
Shanghai. It further illustrates how the flow of ideas, INA officers, and 
training institutes in Southeast and East Asia transformed the lives of 
Shanghai Sikhs during the War. 
The existence of the INA in wartime Shanghai also opens up a new 
window for us to understand Shanghai’s history as a whole. Since the 
Japanese troops occupied most parts of Shanghai in November 1937, this 
metropolis, and the French concession and the International Settlement in 
particular, had been described as the “lone islet” (Gudao).726 This term implies 
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that Shanghai, then the economic, political, and cultural center of China, had 
been left behind and cut off from other parts of the country and the outside 
world. Yet, as Poshek Fu points out, the rhetorical use of the term “lone islet” 
by contemporaries might have been a means to shield the Shanghai inhabitants 
from any accusations of having collaborated with the Japanese.727 Shanghai 
was by no means a “lone islet” as capital, smuggled commodities, refugees, 
and intelligence agents continued to flow in and out of the city between 1938 
and 1941.728 As Japan took over the International Settlement in December 
1941, however, the situation deteriorated dramatically. The outbreak of the 
Pacific War blocked most traffic to and from Shanghai. Foreign residents were 
either detained in prisons or flocked into refugee camps.729 Supplies and their 
sources had been confiscated for military use. The shortage of fuel, food, and 
commodities became a daily experience.730 To date, most scholars agree that 
Shanghai suffered a very dark and isolated period from the end of 1941 to 
August 1945.731 Relevant studies have explored how the condition of isolation 
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and the political and economic hardship reshaped the landscape of Shanghai 
and the mentality of its inhabitants.732 
This chapter demonstrates that this experience of isolation is just one 
aspect of the history. Whereas Shanghai had been detached from the Anglo-
American oriented network since the end of 1941, it had been relocated into 
the Japanese imperial network by early 1942. Connections between Shanghai 
and Japan had never stopped. Old links between Shanghai and Southeast Asia 
had been revived in order to facilitate the flow of materials and manpower for 
Japan’s war effort.733 Extracted sources from remote parts of China were 
transported to Japan through the port of Shanghai.734 Japanese soldiers were 
taken there before furthering their march to other parts of China. Veterans who 
had rich experience in the battlefields of China were called back to Shanghai 
before being dispatched to the Pacific islands or Burma.735 In this sense, our 
previous understanding of Shanghai as a fortified prison during the Pacific 
War is only partly correct. From the perspective of the contemporary Japanese, 
Shanghai was still well connected with the outside world, and so did the INA.  																																																								
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Historians nowadays are accustomed to taking the victors’ perspective to 
interpret the past.736 So it was therefore generally accepted that Shanghai was 
rightly described as a lone islet, even if its communications with Tokyo, 
Saigon, Singapore, Bangkok, and Rangoon had never stopped during the War. 
From the perspectives of the Japanese and the INA, however, this story might 
be told in quite another way.  
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Conclusion 
Circulation, Networks, and Subalterns in Global History 
 
In the mystery/thriller film Shanghai (2010), directed by Mikael 
Hafstriom, an American agent comes to Shanghai in October 1941 to 
investigate the death of one of his friends. When the American lands on the 
Bund, the footage shows some turbaned Sikh policemen on the street, while 
the subtitle at that moment describes Shanghai as a city full of Chinese, 
British, French, Japanese, and American residents. The figures of the Sikh 
policemen appear in that film for only two or three seconds, without any lines. 
They stand far away in the background and act as part of the voiceless 
landscape. Indeed, countless literary, historical, and video productions about 
modern Shanghai nowadays have some turbaned Sikhs in their backdrops, an 
effort to make their depictions of Shanghai closer to the historical reality.737 
However, with a few exceptions, most productions, like Mikael Hafstriom’s 
film, merely take Sikhs as a colorful part of the exotic Orientalized landscape 
of cosmopolitan Shanghai. This image of Sikhs is widely circulated, while the 
actual history of how they ended up there has rarely been seriously probed.  
The marginalization of the history of the Sikhs in Shanghai sheds light on 
the hegemony of imperial and national historiographies. In the twentieth 
century, imperial history was obsessed with studies that focused on how 
metropoles in Europe transformed the political institutions, socio-economic 
structures, and cultural landscapes of colonies and colonized people. The 
colonized have been viewed as backward, superstitious, and passive subjects 																																																								
737 In this sense, Sikhs were implicitly involved into the locality production process of 
Shanghai, see Appadurai, “The Production of Locality”. 
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that could only be activated by the stimulations from the West. In recent 
decades, however, imperial historians have set out to review this one-way 
impact-response perspective, and explored how the colonies and the colonized 
changed the metropoles politically, socio-economically, and culturally. To 
date, it is widely agreed that colonial empires were mutually constructed. 
Interactions between metropoles and colonies shaped their main features and 
influenced their historical processes. Although this revisionist approach has 
tried to recover the subjectivity of the colonized, the colonized were still 
bound with the metropoles. In Dipesh Chakrabarty’s words, the history of the 
metropole is the master narrative, while the histories of the colonies are 
varieties that are always related to, if not influenced by, the metropole.738 
Interconnections between colonies and colonized have largely been neglected 
in imperial history. For example, the experiences of the colonized, such as the 
figures of Isser Singh and Buddha Singh described in this thesis, cannot be 
appropriated into the metropole-colony framework of imperial history. Even 
though Isser Singh and Buddha Singh were colonized subjects, worked for the 
British authorities, and travelled across the British Empire, their experiences 
were unrelated to the metropole, Britain in this case. Neither did they travel to 
Britain, and nor did their adventures shed light on or influence contemporary 
British society. Instead, the two episodes demonstrate how British colonies 
and settlements in Asia were connected, and how the colonized made use of 
the facilities of the empire to pursue their own interests. 
The topic of the Sikh community in modern Shanghai cannot be confused 
with national history either. As Presenjit Duara points out, the craze for 																																																								
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national historical writing is both the driving force and the consequence of the 
nation-building process. The approach to take history as the exclusive property 
of a certain single community or entity has gradually hegemonized most 
historical writings during the modern era.739 Ranajit Guha further elaborates 
that the national historiography has for a long time been dominated by 
national elites after the decolonization.740 As a result, histories that are viewed 
as useful for the nation-building process and the interests of bourgeois-
nationalist elitism have been appropriated into the national framework with a 
linear and an evolutionary temporality, while those that are unsuitable for 
these agendas have either been distorted, erased, or forgotten.741 Since the 
Sikh migrants in Shanghai were subalterns that had nothing to do with elite 
politics in India and China, their history has largely been distorted and 
forgotten in both countries.  
To transcend the limitations of imperial and national historiographies, 
alternative methodologies have been tried. One solution is to expand the scale 
of the research to the transnational or global level. To date, the “transnational 
turn” can be detected in almost all fields of historical studies. Historians are 
ready to break the metropole-colony binary and the boundaries of nation-states, 
and to demonstrate that histories of different communities are entangled and 
interconnected. This thesis is inspired by these entangled and connected 
histories, and takes the concept of circulation and network as a priority to 
address three aspects of this study, namely Sikh policemen in imperial history, 
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the Sikh diaspora during the colonial period, and the Sikh community in 
modern Shanghai. 
From the aspect of imperial history, this thesis argues that the British 
Empire was not only a bi-linear structure that linked the metropole with 
colonies, but also a global-scale network that facilitated the circulation of 
personnel, institutions, and information among colonies and settlements. It 
was the circulation of publications and colonial officers across the British 
Empire that disseminated the martial race ideology from India to other British 
colonies and settlements from the 1860s onwards. In Southeast and East Asia, 
Hong Kong became the first colony to introduce Sikhs into its police unit. The 
institutions, recruiting patterns, and management rules of Hong Kong’s Sikh 
branch were then imitated by the colonial authorities in Singapore in 1880, 
although Singapore was closer to the metropole geographically. As Shanghai 
was gradually integrated into the British imperial network, information about 
the Sikh police units in Singapore and Hong Kong also flowed to this Chinese 
treaty port and impressed the local authorities. Based on Hong Kong’s model, 
the SMP set out to employ Sikhs in 1884. Interactions between the SMC, 
colonial authorities in Hong Kong and Singapore, and the Government of 
India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries constantly influenced 
the recruitment, accommodation, and training of Sikh policemen in Shanghai. 
In the 1920s, Shanghai became the node of the Indian nationalist movement in 
East Asia. To check Sikh revolutionaries and anti-British publications, the 
SMC joined a surveillance network that connected British authorities in 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India to share intelligence and conduct 
collaborative operations. This cross-boundary collaboration greatly restricted 
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the Indian nationalist movement in East Asia until the outbreak of the Pacific 
War. All the above has illustrated the intra-dynamics among colonies and 
settlements such as India, Hong Kong, and Shanghai played central roles in 
creating and spreading colonial knowledge and institutions.  
The concept of circulation and network has also been employed to 
uncover the process of the Sikh diaspora during the colonial period. Similar as 
imperial history, studies of the Sikh diaspora are obsessed with the 
motherland-settlement binary, a derivative of the center-periphery paradigm. 
This thesis demonstrates that the Sikh diaspora was by no means a linear 
process that only consisted of the starting point and the destinations, but a 
network that connected various overseas settlements and the hometown. 
Modern telecommunications expedited the circulation of information and 
provided Sikh peasants such as Isser Singh with access to updated news about 
working opportunities overseas. With the help of shipping lines that connected 
ports across Asia, Sikh migrants travelled extensively. Modern 
telecommunication and transportation therefore facilitated the formation of a 
Sikh diasporic network. When the information about good pay in Shanghai 
and North America reached Sikh migrants in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the network was then mobilized by Sikhs for their 
emigrations.  
In terms of modern Shanghai history, this thesis transcends the China-
based paradigm and seeks to position Shanghai in the Sikh diasporic network 
and British imperial network. It shows that the SMC had long maintained 
close relationships with British colonies in Asia, Hong Kong in particular. In 
its early years, the SMC took Hong Kong as a model to build its own 
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administrative institutions. Facing encroaching danger during the Sino-French 
War in 1884, the SMC strengthened its police force by establishing a Sikh 
branch, which was modeled on the Sikh branch of the Hong Kong Police. In 
order to recruit qualified Sikh policemen, the SMC engaged in a salary war 
with Hong Kong and Singapore. Thanks to its better pay, Shanghai became 
the favorite for most Sikh migrants by the turn of the twentieth century, and 
thereby harbored one of the largest Sikh communities in East Asia. For this 
reason, the North America-based Ghadar Party used Shanghai as the forward 
base of its anti-British struggle in the 1910s and 1920s. The circulation of 
revolutionaries, seditious publications, weapons, and funding between 
Shanghai and other Asian cities such as Tokyo, Hong Kong, Manila, 
Singapore, and Bangkok shaped the main features of the Ghadar Movement. 
During the Pacific War, the Indian National Army (INA) employed the 
network that connected Shanghai’s Sikh community with those in other Asian 
cities to implement its full mobilization project. INA instructors were 
dispatched to Shanghai to train newly recruited Sikhs, and money collected 
from local Sikh communities was transported to Southeast Asia to support the 
INA’s war effort. 
In the process of examining these aspects, cross-boundary circulation has 
been highlighted. The circulation of the martial race ideology, British colonial 
officers, and Sikh police institutions led to the setting up of the Sikh police 
unit in Shanghai. The circulation of Sikh migrants, information about job 
opportunities, and Sikh social norms contributed to the main features of 
Shanghai’s Sikh community. Again, the circulation of the Ghadar Party 
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members and the INA officers, along with their institutions and ideas, 
inherently changed the living trajectories of many Sikh residents in Shanghai.  
This circulation, however, would not have occurred had there been no 
structure to sustain it. This thesis argues that what made the circulation 
possible was indeed the existence of multilayered networks. The concept of 
the network has long been employed by historians to explain how 
transnational or global interactions occurred in history.742 Nevertheless, many 
studies merely focus on one specific network, such as the oasis network along 
the Silk Road in the first century that facilitated long-distance trade,743 the 
slave trade network that linked Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean in the early 
modern period,744 or the network of Islamic scholars that stretched from the 
Ottoman Empire to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century.745 On the other 
hand, this study illustrates that, in a similar way, one single network, for 
example the Sikh diasporic network, could be used by different agents, such as 
Sikh migrants, the Ghadar Party, and the INA, for their respective purposes. 
Furthermore, different networks might very well have been intertwined. The 
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overlap between the British imperial network and the Sikh diasporic network 
provides an explanation of why the British colonial authorities employed 
Sikhs and why the Sikhs migrated overseas. The challenge posed by the 
network of the Ghadar Party in Southeast and East Asia in the 1910s and 
1920s led to the birth of the British surveillance network. 
The concept of the multilayered network also inspires us to rethink 
connections and circulations among spaces of different scales and types. Many 
practitioners currently prefer to employ the term “transnational” in their 
studies of cross-boundary activities and processes. Nevertheless, this term 
seems inappropriate when explaining the flow of personnel, institutions, and 
information that took place within an empire or among city-states.746 Instead, 
for many cases the translocal approach seems more inclusive and intermediary, 
and could help us better understand and conceptualize connections that are 
neither necessarily national in scale nor necessarily related to national 
affairs.747 For example, the Sikh diasporic network and the British imperial 
network described in this thesis were composed of colonial outposts, treaty 
ports, and cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Hankou, 
Vancouver, San Francesco, Bangkok, and Rangoon. These localities were 
hardly national entities, nor were the networks that connected them 
transnational. The circulation of Sikh police personnel and institutions from 
Hong Kong to Shanghai in the 1880s, the recruitment conduct of the SMP 
agents in the Punjab, and the travelling of Ghadarities from Hankou to 																																																								
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Shanghai to organize anti-British activities were by no means transnational, 
but rather translocal. 
In all of these translocal connections, the protagonists were Sikh peasants 
from the Punjab. In view of their relations with the British, their economic 
conditions, and their social status, it is reasonable to categorize these Sikhs as 
subalterns.748 In fact, one of the main aims of this thesis is to recover the 
subaltern’s position in global history studies. The rise of global history has 
been closely related to the critics of Eurocentrism since the 1970s. Influenced 
by the world system theory, global historians explore the social inequalities 
that structure the circulation of goods, populations, and ideas across the 
globe.749 However, postcolonial practitioners criticize such scholarship for 
overemphasizing the dichotomy of West and East, oppressors and oppressed, 
and developed and developing, while overlooking the complexities of the 
process of circulations.750  
Since the 1990s, global history studies have been greatly diversified as 
gender, environmental, scientific, and medical topics have entered and 
dominated the field.751 The common theme of such scholarship is that human 
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societies were interconnected in the past and will be integrated more closely 
under the influence of the flow of capital and the development of 
technologies.752 Studies of the power distribution and the living conditions of 
lower-class people in the world system, however, are in decline.753 Although 
many practitioners are attentive to networks that connected various human 
societies and facilitated flows, circulations, and movements, few tend to 
elaborate how power was distributed within these networks, who benefited 
from these networks, and who were marginalized. In other words, while 
scholars are rushing to explore global connections, localities and the people 
living there, subalterns in particular, have been left behind.754 In current global 
history studies, subalterns are often viewed as people who lacked of the 
resources to move around, and could only stay in localities to wait for some 
outside forces to connect, influence, and transform them. 755  Global 
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connections are assumed to have materialized at government or elite level,756 
while subalterns, instead, are assumed to have been unable to actively take 
part in and transform cross-boundary or long-distance movements.757   
This thesis, however, shows that localities can be transcended and 
subalterns can be active. Taking advantage of telecommunication and 
transportation facilities across the British Empire, Sikhs made their own 
decisions and chose the destinations of their emigration by the turn of the 
twentieth century. To attract Sikhs to serve in their police forces, authorities in 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai competed with one another and 
frequently adjusted their recruitment policies over time. In these colonies and 
settlements, some Sikhs, such as Buddha Singh, chose to collaborate with the 
British and became a part of the oppressive colonial machine, while others had 
gradually developed a feeling of discontent with the British rule, owing to the 
inferior treatment they received. The network that used to help Sikhs emigrate 
for better economic opportunities was then employed by Ghadar 
revolutionaries, most of whom were Sikh workers in North America, to 
undertake anti-British activities. The movement of the Ghadarities in the 
1910s and 1920s accelerated the integration of the surveillance system across 
the British Empire and beyond. As this thesis shows, subalterns were very 																																																								
756 The cross-boundary travels and cosmopolitan experience of the Indian revolutionaries such 
as Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, Lala Har Dayal, Raja Mahendra Pratap, and Subhas 
Chandra Bose have all been well studied, see Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian 
Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); 
Carolien Stolte, “Enough of the Great Napoleons!”; Henrik Chetan Aspengren, “Indian 
Revolutionaries Abroad,” accessed 10.1353/cch.2014.0045.  
757 Hatton and Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration; Emmer, “European Expansion and 
Migration,” 3-11; Emmer, “Was Migration Beneficial?” 113-115. There is a new trend in 
recent years that pays more attention to lower-class people’s cross-boundary mobility, and 
their roles in shaping world history, Harper, “Singapore, 1915, and the Birth of the Asian 
Underground”; Anand Yang, “China and India Are One: A Subaltern Vision of ‘Hindu China’ 
during the Boxer Expedition of 1900-1901,” in Asia Inside Out: Changing Times, eds., Eric 
Tagliacozzo, Helen Siu, and Peter Perdue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
207-225.  
	 237	
active in participating in the cross-boundary circulations, and sometimes even 
transformed the rules and patterns of these circulations.758  
Furthermore, unlike Subaltern Studies, which tends to emphasize how 
subalterns resisted and defied the elitist dominance,759 this thesis demonstrates 
that the identities of subalterns were multifaceted. Subalterns were neither 
dominated nor independent of the elites; they might have been revolutionaries, 
collaborators, or ordinary migrants without any political appeal. As Edward 
Said points out, once individuals or ideas are on the move, they are exposed to 
unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation. 
Gradually, they would be transformed, bearing some new meanings or 
features that are different from those at the point of origin.760 Through 
travelling from the Punjab to Shanghai, Sikh peasants who were exploited by 
Hindu landlords and British authorities became policemen who were 
responsible for disciplining the urban population. Through travelling from 
Shanghai to Vancouver or San Francesco, law-enforcement agents who were 
the backbone of British superiority in China became vulnerable migrants who 
were bitterly discriminated against by the local white people. When some of 
them returned to Shanghai in the 1910s and 1920s, they became 
revolutionaries who struggled to destroy British hegemony across the globe. 
Above all, the title of this thesis, “Red Turbans on the Bund: Sikh Migrants, 																																																								
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Policemen, and Revolutionaries in Shanghai”, not only refers to the three 
types of Sikh residents in modern Shanghai, but also indicates their ambiguous 
identities in a cosmopolitan city. 
One of my Chinese friends once asked about my research subject. I told 
him that I was studying the Sikhs in Shanghai. “Yes, I know them,” he replied, 
“They were slaves of the British. Indians were not good to us.” In fact, many 
Chinese nowadays hold certain distorted and imaginary grudges against 
Indians, and vice versa. The exclusive nature of national history impedes the 
mutual understanding of people from different countries. In an age of rapid 
globalization, the agenda of national history that overemphasizes the 
particularity of the self-contained entity no longer serves the good of all 
human beings.  
The urgent call of the age and the introspection regarding the approaches 
of imperial and national historiographies leads us to investigate the 
circulations of species, populations, technologies, and ideas across the globe. 
Recent studies have shown that long-distance trade, war, and large-scale 
migration have connected different parts of Eurasia since the onset of the 
Bronze Age.761 With development of modern technologies, this integration 
process has been dramatically accelerated.762 As a result, certain widely 
known local cooking habits, clothing styles, cultural norms, religious rituals, 
and so forth probably have their origins in some other places, sometimes even 
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somewhere on the other side of the world.763 In sum, what we assume to be a 
specific nation’s political, social and cultural history might well be a far more 
complex process, shaped by the circulation of various kinds of cross-boundary 
elements. One specific community’s history is frequently under the influence 
of some outside forces, and is therefore not so exclusive or unique. Taking 
circulation and network as its principal themes, this thesis strongly aims to 
support this historical trend of looking into all that is connected and 
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